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1.1 Motivation  
A good transition between the different stages of education is necessary for an optimal 
investment in and an optimal development of children’s human capital. Children them-
selves and society in general benefit when children optimize their investment in educa-
tion, use their potential to the fullest and smoothly move through the education sys-
tem. This reduces the number of children who have to repeat a grade, switch to a lower 
track or leave school early. It also contributes to a higher educated population. Delays 
and switches in children’s educational career are inefficient and expensive. In general, 
the decisions made concerning children’s transition from primary to secondary educa-
tion are high stakes for all parties involved.  
The transition from primary to secondary education, where children are placed into 
tracks based on their performance and expected ability, is an important educational 
decision. The Dutch education system relies on early tracking. Consequently, the track 
to which children are allocated has important consequences for their future schooling 
career (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006; Inspectorate of Education, 2014; Timmer-
mans et al., 2013). School tracks determine the type (more practical vs. more theoreti-
cal) and the level of education (vocational, general or academic). Children’s track 
placement is an important determinant of their schooling career in secondary school as 
well as their schooling and labour market possibilities after secondary school. 
To determine children’s best suited track placement measures of children’s ability 
level are needed. In the Dutch education system, two measures are used to determine 
children’s ability level and track placement in secondary school. These measures are the 
teacher’s assessment of children’s ability level and a standardized test score. Both 
measures estimate children’s ability level based on different sets of information. A 
teacher can base his assessment of children’s ability, for example, on children’s prior 
performance, classroom behaviour, background information, personality and other 
characteristics known to the teacher. The test score measures how well children per-
form on a cognitive test that assesses their skills in math and language. These measures 
contain noise which makes it difficult to place children in the educational tracks that are 
best suited to their true ability level. 
Developments in the transition from primary to secondary education and tracking 
are part of the national and the international debate on education. Recently there have 
been several policy changes regarding the transition from primary to secondary educa-
tion in the Netherlands. In these policy changes the teacher’s assessment is assigned a 
more prominent role as a determinant of children’s track placement. At the same time 
the role of the standardized test is de-emphasized as a determinant of children’s track 
placement. These policy developments pose interesting questions for research.  
When measured along the lines of the results in international tests, such as the Pro-
gram of International Student Assessment (PISA) and the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), 
the Dutch education system is generally considered as one of the best performing edu-
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cation systems among the OECD-countries. For example, the PISA 2012 results show 
that among the 65 countries that participated, the Netherlands ranked 10th in mathe-
matics, 15th in reading and 14th in science (OECD, 2016). Despite this relatively high rank 
in terms of average outcomes there is a growing concern among policymakers regard-
ing inequality of opportunities and increased rigidity in track placement related to the 
system of extensive early tracking (OECD, 2012; OECD, 2016; Inspectorate of Education, 
2016). 
Both national and international policy advisors and regulators have expressed con-
cerns regarding early tracking. For example, the Dutch Inspectorate of Education (2015) 
stated in its 2014-2015 annual review of the Dutch education system that differences in 
equality of opportunity are increasing and that the education level of children’s parents 
is becoming a more important determinant of children’s education level. Furthermore, 
according to the OECD (2016, p. 40.) “There is a tension between the central principle 
of tracking, that students of given cognitive skills are best suited to a particular type of 
educational programme, and school discretion, in which tracking decisions depend on 
teachers’ advice and cognitive scores that are interpreted on a variable basis”. There 
are no formal guidelines for establishing the teacher’s assessment or track placement. 
Therefore, it is based on variable criteria, such as the differing use of test scores across 
schools for establishing the teacher’s assessment. Furthermore, schools in the Nether-
lands can select students and are free to impose additional selection requirements 
(OECD, 2016; Korpershoek et al., 2016; Inspectorate of Education, 2013). The Dutch 
education council (2010 and 2014) and the OECD (2012) have argued that education 
systems that use extensive early tracking should ensure flexibility so that children are 
offered additional opportunities if changes in their performance occur. However, the 
impression is that these possibilities are diminishing as the possibilities for “bridge clas-
ses” where selection is delayed and “scaffolding diplomas” where students are allowed 
access to a higher level of education after graduating from their initial track, are becom-
ing increasingly difficult.  
Another challenge for the Dutch education system is the underperformance and lack 
of motivation of children a few years after they have been allocated to tracks in second-
ary education. According to the OECD (2016) and the Dutch education council (2007), 
motivation of Dutch children in secondary school is inadequate and there are too few 
top performers, given the overall high standards. Furthermore, in conversations with 
secondary schools it became apparent that various schools experience difficulties with 
children’s performance as of approximately 9th grade. These schools relate children’s 
lower performance to a lack of motivation. They argue that these children should be 
able to perform better, based on their earlier performance in 6th grade, if they were 
more motivated to work harder. When children underperform in school, human capital 
accumulation is not optimal and children could have learned more, possibly even grad-
uate from a higher track and face better prospects if they performed up to their ex-
pected level.  
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In an education system that uses extensive early tracking it is essential to under-
stand the determinants of track placement and their relation to children’s further 
school career. The Dutch education system with its extensive early tracking, offers an 
opportunity to investigate the relation between the teacher’s assessment, the test 
score, track placement, track switching, and other measures of performance such as 
grades and motivation. The relationships that are investigated in this dissertation are 
based on data from the Netherlands, but questions regarding the relation between 
teacher’s assessments, test scores and children’s performance are of universal im-
portance.  
1.2 Aim  
The four studies in this dissertation provide a better understanding of the importance of 
assessment measures of children’s ability level in the transition from primary to sec-
ondary education. Figure 1 gives an overview of the outline of this dissertation. There 
are four topics that represent the core of this dissertation: tests, teacher’s assessments, 
track placement and motivation. The first paper discusses the relation between tests, 
teacher’s assessments and track placement in the transition from primary to secondary 
school. One of the conclusions from this paper is that tests and teacher’s assessments 
are both strong determinants of children’s track placement but that teacher’s assess-
ments have a stronger effect on track placement compared to tests. The second paper 
builds on this conclusion and addresses the question if, and how, teachers adjust their 
own initial teacher’s assessment based on information from children’s test score. One 
of the conclusions of this paper is that the adjustments teachers make to their assess-
ment seem to be related to children’s social-economic background. The third paper 
supposes that objective assessment measures e.g. tests, are generally more beneficial 
to children from lower social-economic backgrounds compared to children from higher 
social-economic backgrounds as subjective assessment measures such as teacher’s 
assessments are more likely to be biased with regard to children’s ethnicity or social-
economic background. Therefore, the third paper investigates what happens to assess-
ment measures of children’s ability level when a policy change decreases the im-
portance of test scores, and thereby increases the importance of teacher’s assess-
ments. The fourth paper observes children who are in 9th grade and whose current 
performance in 9th grade is below their expected performance in 6th grade. This paper 
investigates the effect of an intervention targeted at children’s non-cognitive skills on 
their motivation and school performance.  
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Figure 1: Outline of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation answers four questions: 
1.  How are test scores (TS) and the final teacher’s assessment (FTA) related to track 
placement (TP) and track switching in the first three years of secondary education? 
(Chapter 3) 
 
2.  How do teachers adjust their own initial assessment of children’s ability level (ITA) 
after receiving information from test scores? (Chapter 4) 
 
3.  What happens to assessment measures of children’s ability level when a policy 
change decreases the importance of test scores? (Chapter 5) 
Motivation
Test score
Teacher’s 
assessments
Track placement
4
5
36
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4. What is the effect of an intervention targeted at children’s non-cognitive skills on 
children’s motivation and school performance? (Chapter 6) 
 
1.3 Summary of the main findings 
In chapter 3 I investigate to what extent the teacher’s assessment contains additional 
information, on top of the information provided by cognitive test scores, that is used in 
determining children’s ability level in 6th and in 9th grade and how this relates to track 
switching. The research strategy involves three steps. First, it is investigated if there are 
non-random differences between cognitive test scores and the teacher’s assessment at 
the individual level. Second, a horse race is conducted to investigate if cognitive test 
scores or the teacher’s assessment is more predictive of track placement in 7th grade 
and track allocation in 9th grade. Third, it is investigated whether track switchers (be-
tween 7th and 9th grade) have been allocated according to the teacher’s assessment or 
cognitive test scores. The most important findings can be summarized as follows. First, 
for 19 percent of the sample a substantial difference between the assessment 
measures of ability in 6th grade is observed. Girls are more likely to receive a teacher’s 
assessment that is higher than their test score compared to boys and children from 
families with lower socio-economic status are less likely to receive a teacher’s assess-
ment that is higher than the test score compared to children from higher level families. 
Second, the estimates suggest that the teacher’s assessment is twice as powerful in 
explaining the gap between the lowest and the highest track placement compared to 
the test score, in both 7th and 9th grade. Third, the analysis suggests that children who 
are allocated according to the teacher’s assessment are the least likely to switch tracks. 
Finally, the estimates suggest that the teacher’s assessment positively correlates with 
the 9th grade test scores, whereas the cognitive test score in 6th grade does not. 
Switching tracks between 7th and 9th grade seems to have a negative effect on the test 
score in 9th grade, pointing towards costs of switching. 
Chapter 4 builds on the analyses presented in chapter 3 by showing how teachers 
use the information they receive from children’s test scores to adjust their own assess-
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ment of children’s ability level, given at an earlier point in time. This study uses infor-
mation on the initial teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s as-
sessment, in this order. The research methodology of this study consists of three steps. 
The first step is to determine what factors predict the final teacher’s assessment. In the 
second step we investigate the effect size of having a different test score, compared to 
the initial teacher’s assessment, on the final teacher’s assessment. The third step is to 
investigate whether the adjustment the teacher makes is heterogeneous across gender 
and social-economic status of the children. Two main findings are obtained. First, the 
estimates suggest that teachers on average adjust their initial assessment of children’s 
ability by 19 percent of a standard deviation after observing children’s test score. Sec-
ond, teachers seem to adjust their initial assessment heterogeneously across the gen-
der and social-economic background of children. The adjustments are less favourable 
for girls and children from lower social-economic backgrounds. The estimates show that 
even though it is generally assumed that teachers incorporate a rich set of characteris-
tics into their assessments, there is a significant dependency on the exit test in 6th grade 
for determining children’s ability level.  
Chapter 5 investigates whether a change in the incentives changes the way teachers 
incorporate available information into their teacher’s assessment. As of the schoolyear 
2014-2015 children take the final test only after the teacher has made his assessment 
and the teacher’s assessment is the relevant measure for children’s track allocation 
decision in secondary school. The effect of this change is investigated in three steps. 
First, the initial teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment 
before and after the policy change are observed and it is investigated if changes occur. 
Second, the results are split by gender and the education level of the mother and the 
father and it is observed if there is heterogeneity across gender and the education level 
of the parents. Third, it is investigated if teachers start to use earlier test scores as in-
puts for their assessment now that they can no longer use the 6th grade test score. It is 
investigated if there is an increase in the predictive power of the 5th grade test score for 
the teacher’s assessments. First, it is observed that on average there does not seem to 
be a change in the test score. However, the initial and final teacher’s assessment seem 
to be more alike following the policy change, where the final teacher’s assessment ap-
pears to be significantly lower on average. Second, following the policy change girls 
seem to score significantly higher on the test while boys seem to score significantly 
lower and children whose parents have completed a higher level of education seem to 
receive a higher initial and final teacher’s assessment compared to children whose par-
ents have only completed a lower level of education. Finally, it is observed that teachers 
seem to put more emphasis on children’s 5th grade test score for their teacher’s as-
sessments following the policy change.  
In chapter 6 the effect of an intervention targeted at children’s non-cognitive skills 
on children’s motivation and school performance is investigated. Underachievement is 
at the centre of the educational debate in many countries as underachievement leads 
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to suboptimal investments in human capital. A randomized field experiment is used, in 
which during several months, underachieving children receive monthly assignments 
that target: (a) their study skills by raising awareness in the field of self-discipline, critical 
thinking, decision making and problem solving; and (b) school motivation and future 
orientation by raising awareness of the usefulness of performance in school and obtain-
ing a degree. The program confronts children with their study behaviour and school 
attitude. Outcomes of this study are continued participation with the treatment and 
children’s gpa. Since the children in our target group are selected because they are 
currently underperforming, it is expected that these children have a higher probability 
of dropping out as their motivation to take up and complete the treatment is likely 
lower compared to other children. The estimates suggest that children with a lower gpa 
and children with a higher reported level of motivation more often continue with the 
treatment. The study finds no effect of the intervention on children’s motivation or gpa.  
1.4 Implications  
The results of the first study indicate that the teacher’s assessment is a better predictor 
of children’s track placement in 7th and 9th grade than the test score. The teacher’s 
assessment also seems beneficial as it generally allocates children to a higher track 
compared to the test score and allocating children based on the teacher’s assessment 
does not seem to lead to more children switching tracks between 7th and 9th grade. 
Therefore, allocating children to tracks based on the teacher’s assessment appears to 
lead to a higher investment in human capital, compared to allocation based on test 
scores.  
However, the teacher’s assessment also appears to be dependent on information 
received from the 6th grade test score. This follows from two results. First, teachers 
significantly adjust their assessment of children’s ability level after learning about these 
children’s test score. Second, teachers revert to earlier test scores when the test score 
in 6th grade is not available and use these measures of children’s ability level as input for 
their own assessment.  
Furthermore, results of the second and third study show that the teacher’s assess-
ment is sensitive to heterogeneity across gender and the social-economic background 
of children. First, it is observed that teachers adjust their assessment of children’s ability 
level heterogeneously across the gender and the social-economic background of chil-
dren. Second, the results indicate that when the test becomes a less important measure 
of children’s track placement, changes in the teacher’s assessments differ across gender 
and children’s social-economic background, favouring children from higher social-
economic backgrounds. These results suggest that even though allocating children into 
tracks based on the teacher’s assessment could be more efficient, as it could lead to 
higher investments in human capital, there might be a trade-off concerning equity.     
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These findings have implications for different parties. Children (and parents) benefit 
from the test as an assessment measure as it gives an objective assessment of their 
ability level independent from their other characteristics. This can provide additional 
information about their true ability level than only relying on the teacher’s assessment. 
These studies also give an insight into the assessment process as done by teachers. 
These studies do not ascertain through which channel the heterogeneity in the teach-
er’s assessment can be explained. The heterogeneity could be the result of new infor-
mation or stereotyping. Nevertheless, teachers should be aware of this process and the 
potential consequences. Furthermore, schools and society in general gain insight into 
the selection and allocation process into tracks. Schools gain insight into the potential 
consequences of their own policies and choices made at the beginning of children’s 
educational career. Society gains insight into the determinants that can result in a high-
er investment in human capital.  
The fourth study shows how difficult it is to target specific groups of children with a 
school intervention. This study focused on children who in 9th grade perform at a lower 
level compared to their expected performance in 6th grade. These children could, argu-
ably, benefit from interventions aimed at improving their motivation and performance. 
However, as they are not motivated to perform well in school they are also less likely to 
successfully participate in these kind of policy interventions. This study shows the im-
portance of school support for this type of research. Without specifically targeting these 
children and without support from teachers and school staff it is difficult for outside 
researchers to successfully perform interventions.   
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2.1 The Dutch education system 
2.1.1 General information 
In the Netherlands primary education consists of eight years of which the first two are 
spent in kindergarten. As of the third year of elementary school (i.e., 1st grade), chil-
dren formally learn how to read and write. Most children start kindergarten at the age 
of 4, enter 1st grade at the age of 6 and finish elementary school at the age of 12. As of 
secondary school children are allocated to tracks.  
The Dutch secondary education system is hierarchically structured by ability and 
consists of three main tracks that differ in duration and qualification. Figure 1 gives an 
overview of the tracks in secondary education. The four-year track (VMBO or T1) quali-
fies children for vocational education (MBO). These vocational programmes are provid-
ed at regional training centres (ROCs), agrarian training centres (AOCs) and vocational 
schools (vakscholen). The five-year track (HAVO or T2) qualifies children for higher voca-
tional education (HBO), which are practical oriented programmes, usually provided at 
universities of applied sciences including both professional bachelor and masters pro-
grammes.  
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Figure 1: overview of educational tracks 
 
The six-year track (VWO or T3) qualifies children for university education (WO) including 
bachelors and master programmes and the opportunity to move on to Ph.D pro-
grammes (OECD, 2016). The second column in Figure 1 shows four sub-tracks at pre-
vocational education (T1a to T1d). The difference between these four sub-tracks is the 
importance of a practical versus a more theoretical focus of the curriculum. Time spent 
on more theoretically oriented courses increases with the tracks from T1a to T1d.1 The 
third column of Figure 1 shows all possible tracks, some of which are combinations of 
the three major tracks.  
The track placement (TP) decision is made by the secondary school. In our data this 
decision is based on test scores (TS) and the elementary school’s teacher’s assessment 
(FTA). Figure 2 shows this sequence of events. To determine the optimal track place-
                                                                
1 The six-year track (T3) can also be divided into two sub-tracks of which one includes the option to take 
courses in Greek and Latin. Our data do not allow us to distinguish between these two sub-tracks, which 
means that we combine them in T3.  
T3 
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ment for children, secondary schools receive an educational report for every child. This 
educational report provides an overview of the child’s learning outcomes and progress, 
its behaviour, (social-emotional) development and possible special needs. The educa-
tional report also includes the teacher’s assessment of the child’s ability level and the 
child’s test score on an exit test in 6th grade (PO-raad and VO-raad, 2016). Secondary 
schools use this information to allocate children into tracks. There are no legal criteria 
set for the admittance to a track or school. Every secondary school can decide how and 
if children are admitted and to which track they are allocated. Occasionally, an inter-
view or an entrance test takes place to assess a child’s ability. In regions where there is 
a higher supply of children (or a higher demand for secondary schools), schools can 
follow a  stricter admission procedure than regions where the supply of children is low-
er (Korpershoek et al., 2016). For example, a number of schools use lotteries to decide 
which children are admitted. In approximately 50 percent of the municipalities primary 
and secondary schools make joint agreements about a local procedure for the transition 
from primary to secondary education (ITS et al., 2013).  
 
 
Figure 2: sequence of events for track placement 
 
As of schoolyear 2014-2015 a policy change has taken effect that influences the transi-
tion from primary to secondary education. Two important changes are the introduction 
of a compulsory exit test in primary education and children’s track placement in sec-
ondary education gives more weight to the teacher’s assessment of children’s ability 
level. The obligatory exit test promotes continuous learning in the transition from pri-
mary to secondary education by providing information about children’s level of 
knowledge and skills (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2014). As of 
schoolyear 2014-2015 the final teacher’s assessment is announced before the 1st of 
March while the test takes place between the 15th of April and the 15th of May 
(Rijksoverheid, 2016; Rijksoverheid, 2016a). If children perform better on the test com-
pared to their teacher’s assessment the teacher is obligated to reconsider the initial 
assessment of children’s ability level. In case the teacher’s assessment deviates from 
the test score, the teacher needs to motivate this decision (Rijksoverheid, 2016b). Fur-
thermore, secondary schools are not allowed to use any other information about chil-
dren’s ability level, such as IQ tests, earlier test scores or other information, for their 
admission and track placement (PO-raad and VO-raad, 2016). 
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2.1.2 Test 
In 6th grade, the final year of primary education, children complete an exit test. This test 
consists of questions in the areas of math, reading, study skills and science. Schools 
have different tests that they can choose from.2 The test that is used in this dissertation 
is called the “Eindtoets Basisonderwijs” from Cito, which is the most commonly used 
objective assessment test in 6th grade. Approximately 85 percent of all Dutch children 
complete this high-stakes test in 6th grade (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en 
Wetenschap, 2015). An example of an official test form is shown in Figure 3. The test is 
standardized, which implies that the test procedure is the same for all children who 
take part in the test. The degree of difficulty of the test is approximately the same 
across different years. Every year the test is calibrated to ensure that children’s average 
scores on the test are comparable across years. Children’s performance on this test is 
measured on a scale from 501 to 550.  
The aim of the 6th grade test is to establish to what extent children master the refer-
ence levels of math and language skills and to provide an independent and appropriate 
perspective on children’s expected performance and their best track placement in sec-
ondary education (Rijksoverheid, 2016a). The test is not meant to provide a signal of 
grades or performance on an intelligence test, which can lead to negative connotations. 
The test institute offers guidelines for children’s track allocation by reporting brackets 
of scores and accompanying track placement suggestions.  
 
                                                                
2 In 2016 schools can choose from three approved exit tests.  
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/toelating-middelbare-school/inhoud/keuzemogelijkheden-
verplichte-eindtoets-basisschool 
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Figure 3: Example of an official test form 
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The test also serves other purposes. High scores on the standardized test are an im-
portant way in which elementary schools try to signal the quality and value-added of 
their educational efforts. Elementary schools seem to use their average scores on this 
test to attract new children. In addition, the Dutch Inspectorate of Education uses these 
results, controlled for individual characteristics, as one of the inputs for their overall 
evaluation of the school’s quality and value-added. Furthermore, inputs for the Inspec-
torate of Education’s evaluation of secondary schools’ performance include the per-
centage of children who graduate every year as well as the percentage of children who 
switch tracks. Allocating children to tracks that are too high (too low) leads to switching 
downward (upward) and would induce negative (positive) evaluations on this part of 
the performance assessment (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015).3 Neverthe-
less, secondary schools also benefit from having more children in the higher tracks as 
this is beneficial for signalling the quality of the schools’ education, which potentially 
helps to attract more children. 
2.1.3 Teacher’s assessment 
In addition to the objective test score, teachers make a personal assessment of each 
child’s level of ability. The assessment can be based, among others, on the teacher’s 
experience and interaction with the child, observable demographic and socio-economic 
factors and the child’s performance throughout all grades in primary school. At the time 
teachers announce their assessment of the child’s ability level they know how the child 
performed on the test. This subjective assessment is provided before children apply to 
secondary school.  
Elementary school teachers do not have a strong incentive for strategic behaviour in 
such a way that their assessment overstates the child’s ability level. The teacher’s com-
pensation scheme does not depend on the assessments made. Furthermore, the ele-
mentary school’s population usually goes to the same set of secondary schools every 
year. This repeated interaction leads to more aligned incentives and a better under-
standing of ability signals between the elementary and the secondary schools. Addition-
ally, each year children are assigned to a class in which they are generally taught by one 
elementary school teacher. 
                                                                
3 As of June 2016 the Inspectorate of Education uses a new model to calculate learning outcomes that uses a 
different method for assessing schools’ educational quality and no longer ‘punishes’ schools when children 
switch down tracks.  
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2.2 The data  
2.2.1 General information 
The “Onderwijs Monitor Limburg” (OML) is a collaboration between Maastricht Univer-
sity, school boards (primary, secondary and tertiary) and government bodies in Limburg 
(a province in the South of the Netherlands). The OML aims to gain insight into the 
educational development of children in order to foster the further improvement of 
education and to acquire knowledge about the dynamics of educational processes in 
general. The OML is part of a larger program (Educatieve Agenda Limburg) that focuses 
on the monitoring of educational development and teacher quality. The starting point 
of the OML is information which is already collected within schools. Additional testing 
and surveying is done where needed (in close collaboration with the schools) (Edu-
catieve Agenda Limburg, 2016). 
This combination provides a unique dataset about the educational development of 
children in Limburg. Almost all schools in the region have participated in the data collec-
tion process. Approximately 95 percent of all primary schools and 90 percent of all sec-
ondary schools have participated in the data collection process. The unique feature of 
this data is that these children are followed over time as they progress from 6th to 9th 
grade. In both years the data collection includes administrative data from the school 
information systems, surveys among children and their parents, test results and teach-
er’s assessments. The data covers children from all tracks with the exception of those 
who are in special needs education. Depending on the chapter, either longitudinal or 
panel data is used.   
The most important variables for the analyses are obtained from the schools’ infor-
mation systems and from surveys. These variables include children’s test score in 6th 
grade, the teacher’s assessment of children’s ability level in 6th grade, track placement 
in secondary school in 7th grade and key demographic variables such as gender, age of 
the child and the education level of the father and the mother. The administrative data 
together with the survey data allow researchers to follow children over time and inves-
tigate longer-term impacts. Additionally, multiple sources of data give a more complete 
picture of children’s environment and characteristics and it can confirm the validity of 
the measures.4     
2.2.2 Representativeness 
The data contains information on children who attend schools in Limburg. The province 
of Limburg is the most southern province of the Netherlands. This particular data is used 
since it offers unique opportunities to investigate questions in education economics 
                                                                
4 The importance of using multiple sources of data has been proven successful by different authors such as 
Chetty et al. (2010), Dohmen et al. (2011) and Vischer et al. (2013).  
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concerning the importance of the teacher’s assessments and test scores and their impact 
on children’s further school career. The data are not directly generalizable to the whole 
population of the Netherlands. Children and their environment in Limburg have certain 
characteristics that are particular to this province and that differ from other provinces. 
Table 1 gives a brief overview of the comparability of some regional characteristics. For 
example, compared to the average of the Netherlands, Limburg has a lower number of 
immigrants, faces a population decline, has relatively more lower and fewer higher edu-
cated people and its inhabitants have a lower average personal income.  
Table 1: Characteristics of the Netherlands and Limburg 
  The Netherlands (average 
per province) 
Limburg  
Population 1,408,393 1,117,941 
Immigrants 305,443 233,569 
Population density per km2 502 520 
Average number of persons per household 2.17 2.11 
Total population growth (in persons) 5,953 -2,065 
Working population (18-65 year in %) 71 67 
Highest attained education level (18+ years excluding students in %)*     
Lower 34 39 
Middle 41 41 
Higher 25 20 
Average personal income (in euro)** 30,200 28,400 
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2015, Demografische kerncijfers per gemeente 2015; Centraal 
Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2014, Inkomen, arbeidsdeelname, opleidingsniveau, vermogen en sociale samen-
hang naar regio; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2016, Gemiddeld inkomen van personen naar regio.  
* Lower: SOI 10, 20, 31, 32 en 33,  Middle: SOI 41, 42 en 43, Higher: SOI 51, 52, 53, 60 en 70 
http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/classificaties/overzicht/soi/2006/default.htm 
** Average gross income from labor and social services  
2.3 Field experiment 
The additional data for the fourth paper was collected by performing a field experiment 
at secondary schools in Limburg. For this study 18 schools were recruited to participate 
in the experiment. After the schools decided to participate in the experiment, children 
were selected per school to take part in the treatment or the control group. The chil-
dren that participated in this experiment were also part of the schools that participate 
in the data collection process of the OML. Therefore, for these children information is 
available concerning the test score and the teacher’s assessment in 6th grade as well as 
demographic variables comparable to the data used in the other three papers. The 
selection of children was made based on test score data obtained from the OML. For 
this paper multiple sources of data were used to get a more detailed picture of the 
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children in our sample and to validate our measures (Chetty et al. (2011); Dohmen et al, 
(2011); Vischer et al. (2013). 
Data specifically collected for this paper are the children’s grades, measured on a 
scale from 1-10. From the schools we obtained information on children’s grades before 
the start of the experiment and after the experiment had ended. Other variables that 
are specific to this paper are the variables related to motivation, homework and self-
confidence. These variables are obtained from the surveys collected by the OML before 
the start of the experiment.  
2.4 Correlation vs. causal evidence  
To execute proper analyses and give substantiated policy implications research needs to 
give an extensive description of the situation and context of the research question. To 
describe the situation and context researchers need good data that allows them to 
observe people’s characteristics and follow them over time. To find out what works and 
what does not work researchers should (preferably) use (quasi)experimental research 
methods. In topics related to education causal relationships are difficult to ascertain 
and the interpretation of findings needs to be adjusted accordingly. Causal relationships 
are difficult to identify as exogenous variation is scarce. For example, it is difficult to find 
a variable that is related to track placement but not related to the test score or the 
teacher’s assessment. Variables that are available in the data can generally be linked to 
one of these ability measures. Other empirical methods such as (natural) experiments 
offer the possibility to show causal relationships but have other drawbacks such as the 
control that is needed to maintain the proper execution of a research design, they are 
generally small scale and usually expensive to set up. The first three empirical papers in 
this dissertation show relationships in the data by means of correlations. The fourth 
paper uses a randomized field experiment and shows causal relationships. Both re-
search methods are essential in the area of education economics.  
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Chapter 3: 
Does the teacher beat the test? 5 
The value of the teacher’s assessment in 
predicting children’s ability 
  
                                                                
5 Published as: Feron, E., Schils, T. and Weel, B. t. (2016) Does the Teacher Beat the Test? The Value of the 
Teacher’s Assessment in Predicting Student Ability, De Economist, Vol. 164. No. 4. pp. 391-418.   
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3.1 Introduction 
The weight of cognitive test scores in allocating children to different levels of education 
has increased over time (e.g., Kautz et al., 2014). The reason why cognitive test scores 
are widely used as assessment measures to sort children is that they are assumed to 
give objective measures of ability levels. Assessments made by teachers represent more 
subjective measures of ability and have been criticized for being biased; for example 
towards gender and against minorities (e.g., Dee, 2005; Burgess and Greaves, 2013; 
Fairlie et al., 2014). However, teacher’s assessments could also be valuable comple-
ments to cognitive test scores. Teachers work with children on a daily basis, which al-
lows them to also assess other determinants of ability such as motivation and classroom 
behavior (e.g., Segal, 2008).  
This research investigates to what extent a teacher’s assessment contains additional 
information that is useful in determining elementary school children’s ability level on 
top of the information provided by cognitive test scores. We make use of a database 
that contains information about cognitive test scores and teacher’s assessments in 
elementary school and about initial track placement and subsequent careers in second-
ary school of Dutch pupils. The Netherlands has an educational system that involves 
early tracking (i.e. at the age of 12). Our empirical analysis benefits from this system 
because we observe both high-stakes cognitive test scores and teacher’s assessments at 
the end of 6th grade and the transition from elementary to secondary school during 
which children are allocated to different (hierarchical) education tracks.  
The research strategy involves three steps. The first step is to document whether or 
not there are non-random differences between cognitive test scores and teacher’s 
assessments at the individual level. In the second step we investigate whether or not 
cognitive test scores or teacher’s assessments are more predictive of track placement in 
7th grade and track allocation in 9th grade. In a complementary analysis we document 
the determinants of math and language test scores in 9th grade by correlating them 
with both ability signals. In the third step we pay attention to track switchers (between 
7th and 9th grade) to investigate whether these children have been allocated according 
to teacher’s assessments or cognitive test scores.6 The application of the assessment 
measures by secondary schools to allocate children to different tracks (or the lack 
thereof) yields information about the usefulness of objective and subjective assessment 
measures in allocating children.  
Our database for the empirical analysis includes 4,500 children. The database is con-
structed by making use of administrative data from school tracking systems and survey 
data of children in 6th and 9th grade in the period 2009-2012 (i.e., these children were in 
                                                                
6 The benefits of an early tracking system are highest when children are allocated to tracks most suitable given 
their ability level and that they stay within this track throughout their secondary school careers. These seem 
to be the most important reasons for early tracking in for example Germany (e.g., Woessmann, 2004) and the 
Netherlands (e.g., Diris, 2012), two countries that track children the earliest among all OECD countries. 
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6th grade in 2009 and were followed until 9th grade in 2012). We have access to a col-
lection of data consisting of both objective and subjective assessment measures in 6th 
grade, track placement from 7th to 9th grade, test scores on an identical test across all 
different tracks in 9th grade and information about switching tracks in secondary school. 
The survey data include measures about demographic factors as well as socio-economic 
status. The objective assessment measure is a high-stakes standardized test score (so-
called Cito Eindtoets) which children take in 6th grade. This objective test score provides 
a well-defined measure of levels of achievement and is annually taken by almost all 6th 
grade children in the Netherlands.7 The subjective assessment measure is the teacher’s 
assessment of the child’s ability level. This subjective assessment is made by teachers in 
6th grade after they have observed the test score from the objective assessment.  
Our four most important findings can be summarized as follows. First, for 19 percent 
of our sample we observe a substantial difference between the objective and subjective 
assessment measure of ability in 6th grade. In three quarters of these cases the subjec-
tive teacher’s assessment measure is higher than the test score. We find that there are 
systematic differences between the objective and subjective assessment measure. Our 
most important findings relate to gender and social-economic status. Girls are more 
likely to receive a teacher’s assessment that is higher than their test score compared to 
boys and children from families with lower socio-economic status are less likely to re-
ceive a teacher’s assessment that is higher than the test score compared to children 
from higher level families.8 
Second, our estimates suggest that the teacher’s assessment is twice as powerful to 
explain the gap between the lowest and the highest track placement compared to the 
test score, in both 7th and 9th grade. These results suggest that secondary schools put 
more emphasis on the subjective assessment measure relative to the objective assess-
ment measure when allocating children to tracks in 7th grade. It also suggests that the 
teacher’s assessment is not only more predictive of initial track placement but also of 
the longer term career in secondary school compared to the cognitive test score. In 
addition, secondary schools seem to allocate children in accordance with the highest 
assessment signal of ability. Finally, our estimates are conservative or lower-bound 
estimates as we only consider eight different educational tracks in secondary education 
for these analyses and are very strict in labelling signals as different. 9 
                                                                
7 Approximately 85 percent of all Dutch children who are in 6th grade participate in the Cito Eindtoets every year.  
8 These numbers are consistent with previous studies using data about the Dutch education system. For 
example, Timmermans et al. (2012) investigate the relationship between assessment measures and secondary 
school careers. They use a different dataset, which contains information about children from all regions in the 
Netherlands but no information on track placement and switching. Their descriptive statistics about assess-
ment measures are similar to ours, which suggests that our analysis is likely to be representative for the 
Netherlands. Golsteyn and Schils (2014) show that boys and girls score differently on the 6th grade tests 
according to differences in personality that might also be related to higher teacher assessments. 
9 We group the tracks in pre-vocational education which leads to eight educational tracks as the number of 
children allocated to each of these tracks is relatively low. This decreases the variation in the data compared 
to analyzing 11 educational tracks.  
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Third, we observe that the teacher’s assessment has non-random deviations from 
the test score. The question is whether these non-random deviations are efficient with 
respect to later outcomes, such as switching tracks. We observe that approximately 24 
percent of our sample makes a switch between tracks between 7th and 9th grade. Our 
analysis suggests that children who are allocated according to the teacher’s assessment 
are the least likely to switch tracks.  
Finally, the estimates suggest that the teacher’s assessment positively correlates 
with the 9th grade test scores, whereas the cognitive test score in 6th grade does not 
explain test scores in 9th grade (when controlling for the teacher’s assessment). Fur-
thermore, switching tracks between 7th and 9th grade seems to have a negative effect 
on the test score in 9th grade, pointing towards costs of switching. 
This paper contributes to the literature about the consequences of using objective 
and subjective assessment measures for tracking and successive performance. Dee 
(2005), Lindahl (2007), Lavy (2008), Gibbons and Chevalier (2008), Cornwell et al (2012) 
and Burgess and Greaves (2013) all use objective and subjective assessment measures 
to study discrimination and uncertainty. It is shown that systematic differences exist 
between these two types of instruments in the assessment of children’s performance, 
such as between boys and girls, or between blacks and whites. Bernardi et al. (2014) 
show that additional information from cognitive and non-cognitive tests is able to help 
children make a more efficient track allocation choice. Our contribution to this litera-
ture is that we analyze differences in both assessment measures for track allocation and 
switching, where we are able to observe children’s later outcomes in 9th grade in the 
form of track allocation, track switches and their scores on a math and language test. 
Other studies have shown that test scores in secondary school are predictive of la-
bor-market outcomes (e.g., Murnane et al., 1995 and Currie and Thomas, 1999). We 
obtain a set of estimates suggesting that switching seems to lead to lower test scores in 
9th grade. This seems to support  arguments that switching tracks harms children’s 
accumulation of human capital, which is documented in Van Elk et al. (2009) and Diris 
(2012) for the Netherlands.  
Our work also contributes to the literature on early school tracking. The long-run ef-
fects of early tracking for human capital development and educational opportunities 
have been summarized by Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) and Brunello and Checchi 
(2007). According to the OECD, the early tracking regime in the Netherlands causes a 
severe constraint for the growth of higher education participation. It states that “In the 
end, postponement of the present early tracking regime seems inevitable; although this 
is a major change in the way Dutch society thinks of itself” (OECD, 2007, p.38). Con-
sistent with this advice, other studies using Dutch data suggest that relatively low-ability 
children could improve their educational outcomes by about 30 percentage points 
when tracking is postponed by one year. At the same time, most children do not seem 
to be hurt by the presence of low-ability children in the first year of secondary school. 
Only children who are considered to have the highest ability seem to be hurt by the 
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presence of lower ability peers (e.g., Van Elk et al., 2009 and Diris, 2012). We show that 
a substantial fraction of our population is not allocated to the right track, which seems 
akin to restraints on optimal human capital development. 
We proceed as follows. First, we present background features of the Dutch educa-
tion system and explore the research strategy. Section 3 documents the data descrip-
tion and statistics of our core variables. Sections 4-6 present the results on the differ-
ences between objective and subjective assessment measures, track switching and 9th 
grade test scores. Section 7 briefly addresses the policy perspective of our analysis with 
a focus on reducing switching. Section 8 concludes. We present additional results and 
detailed data descriptions in the Appendix to this paper. 
3.2 Background and strategy 
We observe five main outcomes for each child: the test score which serves as an objec-
tive assessment of ability at the end of elementary school (6th grade), the elementary 
school teacher’s assessment which serves as a subjective assessment measure of ability 
(6th grade), track allocation in the first and third year of secondary education (7th and 
9th grade), the results from a cognitive test in 9th grade, and track switching in the first 
three years of secondary education (7th-9th grade). We now present information on 
these measures and information about the Dutch education system.  
3.2.1 Dutch education system10 
Countries differ in the age at which they first track children into different types of schools. 
In the majority of OECD countries, tracking takes place between the ages of 14 to 16. 
Some countries, including the Netherlands, undertake the first tracking at the age of 12 
when children progress from elementary to secondary school (i.e., from 6th to 7th 
grade).11 We take advantage of this system by studying the allocation in secondary school, 
the transition from elementary to secondary school and performance in 9th grade. 
Figure 1 shows all possible tracks, some of which are combinations of the three ma-
jor tracks. Both the objective and subjective assessment measure are tailored toward 
                                                                
10 More information about the Dutch education system can be found in chapter 2.  
11 Research has been conducted to investigate the effects of early tracking on differences in human capital 
formation and educational opportunities (e.g., Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006 and Brunello and Checchi, 
2007 for comprehensive review studies). The overall conclusion of these investigations has been that the 
earlier the tracking, the greater the impact of socio-economic factors, such as parental education, on educa-
tional outcomes and opportunities. For the Netherlands, Van Elk et al. (2009) and Diris (2012) find that early 
tracking reduces participation in and completion of education for relatively low-ability children placed in lower 
tracks at the age of 12, while there does not seem to be a positive effect on those placed in the higher tracks. 
One of the main reasons of implementing an educational system with early tracking is to provide children with 
a learning environment in which they benefit from classrooms with homogenous populations. Such popula-
tions would benefit from peer effects. In addition, it allows for a focused curriculum and appropriately paced 
instructions. 
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allocating children into one of these 11 track combinations. The 6th grade test distin-
guishes brackets which are consistent with these 11 track combinations, shown in the 
fourth column of Figure 1. Teacher assessment is measured on the same 11-point scale.  
 
 
Figure 1:: Tracks in secondary education in The Netherlands 
Note: The left-hand side shows the three major tracks from high (T3) to low (T1). The T1 track is subdivided 
into four sub-tracks. The right-hand side of the figure shows the 11 tracks to which children can be allocated 
in 7th grade and the objective assessment measure (test score) in the brackets that belongs to each of these 
tracks. 
3.2.2 Background 
The children in our data have completed this Cito Eindtoets in 2009, which is the most 
common objective assessment test in elementary schools in the Netherlands. The test 
was taken during three days at the beginning of February 2009. The test is standardized 
meaning that the test procedure is the same for all children. In the assessment children 
have to answer questions in the areas of math, reading, study skills and science. The 
T3 
VWO
T2
HAVO
T1
VMBO
T1d
KL
GL
TL
KL
T1c
1a T1a
T1b T1b
T1c
T1d
T1a/T1b
T1b/T1c
T1c/T1d
T1d/T2
T2
T2/T3
T3 548-550
544-547
540-543
537-539
535-536
532-534
529-531
527-528
523-526
519-522
500-518
Chapter 3 
42 
degree of difficulty of the test is approximately equal across different years. The test is 
calibrated every year to ensure that children’s average scores on the test are comparable 
across different years. The performance is measured on a scale between 501 and 550.  
The aim of the cognitive test score is to provide an independent and appropriate 
perspective on children’s expected performance and their best track placement in sec-
ondary education. The test is not meant to provide a signal of grades or performance on 
an intelligence test, which can lead to negative connotations. The test institute offers 
guidelines for children’s track allocation by reporting brackets of scores and accompa-
nying track assessments. We followed these guidelines for constructing our objective 
ability measure variable. We use the brackets as the outcome measure of the objective 
assessment measure.  
In addition to the objective test score, teachers make a personal assessment of each 
child’s level of ability. The assessment is based on the teacher’s experience and interac-
tion with the child, observable demographic and socio-economic factors and the child’s 
performance throughout all grades in elementary school. Teachers also know the test 
score from the objective assessment measure when they present their assessment of 
the child’s ability. This subjective assessment is provided in the spring of 2009 before 
children apply to a secondary school. The teacher’s assessment is provided in similar 
brackets as the objective assessment and fits with possible track allocations in second-
ary schools. Secondary schools obtain the information about the objective and subjec-
tive assessment measures and allocate children to tracks.  
3.2.3 Strategy 
Our analysis first focuses on the way in which both the objective and subjective assess-
ment measures in 6th grade help to explain track placement in 7th grade. Both assess-
ment measures aim to measure ability, but face the problem that the true underlying 
and unobserved level of ability is unknown. We define the objective assessment meas-
ure of child 𝑖𝑖 as his test score (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖). This test score depends on 𝑖𝑖’s true and unobserved 
ability (𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖), a vector of observed characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) and the elementary school he at-
tends (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖). These ingredients lead to the following measurement of child 𝑖𝑖’s test score: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖). (1) 
In an ideal world 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. In practice this is not true because 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is measured with 
noise and observed characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 are likely to influence the measurement of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 by 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. The reason for adding school fixed effects (or dummies in our cross-sectional speci-
fications) is that characteristics of elementary schools can be related to test results of 
children in 6th grade, which can influence 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. Some of these school characteristics we 
cannot observe. Hence, we add school fixed effects to the model.  
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We define the subjective assessment measure of child 𝑖𝑖 as the teacher’s assessment 
of his ability (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖). This measure includes the same ingredients as well as the observed 
test score:  
 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖). (2) 
The information about the child’s test score influences the teacher’s assessment of the 
child’s ability. We abstract from differences in school fixed effects that may select 
teachers with certain attitudes because we do not observe individual teachers in the 
data. Because children are assigned to one teacher in the final year of primary educa-
tion and most elementary schools have only one 6th grade class, potential teacher ef-
fects are captured by school fixed effects. This is also the reason for indexing all varia-
bles with child 𝑖𝑖 and for ignoring teacher 𝑗𝑗 effects. 
Finally, we observe child 𝑖𝑖’s initial track placement (𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) in 7th grade (at secondary 
school) and thereafter allocation in 9th grade. The decision about initial placement is 
made by the secondary school and includes the objective and subjective assessment 
measures. Adding secondary school fixed effects to the model would create additional 
endogeneity as not all schools offer the same track levels and secondary school fixed 
effects are related to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. 
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = ℎ(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖). (3) 
In the first part of the empirical analysis we analyze if there are any systematic differ-
ences between the test score, the teacher’s assessment and track placement for various 
socio-economic background characteristics of children. Furthermore, we are primarily 
interested in explaining the track placement of child 𝑖𝑖. We estimate equation (3) with an 
ordered probit model to find the determinants of track placement in both 7th and 9th 
grade. Second, we do not observe 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 but two signals 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. Third, in the empiri-
cal analysis we incorporate the possibility that secondary schools take into account both 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, although 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 includes information about 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. In this way we have the two 
signals competing with each other. A statistically significant coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 would in 
all likelihood suggest that secondary schools put weight on both signals of ability. The 
equation we first estimate is: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, (4) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is the error term.  
In the second part of the empirical analysis we estimate the determinants of track 
switching in the first three years of secondary school (i.e., in the period spanning 7th, 
8th and 9th grade). To do so, we first estimate a set of probit models in which we show 
what type of children tend to switch tracks. Second, we estimate probit models in which 
we estimate the probability of switching tracks (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) for child 𝑖𝑖: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎4𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, (5) 
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where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is the error term. We estimate different versions of the model in which the 
dependent variable is switch, switch up or switch down. We only include secondary 
school fixed effects because switching takes place in secondary school. We show below 
that elementary school fixed effects have no impact on track placement, which makes 
us confident that including only secondary school fixed effects is sufficient to estimate 
the determinants of switching. 
Finally, we estimate models to investigate to what extent test scores on an identical 
(low-stakes) test in 9th grade are correlated with the ability signals from the teacher 
and the test score in 6th grade. We also estimate to what extent switching is correlated 
with test scores in 9th grade. 
The strength of the data at our disposal is that we are able to observe performance 
in both primary and secondary school. In addition, we have detailed information about 
elementary school teacher’s assessments and initial track placement in secondary 
school. This is a unique feature in the literature. Nevertheless, the analysis is con-
strained by the fact that we are not able to identify a source of exogenous variation in 
our data. Ideally, one would want to conduct an experiment in which a random portion 
of the sample was placed according to the test scores’ signal, another part according to 
the teacher’s signal and a final slice of the population as it is currently done (i.e., decid-
ed by the secondary school). The alternative is to find instruments to deal with the 
“self-fulfilling prophecy” that creates endogeneity. The “self-fulfilling prophecy” is the 
idea that when a child is placed on a higher or lower track than he should be according 
to his true ability, the child is more likely to switch back to the track that matches his 
true ability. This is to be kept in mind when interpreting the results in the switching 
section. Furthermore, all tests, but also the teacher’s assessment, contain measure-
ment error and analyses concerning ability suffer from omitted variable bias. However, 
such instruments are not readily available. Our analyses focus on outcomes between 
6th and 9th grade. In order to find exogenous variation we would need a set of instru-
ments related to (one of) our assessment measures and at the same time unrelated to 
any unobservable variables that might influence our outcome variable. Since children’s 
true ability is unobserved, this is problematic. We are aware of the endogeneity con-
cerns with respect to omitted variable bias and also with the fact that potential meas-
urement error is an important disclaimer when interpreting the estimated coefficients, 
but try to deal with this in the best way possible by using primary and secondary school 
fixed effects and a rich set of covariates, including track placement in 7th grade.  
3.3 Data 
Before we present our results, we first document the most salient features of our data 
to reveal information about the allocation of children and to present a number of key 
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descriptive statistics. More information as well as additional regression analyses are 
presented in the Appendix. 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
For the analyses we use a unique dataset on the educational development of children in 
a given region (Limburg) of the Netherlands. Table 1 documents the distribution of test 
scores 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 in 7th and 9th grade, teacher advice 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, and (initial) track placement 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, 
across the 11 different tracks. The numbers in each row add up to 100 percent. In addi-
tion, the table documents the number of switchers from the initial track to which they 
are allocated in 7th grade. The numbers represent the fraction of children who switch 
away from each of these tracks. The distribution of test scores and teacher’s assess-
ments seems to be broadly consistent but there are also important differences. Track 
placement and teacher’s assessment at higher levels of secondary education is different 
from the test scores, with almost a quarter of the sample being placed in T3 in 7th 
grade. Teacher’s assessments seem to be more favorable for the higher tracks com-
pared to the test score. These differences are further explored in Section 4.  
Table 1: The distribution of test scores, teacher assessment and track placement 
 Track 
 T1a T1a/b T1b T1b/c T1c T1c/d T1d T1d/2 T2 T2/3 T3 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  2.00 2.62 3.87 2.76 6.33 9.07 7.11 13.98 20.49 18.96 12.82 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  4.00 3.27 4.53 0.31 0.11 5.18 10.96 12.33 18.02 16.62 24.67 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  2.69 3.11 7.27 0.00 1.53 1.84 10.73 10.84 11.07 25.93 24.98 
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 3.59 0.21 11.30 0.00 7.29 5.28 19.01 10.35 12.99 9.93 20.06  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  9th 1.21 2.21 4.14 0.00 1.88 1.38 11.70 11.31 9.82 29.14 27.12 
Note: All rows add up to 100. 𝑛𝑛 = 4,500 except for 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  where 𝑛𝑛 = 4,019 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  9th where 𝑛𝑛 = 1,812. See 
Figure 1 for a schedule of the different educational tracks. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  is the objective assessment measure based on 
the Cito Eindtoets (test score) in 6th grade. 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  is the subjective assessment measure based on the teacher 
advice in 6th grade. 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is track placement in 7th grade. 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is a measure of switching. The numbers in this 
row show the fraction of children that switch away from this track after initial placement in 7th grade. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  9th 
is the test score in 9th grade on math or language. 
 
Furthermore, teachers seem to be reluctant to advise tracks in the middle tracks of 
vocational education (i.e., tracks in T1). As can be observed from Table 1, some T1 sub-
tracks contain only few observations. These are combination tracks to which only a few 
children are allocated.12 We join the combination tracks and the regular tracks for T1 
when analyzing differences between 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. This means that for the analysis of 
track allocation we combine tracks T1a and T1a/T1b, T1b and T1b/T1c and T1c and 
T1c/T1d into three categories. This results in a more conservative estimate of the de-
terminants of allocation in Section 4. As the difference between 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 does not 
                                                                
12 It is possible that this is related to the availability of this type of school track in the area.  
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have a direct impact on the number of children who switch tracks, we use 11 tracks for 
the analyses of switching tracks. We define differences in 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 when there 
is a difference of at least two tracks. Furthermore, we define a switch between tracks 
when children switch at least two tracks. For example, if children switch from track T2 
to track T1d/T2 or track T2/T3 this is not defined as a switch. When children switch from 
track T2 to track T1d or track T3 this is defined as a switch.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. Our data include slightly more girls than boys. 
In 6th grade children are on average 12 years old. Most of the children (and their par-
ents) were born in the region (Limburg) but there are also children (and their parents) 
who were born in another part of the Netherlands or abroad. The education level of the 
father and mother is measured as the highest completed level of education. The aver-
age education level of parents suggests that they have completed vocational education. 
Parental education levels are measured in four different categories: (1) lower educa-
tion, (2) vocational education, (3) higher education and (4) university education. The 
labor-market position of the father and mother is also measured in four categories: (1) 
employed, (2) unemployed, (3) sick/unable to work and (4) not in the labor force. Al-
most all fathers are employed, while more mothers report to be unemployed. The 
number of workdays per week of the father and mother is a measure of the amount of 
time allocated to paid work. Most fathers work fulltime, while more mothers report to 
work part-time. In The Netherlands, part time employment is an important form of 
employment for women with young children (e.g., Bosch et al., 2010). Working time is 
defined in three categories: (1) part-time 1-2 days per week, (2) part-time 3-4 days per 
week and (3) fulltime. Almost 80 percent of the children in our sample live with both 
parents in 9th grade.13  
The teacher’s assessment, track placement and test score are all measured on a 
scale from 1-8. The original test score in 6th grade is measured on a scale from 501-550. 
Based on test score ranges provided by the institution that supplies the test in 6th 
grade, we rescaled the test score to a scale from 1-8. Average test score and average 
test score (short) correspond to a T1d/T2 track. The average teacher’s assessment and 
average track placement correspond to a T2 track (see Figure 1). Almost 24 percent of 
children switch tracks between 7th and 9th grade.  
  
                                                                
13 The corresponding survey question is: “Do you live at home with both parents?”  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the main variables in the empirical analysis 
  N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Female  4,422 0.51 0,50 0 1 1 
Age (years) 4,500 12.06 0.55 10 12 14.75 
Region of birth child  
1. Limburg 
2. The Netherlands 
3. Abroad 
3,943 1.15 0.46 1 1 3 
Region of birth father 3,923 1.36 0.67 1 1 3 
Region of birth mother  3,935 1.35 0.67 1 1 3 
Education father 
1. Lower education 
2. Vocational education 
3. Higher education 
4. University 
3,752 2.38 1.10 1 2 4 
Education mother 3,763 2.22 1.03 1 2 4 
Labor market position father 
1. Employed 
2. Unemployed 
3. Sick/unable to work 
4. Other 
3,858 1.12 0.51 1 1 4 
Labor market position mother 3,869 1.48 1.04 1 1 4 
Workdays per week father 
1. Part-time 1-2 days 
2. Part-time 3-4 days 
3. Fulltime 
3,249 2.91 0.29 1 3 3 
Workdays per week mother 2,848 2.31 0.62 1 2 3 
Living with both parents 3,608 0.79 0.41 0 1 1 
Teacher’s assessment  4,500 5.60 2.15 1 6 8 
Track placement 4,500 5.75 2.16 1 7 8 
Test score 4,500 538.67 8.03 504 540 550 
Test score (short) 4,500 5.21 2.02 1 6 8 
Switching 4,019 0.24 0.42 0 0 1 
Note: The same description of region of birth of the child applies to the father and mother. Similarly, the same 
description of Education father, Labor market position father and Workdays per week father apply to the 
mother.  
 
Figure 2 shows the distributions for the test score (Panel A), the teacher’s assessment 
(B), and track placement (C) in the eight brackets we use for the first section of the 
empirical analyses. These eight categories are underlying our definitions of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖. The vertical axis in each of the three panels shows the percentage of children 
in each category. These percentages add up to 100. As can also be observed from the 
numbers displayed in Tables 1 and 2, the differences in means and other moments of 
the distribution between the three measures are relatively small.  
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A: Objective assessment measure (test score) in 6th grade 
 
B: Subjective assessment measure (teacher assessment) in 6th grade 
 
C: Track placement in 7th grade 
 
Figure 2: The distribution of objective and subjective assessment measures in 6th grade and track placement 
in 7th grade in 8 brackets (from low to high) 
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Table 3 shows the bivariate correlation coefficients and their statistical significance of 
the main variables in our empirical analyses.14 We observe that the correlations among 
the teacher’s assessment, test scores and track placement are high and positive, which 
comes without surprise given the patterns displayed in Figure 2. What is also interesting 
to observe is that track placement shows a higher positive correlation with the teacher’s 
assessment than with test scores. Furthermore, we observe that there is a negative 
correlation between switching tracks and the test score, the teacher’s assessment and 
track placement. The majority of the switches happen in the pre-vocational track as can 
be observed from Table 1.  
Finally, we use information about a math and language test that children in our sam-
ple have taken in 9th grade. This test was a low-stakes test and part of the research pro-
ject conducted at the schools in our sample. It main purpose was to have a school-
independent test score for children in 9th grade. The difficulty level of the test differs 
according to the children’s track level. Since we want to compare the effect of switching 
tracks across tracks we only use the questions on math or language that are identical for 
all students. This leaves us with 11 questions on math and 8 questions on language. Since 
we do not have enough observations for all tracks, we only look at students in track T1c, 
T1d, T2 and T3 in relation to their score on the math or language test. The average per-
centage of questions answered correctly increases from 34 in track T1c to 49 in track T3. 
The standard deviation is around 20 percent in all tracks. The distribution of the test 
score in 9th grade is presented in the last row of Table 1. The row adds up to 100 percent 
and shows the percentage of students per initial track placement in 7th grade. 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients 
  Teacher's assessment Test score Track placement Switching 
Teacher's assessment 1       
Test score 0.8495*** 1     
Track placement 0.8896*** 0.8040*** 1   
Switching -0.2247*** -0.1973*** -0.2309*** 1 
Note: Bivariate correlation coefficients. ***, ** represents significance at the 1 and 5 percent level respective-
ly. Teacher Assessment, track placement and test score (short) are all measured on a scale from 1-8. All other 
variables are measured as described in table 2. 
3.3.2 Possible selection  
Data has been collected from 155 elementary schools (95 percent of all schools in the given 
region) and 30 secondary schools (90 percent of all schools in the given region). This results 
in a database of 𝑛𝑛 = 4,500 for the first section, 𝑛𝑛 = 4,019 for the second section and 
𝑛𝑛 = 1,812 for the third section of the empirical analyses of this paper. In the first section 
of the empirical analyses we discuss non-random differences between the test score, the 
teacher’s assessment and track placement in 7th and 9th grade. In the second section of 
                                                                
14 Appendix A presents a correlation table of all variables of interest and a detailed description of the covariates.  
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the empirical analyses we discuss track switching because mistakes in initial track place-
ment or suboptimal allocation can be made undone in the first part of secondary educa-
tion. In the third section we correlate both ability signals and switching with 9th grade test 
scores. Data has been collected for 9,092 children. For the analyses in the first section of 
the paper we only use those children for whom we observed the teacher’s assessment and 
the test score in our data. For the analyses in the second section we also need to know 
children’s track placement in 7th, 8th and 9th grade, which reduces the sample size to 
4,019. Finally, 9th grade test scores are available for 1,812 children. 
Possible selection issues with regard to the sample we use for our analyses are ad-
dressed. It is investigated whether individual characteristics are able to predict whether 
children end up in our sample for analyses. We are mainly concerned about schools only 
reporting data for their well performing children and holding back information on their 
poorer performing children. However, after controlling for school fixed effects we find that 
individual characteristics are not significantly related to selection into our sample. We con-
clude that selection is not an issue (see the Appendix for a more elaborate analysis). 
3.4 Track placement 
This section presents our first set of estimation results. We first investigate to what 
extent there are non-random differences between the objective and subjective assess-
ment measures. Second, we present a set of estimates about the determinants of track 
placement in 7th and 9th grade.  
3.4.1 Differences between objective and subjective assessment measures 
To compare differences between our objective and subjective assessment measures we 
have created three categories: 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 and  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. Figure 4 shows 
that 81 percent of the children in our sample are faced with objective and subjective 
assessment scores that are equal. If there is no systematic difference between the 
teacher’s assessment and the test score, we would expect both assessments to be 
equal on average. Any deviations should be approximately symmetric. From Figure 4 we 
observe however that it is more likely that the subjective assessment measure is higher 
when there is a difference between the two measures. In 5.1 percent of the cases the 
subjective assessment is lower compared to the objective assessment, in 13.9 percent it 
is higher. Since the teacher’s assessment makes use of the information revealed by the 
test score, the teacher has access to a child’s educational history in elementary school 
and has knowledge about a child’s background characteristics and earlier test scores, 
she has an information advantage.15 
                                                                
15 If we use 11 different tracks instead of 8, 32.9 percent of all children is faced with different assessment 
measures. Of these children 83 percent receives a higher subjective assessment measure of ability. 
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Figure 4: Similarities of and differences between objective and subjective assessment measures 
Note: 𝑛𝑛 = 4,500. The three columns add up to 100 percent. Objective assessment measures are test scores in 
6th grade (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖); subjective assessment measures are teacher assessments in 6th grade (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖).  
 
When we look into the differences between the test score, the teacher’s assessment and 
track placement in 7th grade, we find that most of the differences we observe are relat-
ed to gender and social-economic status. Table C1 and C2 in the Appendix show descrip-
tive statistics and estimated marginal effects from ordered probit models. From these 
analyses we observe the following main patterns. First, we observe that girls seem more 
likely to receive a teacher’s assessment that is higher compared to the test score, while 
they seem less likely to receive a teacher’s assessment that is lower compared to the test 
score. In addition, girls are more likely to receive a track placement equal to the subjec-
tive assessment measure and more likely to have a test score that is lower compared to 
their track placement. This suggests that girls not only get a more favorable assessment 
from the elementary school teacher, but also with regard to track placement in second-
ary school. Second, from the labor market position of the mother we observe that chil-
dren who have mothers who are unemployed are less likely to receive a subjective as-
sessment that is higher than the objective assessment. These children are also less likely 
to have a test score that is lower than their initial track placement and more likely to 
receive a track placement that is equal to their test score. Furthermore, children of 
mothers who are sick/unable to work are less likely to receive a subjective assessment 
that is higher than the objective assessment. These children are also less likely to receive 
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cent of the mothers who are unemployed and over 85 percent of the mothers who are 
sick\unable to work completed only lower education or vocational education. Burgess 
and Greaves (2013) obtain similar results with respect to ethnic minorities, which they 
attribute to negative stereotyping of particular groups in society. 
3.4.2 Determinants of track placement 
Figure 5 shows how children are allocated to tracks according to the two assessment 
measures. The figure is divided into three panels. The first panel documents track 
placement of children who are faced with 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. The second panel displays track 
placement of those with  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 and the final panel shows placement of those with 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. Track placement can be equal to either 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 or 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 in the upper and lower 
panel or 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 in the middle panel of Figure 5. In addition, placement in the cate-
gory labeled “else” represents those children who are placed in a track that was rec-
ommended by neither the subjective assessment nor the objective assessment meas-
ure. In almost all of these cases the subjective and objective assessment measures dif-
fer by more than three levels and track placement is in between these two measures. In 
some cases track placement is higher or lower than both assessment measures indicate. 
In the latter case our data suggest that it is more likely that track placement is higher 
than both assessment measures would merit.  
The bars in Panel A of Figure 5 suggest that when 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 children are more likely to 
be placed according to 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 than 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 (40.2 percent vs. 17.9 percent). At first sight, this 
suggests that secondary schools seem to act in a relatively conservative way by following 
the lower of the two signals. They seem to attach more value to the teacher’s assessment 
of the child’s ability relative to the test score. At the same time, the share of children placed 
in tracks that do not directly correspond with one of the assessment measures is relatively 
large (41.9 percent). The numbers in Panel C suggest that secondary schools are more likely 
to follow the teacher’s assessment even when it is higher than the test score. More than 
two thirds of the population with 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  is placed according to 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. Also the share of 
children placed in tracks that do not directly correspond with the assessment measures is 
relatively low compared to the case in which 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. Combined with the information 
from Panel A, a picture emerges that secondary schools attach more value to the teacher’s 
assessment of children’s ability relative to test scores. Note that the teacher’s assessment 
of a child’s ability is on average higher than the test score would suggest. Finally, the statis-
tics in Panel B of Figure 5 reveal that when both assessment measures give the same signal 
about children’s ability almost all children are placed in the corresponding track. Neverthe-
less, 7.3 percent of the children are allocated to a different track. Upon closer inspection 
most of these children are allocated to higher tracks relative to what the teacher’s assess-
ment and the test score recommend. Overall, it seems to be the case that secondary 
schools have a preference to allocate children according to the teacher’s assessment 
measure and/or according to the assessment that signals the highest ability.  
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A: 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 
 
B: 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  
 
C: 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  
 
Figure 5: Track placement for different objective and subjective assessment measures  
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We continue by estimating the determinants of track placement in 7th grade. Table 4 
presents the estimation results of equation (4). The estimates are coefficients from 
ordered probit models where track placement (measured between 1 and 8) is the de-
pendent variable. In the first two columns we either use the test score or the teacher’s 
assessment to estimate the determinants of track placement. As expected, we observe 
a strong positive relation between both the test score and track placement and the 
teacher’s assessment and track placement. When we rescale the test score and the 
teacher’s assessment by the cut points in their respective regressions we observe that a 
one standard deviation increase in the test score (teacher’s assessment) bridges 35.1 
percent (35.2 percent) of the gap between the lowest and the highest track placement, 
without adding any other control variables. In column (3) we add both the test score 
and the teacher’s assessment to the model. The test score and the teacher’s assess-
ment do not seem to be orthogonal. When the test score and the teacher’s assessment 
are both added to the model we observe that a one standard deviation increase in the 
test score (teacher’s assessment) bridges 11.7 percent (25.2 percent) of the gap be-
tween the lowest and the highest track placement, without adding any other control 
variables. The difference in coefficients between the test score and the teacher’s as-
sessment is significant. An important observation is that the teacher’s assessment 
seems to be a better predictor of track placement than the test score. In columns (4)-(6) 
we add control variables, elementary school fixed effects and a measure of children’s 
GPA on math and language tests in previous years, respectively. Our estimates remain 
approximately the same in these different specifications. Overall, both the teacher’s 
assessment and the test score seem likely to be important determinants of track place-
ment in 7th grade. From our final specification in column (6) we conclude that the 
teacher’s assessment appears to play a more important role in determining track 
placement compared to the test score. The estimated coefficient is about twice as 
large. This finding seems to be consistent with the subjective assessment measure hav-
ing more information about the child’s ability than the objective assessment measure.  
In columns (7)-(12) we investigate the determinants of track placement in 9th grade. 
Track placement in 9th grade consists of six categories as over time the combination 
tracks disappear and children get allocated to their final track.16 Columns (7)-(9) show 
the results for the sample of children who have not switched tracks between 7th and 
9th grade. We obtain estimated coefficients that suggest that the teacher’s assessment 
is still the best predictor of track placement for the children who have not switched 
tracks.  
                                                                
16 Secondary schools use combination tracks in the first year(s) of secondary education due to the uncertainty 
around ability. By using combination tracks schools can observe performance and allocate children to the 
most appropriate track after learning more about the ability. The combination tracks disappear into the 
neighboring main tracks. For example, children placed in track T2/T3 in the first year are expected to be re-
placed in track T2 or T3 in year 2 or 3. Such a re-placement is not considered as switching tracks. 
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Columns (10)-(12) show the results for the entire sample of children we observe in 
9th grade. We obtain a set of coefficients that suggests that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the predictive power of the test score and the teacher’s 
assessment. These results indicate that the teacher is the best predictor of children’s’ 
ability both in 7th grade and later on in the children’s secondary school career. Howev-
er, the results also show that the predictive power of the teacher compared to the 
predictive power of the test score falls over time. A possible explanation for this is that 
children who were initially assessed too favorable by the teacher have switched to a 
lower track in the first three years of secondary education.   
To take into account the covariation between the teacher’s assessment and the test 
score we also estimate the predictive power of the teacher’s assessment on track 
placement in 7th and 9th grade after correcting for the predictive power of the test 
score. This seems a natural thing to do because the teacher knows the test score of the 
child when the assessment is made. We find that the teacher’s assessment is still highly 
predictive of track placement in 7th and 9th grade after controlling for the covariation 
between the teacher’s assessment and the test score. The estimated coefficients of 
these analyses can be found in Appendix E.  
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
4:
 T
he
 d
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 o
f t
ra
ck
 p
la
ce
m
en
t (
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
𝑇𝑇
𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖
) 
  
Tr
ac
k 
pl
ac
em
en
t 
  
7t
h 
gr
ad
e 
 
9t
h 
gr
ad
e 
  
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
(1
0)
 
(1
1)
 
(1
2)
 
Te
st
 sc
or
e 
(T
S)
 
1.
51
7*
**
 
  
0.
68
7*
**
 
0.
76
2*
**
 
1.
10
2*
**
 
0.
98
0*
**
 
1.
00
7*
**
 
1.
50
1*
**
 
1.
28
5*
**
 
0.
85
4*
**
 
1.
03
7*
**
 
1.
08
6*
**
 
  
(0
.0
93
) 
  
(0
.1
06
) 
(0
.0
87
) 
(0
.1
42
) 
(0
.2
63
) 
(0
.0
72
) 
(0
.1
15
) 
(0
.2
80
) 
(0
.0
76
) 
(0
.1
10
) 
(0
.1
99
) 
Te
ac
he
r's
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t (
TA
)   
1.
99
8*
**
 
1.
49
0*
**
 
1.
46
3*
**
 
1.
84
7*
**
 
1.
94
1*
**
 
1.
69
0*
**
 
2.
17
3*
**
 
2.
09
7*
**
 
1.
03
0*
**
 
1.
61
2*
**
 
1.
48
1*
**
 
  
  
(0
.2
46
) 
(0
.2
49
) 
(0
.2
46
) 
(0
.2
79
) 
(0
.2
78
) 
(0
.2
06
) 
(0
.2
09
) 
(0
.2
73
) 
(0
.2
49
) 
(0
.1
83
) 
(0
.2
04
) 
Cu
t1
 
-2
.9
94
**
* 
-4
.0
29
**
* 
-4
.1
62
**
* 
-4
.2
55
**
* 
-5
.8
75
**
* 
-1
1.
26
6*
**
 -6
.1
68
**
* 
-9
.5
15
**
* 
-1
1.
52
9*
**
 -4
.1
52
**
* 
-7
.4
59
**
* 
-1
1.
35
0*
**
 
Cu
t2
 
-2
.0
27
**
* 
-2
.4
10
**
* 
-2
.5
53
**
* 
-2
.7
96
**
* 
-4
.1
15
**
* 
-9
.0
60
**
* 
-3
.5
64
**
* 
-6
.7
32
**
* 
-8
.5
74
**
* 
-2
.8
63
**
* 
-5
.3
78
**
* 
-8
.9
05
**
* 
Cu
t3
 
-1
.7
12
**
* 
-1
.8
90
**
* 
-2
.0
31
**
* 
-2
.0
11
**
* 
-3
.4
19
**
* 
-8
.4
08
**
* 
-3
.0
09
**
* 
-5
.3
91
**
* 
-7
.6
37
**
* 
-2
.1
81
**
* 
-3
.9
68
**
* 
-7
.8
41
**
* 
Cu
t4
 
-0
.9
62
**
* 
-0
.8
89
**
* 
-0
.9
94
**
* 
-0
.8
11
 
-1
.8
95
**
* 
-7
.2
45
**
* 
-1
.2
46
**
 
-3
.4
76
**
* 
-5
.6
69
**
* 
-0
.7
05
 
-2
.7
03
**
* 
-6
.2
33
**
* 
Cu
t5
 
-0
.3
65
* 
-0
.1
60
 
-0
.2
16
 
0.
06
2 
-0
.5
23
 
-5
.4
83
**
* 
1.
00
1*
 
-0
.6
01
 
-2
.5
75
**
* 
0.
78
5*
* 
-0
.6
29
 
-3
.8
85
**
* 
Cu
t6
 
0.
15
1 
0.
43
2*
* 
0.
41
4*
* 
0.
65
1 
0.
32
3 
-4
.7
19
**
* 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Cu
t7
 
1.
32
2*
**
 
1.
65
1*
**
 
1.
73
4*
**
 
2.
19
9*
**
 
1.
72
0*
* 
-3
.3
19
**
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Te
st
 sc
or
e/
(C
5-
C1
) 
0.
35
1 
  
0.
11
7 
0.
11
8 
0.
14
5 
0.
12
3 
0.
14
0 
0.
16
8 
0.
14
4 
0.
17
3 
0.
15
2 
0.
14
5 
Te
ac
he
r a
ss
es
sm
en
t/
 (C
5-
C1
) 
0.
35
2 
0.
25
3 
0.
22
7 
0.
24
3 
0.
24
4 
0.
23
6 
0.
24
4 
0.
23
4 
0.
20
9 
0.
23
6 
0.
19
8 
Di
ffe
re
nc
e 
TS
-T
A 
(p
-v
al
ue
)   
  
0.
01
2 
0.
01
1 
0.
03
0 
0.
02
5 
0.
00
1 
0.
00
2 
0.
05
6 
0.
56
2 
0.
01
8 
0.
22
9 
Co
nt
ro
ls 
no
 
no
 
no
 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
s 
Pr
im
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 F
E 
no
 
no
 
no
 
no
 
ye
s 
ye
s 
no
 
ye
s 
ye
s 
no
 
ye
s 
ye
s 
G
PA
t-
1,
2,
3 
no
 
no
 
no
 
no
 
no
 
ye
s 
no
 
no
 
ye
s 
no
 
no
 
ye
s 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
4.
50
0 
4.
50
0 
4.
50
0 
2.
50
9 
1.
10
0 
57
2 
1.
70
8 
87
2 
46
9 
2.
50
9 
1.
10
0 
57
2 
N
ot
e:
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 a
re
 fr
om
 o
rd
er
ed
 p
ro
bi
t r
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 w
ith
 tr
ac
k 
pl
ac
em
en
t a
s 
th
e 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e.
 T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 c
ol
um
ns
1-
6 
is 
tr
ac
k 
pl
ac
em
en
t i
n 
7t
h 
gr
ad
e 
fo
r a
ll 
ch
ild
re
n.
 T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 c
ol
um
ns
 7
-1
2 
is 
tr
ac
k 
pl
ac
em
en
t i
n 
9t
h 
gr
ad
e,
 w
he
re
 c
ol
um
ns
 7
-9
 a
re
 fo
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
w
ho
 h
av
e 
no
t s
w
itc
he
d 
tr
ac
ks
 a
nd
 c
ol
um
ns
 1
0-
12
 
ar
e 
fo
r 
al
l c
hi
ld
re
n.
 T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
 9
th
 g
ra
de
 c
on
sis
ts
 o
nl
y 
of
 6
 t
ra
ck
s 
as
 o
ve
r 
tim
e 
th
e 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
tr
ac
ks
 d
isa
pp
ea
r 
an
d 
ch
ild
re
n 
ge
t 
al
lo
ca
te
d 
to
 a
 fi
na
l t
ra
ck
. 
St
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s 
ar
e 
cl
us
te
re
d 
at
 th
e 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 le
ve
l. 
**
*,
 *
*,
 *
 re
pr
es
en
t 1
, 5
 a
nd
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
ve
ls 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 T
S 
an
d 
TA
 a
re
 s
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d.
 T
he
 c
on
tr
ol
 
va
ria
bl
es
 a
re
 g
en
de
r, 
ag
e,
 b
irt
h 
re
gi
on
 o
f t
he
 c
hi
ld
, b
irt
h 
re
gi
on
 o
f f
at
he
r a
nd
 m
ot
he
r, 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
le
ve
l o
f f
at
he
r a
nd
 m
ot
he
r, 
la
bo
r m
ar
ke
t p
os
iti
on
 o
f f
at
he
r a
nd
 m
ot
he
r, 
w
or
k 
da
ys
 p
er
 w
ee
k 
of
 fa
th
er
 a
nd
 m
ot
he
r, 
if 
th
e 
ch
ild
 li
ve
s w
ith
 b
ot
h 
pa
re
nt
s,
 a
re
a 
co
de
 o
f r
es
id
en
ce
 a
nd
 re
gi
on
. G
PA
t-
1,
2,
3 
is 
th
e 
ch
ild
’s
 G
PA
 in
 e
le
m
en
ta
ry
 sc
ho
ol
 in
 p
re
vi
ou
s y
ea
rs
. 
 
Chapter 3 
56 
Does the teacher beat the test? 
57 
3.5 Switching tracks   
Children could be allocated suboptimally across different levels of secondary education. 
Suboptimal allocation encourages switching, which comes with a cost of suboptimal 
human capital investments and adjustment cost. In addition, children could have to stay 
for an additional period in the secondary education system because transitions between 
tracks are not always smooth. Note that switching tracks is the most drastic measure 
that secondary schools can take when children are not performing up to expectations. 
For example, the first option for children who are not able to keep up with the required 
level is to let them repeat the same grade. In the event that the school believes that 
grade retention will be insufficient, children have to switch tracks. Furthermore, it is 
possible that the costs of switching tracks are different when children switch up tracks 
compared to when they switch down tracks. It is likely that the costs of switching tracks 
for children who switch down are more related to demotivation and that the cost of 
switching up tracks are more related to previous underinvestment of human capital. 
3.5.1 Documenting switchers 
Figure 3 shows that approximately 24 percent of our sample of children switches tracks 
between 7th and 9th grade. Most of the switches (55 percent) happen from 8th to 9th 
grade. Approximately 71 percent of all children who switch between tracks switch down 
and only about 29 percent of all children who switch between tracks switch up.17 In 
Figure 3 we observe that most children who switch tracks switch two tracks up or down 
measured on the track scale from 1-11 as described in Figure 1. Furthermore, correla-
tions between the teacher’s assessment, test score, track placement and switching are 
negative. This is due to the nature of our data. Since we observe track switches until 9th 
grade, we capture almost all of the switches in the T1 track but we capture less of the 
switches in the T2 and T3 tracks as these children still have the opportunity to switch 
tracks after 9th grade. This finding is confirmed by results from the Inspectorate of 
Education for all children in The Netherlands (Inspectorate of Education, 2007). Appen-
dix D documents the characteristics of switchers in detail and presents the coefficients 
of probit models. 
 
                                                                
17 Our data includes 1,266 switchers. Of these switchers 43 children switch down/up multiple tracks and 65 
children switch both up and down between 7th and 9th grade. We analyze overall switches which means that 
we refer to 1,158 switchers (i.e., 1,266 − 43 − 65 = 1,158). Figure 3 includes all 1,266 switchers.   
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Figure 3: Track switching between initial track allocation in 7th grade and 9th grade 
Note: The figure shows the total number of switchers. Negative numbers on the horizontal axis are defined as 
switches down and positive numbers as switches up. The blue and red bars add up to 100 percent individually.  
 
Figure 6 shows track switching by differences in objective and subjective assessment 
measures. The figure is divided into three panels. The first panel documents the track 
switching of children who are faced with 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. The second panel displays track 
switching of those with 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  and the final panel shows switching of those with 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. Similar to Figure 5, track placement is equal to either 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 or “else”. The 
category labeled “else” represents those children who are placed in different tracks 
than the measures advised. Note that the number of switchers is determined on the 
basis of all 11 possible tracks. 
The bars in Panel A suggest that when 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 fewer children switch between 
tracks when they have been placed according to 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and more children switch when 
they are placed according to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 or in another track than either measurement pointed 
at. Comparison of 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 in Panel A suggests that those who are placed according 
to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 are more likely to switch up consistent with the argumentation that the teacher’s 
assessment is generally more generous about the children’s ability than the test score. 
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A: 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 
 
B: 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  
 
C: 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 > 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  
 
Figure 6: Track switching for different objective and subjective assessment measures 
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The numbers in Panel C suggest that although secondary schools are more likely to 
follow the teacher’s assessment, even when it is higher than the test score, the number 
of switchers is relatively low when children are allocated based on 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖. In addition, if 
children are placed according to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 more children switch up. Finally, the statistics in 
Panel B of Figure 6 reveal that children switch less often if 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. The over-
all picture that emerges from Figure 6 is that children placed according to 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 have a 
lower probability to switch tracks relative to children placed according to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. This con-
clusion seems to hold regardless of the difference between 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. In addition, 
children allocated in accordance with the highest (lowest) of the two assessment 
measures seem to have a higher probability to switch down (up) a track, which is con-
sistent with overassessment (underassessment) of a child’s ability. 
3.5.2 Determinants of track switching 
We continue by presenting the results of analysing probit models in which we estimate 
the probability of switching. Columns (1)-(3) in Table 5 present marginal effects for 
overall switching, columns (4)-(6) present marginal effects for switching down and col-
umns (7)-(9) present marginal effects for switching up. The third specification in all 
three models includes control variables and secondary school fixed effects. Further-
more, standard errors are clustered at the secondary school level.  
The estimated coefficients in column (3) suggest that children who are placed in a 
track according to the teacher’s assessment (and not according to the test score) are 
9.8 percent more likely to switch tracks, children who are placed according to the test 
score (and not according to the teacher assessment) are 17.9 percent more likely to 
switch tracks and children who are placed not according to the teacher’s assessment or 
the test score are 16.7 percent more likely to switch tracks compared to the base lev-
el.18  
The coefficients displayed in column (6) suggest that children placed in a track ac-
cording to the teacher’s assessment (and not according to their test score) are more 
likely to switch down, whereas children who are placed according to their test score 
(and not according to their teacher’s assessment) or according to neither of the as-
sessment measures are not more likely to switch down. Finally, from the estimated 
coefficients shown in column (9) we observe that children who are placed in a track 
according to their test score (and not according to their teacher’s assessment) and 
children who are placed according to neither of the assessment measures are more 
likely to switch up, whereas children placed according to their teacher’s assessment 
(and not according to their test score) are not more likely to switch down. Finally, chil-
dren for whom 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 are least likely to switch tracks. For these children 
there is only little uncertainty about the most efficient track placement. These results 
                                                                
18 The base level in all these analyses is when 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  or 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 & 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 but 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖. 
For example: 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇3, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇2 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑇𝑇2/𝑇𝑇3.  
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seem to suggest that children are less likely to switch when they are allocated to tracks 
based on the teacher’s assessment. However, the teacher’s assessment is generally 
more favourable than the test score about a child’s ability. Therefore, children who are 
allocated according to the teacher’s assessment are more likely to switch down and 
children allocated to the test score are more likely to switch up.19 
Table 5: Switching between tracks 
  Switch  Switch down  Switch up 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
PL=TA≠TS 0.099*** 0.093*** 0.098*** 0.103*** 0.091*** 0.085*** -0.017 -0.010 -0.000 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) 
PL=TS≠TA 0.319*** 0.161*** 0.179** 0.102*** 0.024 0.025 0.252** 0.096*** 0.084** 
  (0.101) (0.049) (0.078) (0.038) (0.043) (0.038) (0.117) (0.036) (0.042) 
PL≠TA≠TS 0.269*** 0.197*** 0.167** 0.131** 0.090 0.079 0.164* 0.105*** 0.059* 
  (0.100) (0.065) (0.081) (0.060) (0.073) (0.062) (0.097) (0.038) (0.035) 
Controls no no yes no no yes no no yes 
Secondary school FE no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes 
Observations 4,019 3,836 2499 4,019 3,664 2281 4,019 3,031 1750 
Note: Probit regressions with marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the secondary school level. 
***, **, *, at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels respectively. The base level in these 
regressions is when PL=TA=TS and when PL=TA & PL=TS but TA≠TS. This can happen for example when 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇3, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇2 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑇𝑇2/𝑇𝑇3. In column 1, the base level represents 52,97 percent of the children. 
The three other categories shown in the table represent 30,28 percent, 5,8 percent and 10,95 percent respec-
tively. We control for gender, age, birth region of the child, birth region of the father and mother, education 
level of the father and mother, labor market position of father and mother, if the child lives with both parents, 
area code of residence and region.  
3.6 Test scores in 9th grade 
For a subsample of children we have data about a math and language test score in 9th 
grade. Children were randomly assigned questions in either math, language or both. We 
use the answers to 11 math questions or 8 language questions that have been asked to 
children in all tracks. This results in test scores of 𝑛𝑛 = 1,812 children.  
Table 6 documents the estimated coefficients of an analysis in which we investigate 
the effect of the teacher’s assessment and test scores in 6th grade on the test score in 
9th grade. The coefficients shown are coefficients from OLS regressions in which the 
dependent variable is the child’s score on the test in 9th grade. The test score and the 
teacher’s assessment are standardized and standard errors are clustered at the second-
                                                                
19 In Appendix F we look at the type of school children attend. We see that most of the track switching takes 
place within the pre-vocational education tracks. This is consistent with findings from the Dutch Education 
Inspectorate. Furthermore, in the switching analyses we control for the type of school (level of comprehen-
siveness) children attend. 
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ary school level. Columns (1) and (2) show that both the test score and the teacher’s 
assessment in 6th grade are positively and statistically significant related to children’s 
test score in 9th grade. Put together, the teacher’s assessment seems to be able to 
predict the test score in 9th grade more accurately. This effect is robust to the inclusion 
of secondary school fixed effects, which suggests that this effect is not specific to cer-
tain (characteristics of) schools.20  
We also estimate the predictive power of the teacher’s assessment for children’s 
test scores in 9th grade after controlling for the covariation between the teacher’s as-
sessment and the test score in 6th grade. This analysis results in an estimated coeffi-
cient of 0.0395 that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. So, even after con-
trolling for the covariation between the teacher’s assessment and the test score, the 
assessment seems to be more predictive of later test scores compared to the 6th grade 
test score. It seems likely that the teacher’s assessment also captures other skills, be-
sides math and language, that are important determinants of children’s school career.  
Table 6: Determinants of scores on math or language tests in 9th grade 
  math or language test 9th grade 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test score 0.027*   0.006 0.002 
  (0.014)   (0.015) (0.016) 
Teacher's assessment   0.071*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 
    (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Secondary school FE no no no yes 
Observations 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,116 
Adjusted R-squared 0.072 0.082 0.082 0.085 
Note: Estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the children’s score on a 
math or language test in 9th grade. Test score and teacher advice are standardized. Standard errors are 
clustered at the secondary school level. ***, **, *, at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels 
respectively. We control for track placement in 7th grade, gender, age, region of birth of child, father and 
mother, education level of father and mother, labor market position of father and mother, days worked of 
father and mother, if the child lives with both parents, area code of residence and region.  
  
                                                                
20 The test in 9th grade is limited (8 to 11 questions) and is a low-stakes test. The correlation between chil-
dren’s test score in 6th grade and their test score in 9th grade is 0.16 and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. For the analyses in Table 6 one could argue that the teacher’s assessment is better at predicting 
children’s test score in 9th grade as the teacher’s assessment likely captures other elements next to children’s 
ability that affect children’s test score on a low-stakes test more compared to their test score on a high-stakes 
test. The test score in 6th grade could be a better predictor of children’s test score on a high-stakes test but 
such information is unavailable. 
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Table 7 shows the results of an analysis in which we explain the effects of switching on 
9th grade test scores. We compare children who have switched tracks to children who 
have not. The coefficients are from OLS regressions with the test score in 9th grade as 
the dependent variable. The standard errors are clustered at the secondary school level. 
Table 7 has three panels. The top panel presents estimates for overall switching, the 
middle panel presents estimates for switching down and the bottom panel presents 
estimates for switching up. In the top panel the coefficients for switching show that for 
children in the pre-vocational track (T1c in Figure 1), the pre-higher education track and 
the pre-university track there is a statistically significant negative effect of switching 
tracks on the 9th grade test score. Second, the coefficients displayed in the middle 
panel of the table suggest that children in the pre-vocational education track (GL) and 
children in the pre-higher education track experience a statistically significant negative 
effect of switching down tracks. Finally, in the bottom panel of Table 7 the displayed 
coefficients suggest that children in the pre-vocational education track (T1d) and chil-
dren in the pre-university track experience a statistically significant negative effect of 
switching up tracks. Overall, it seems to be the case that children who have switched 
tracks experience a negative effect on their test score in 9th grade compared to chil-
dren who have not switched tracks.21 
 
  
                                                                
21 Here we assume that track switches are caused by poor performance and not related to unobservable 
characteristics, such as illness or behavioral problems.  
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3.7 Conclusions 
This paper documents and interprets the determinants of track placement in the transi-
tion from primary to secondary education and the first three years of secondary educa-
tion. Our main findings suggest that both objective and subjective assessment measures 
of ability in 6th grade predict track placement in 7th grade. The subjective assessment 
measure of the teacher contains more information as the teacher has more knowledge 
about the child’s socio-economic background, the objective test score in 6th grade, 
previous test scores and other characteristics of the child. Our estimates suggest that 
the teacher’s assessment in elementary school is a better predictor of a child’s track 
placement and subsequent performance in secondary school compared to the 6th 
grade test score. We also observe that approximately 24 percent of our population of 
children switches tracks between 7th and 9th grade. We obtain a set of estimates that 
suggests that children are the least likely to switch when they are allocated to a track 
based on the teacher’s assessment. However, when we look at switching down and up 
separately our estimates suggest that children placed in tracks according to the teach-
er’s assessment are more likely to switch down and children placed in tracks according 
to the test score and children allocated not according to any of these assessment 
measures are more likely to switch up. Finally, test scores in 9th grade seem to be bet-
ter predicted by the teacher’s assessment compared to 6th grade test scores. In addi-
tion, switchers obtain lower test scores on this 9th grade test relative to children who 
remain in their initial tracks. 
This research uses a straightforward research design and explores a dataset which 
includes information on assessment measures, track placement and subsequent per-
formance. Future work could extend our analysis by using for example more detailed 
information about different parts of the objective assessment measure. Test scores 
could be decomposed in a language and math component, which could benefit the 
analysis of allocation and performance in secondary school. In addition, the relationship 
with individual characteristics is interesting to explore further. We have used a limited 
number of covariates because of data limitations, but future data collection efforts also 
include measures of behavior and personality traits. This information could help in es-
timating more precise coefficients and possibly additional determinants of performance 
and allocation. Finally, the children in our database are followed throughout the rest of 
their educational careers. This opens avenues for future research about longer term 
effects of track allocation. 
 
  
Chapter 3 
66 
References 
Bernardi, M., M. Bratti and G. De Simone (2014). “I wish I knew…” – Misperceived ability, school track coun-
selling services and performances in upper secondary education, IZA Discussion Paper no. 7940, 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp7940.pdf.   
Bosch, N., A. Deelen and R. Euwals (2010). “Is part-time employment here to Stay? Working hours of Dutch 
women over successive generations, Labor, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 35-54. 
Brunello G. and D. Checchi (2007). Does school tracking affect equality of opportunity? New international 
evidence, Economic Policy, vol. 22, no. 52, pp. 781-861. 
Burgess, S. and E. Greaves (2013). Test scores, subjective assessment, and stereotyping of ethnic minorities, 
Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 535-576. 
Cito (2012). Terugblik en resultaten 2012. Eindtoets Basisonderwijs Groep 8, Cito, Arnhem. 
Cornwell, C., D.B. Mustard and J. van Parys (2012). Noncognitive skills and the gender disparities in test scores 
and teacher assessments: evidence from primary school, Journal of Human Resources, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 
236-264. 
Currie, J. and D. Thomas (1999). Early test scores, socioeconomic status and future outcomes, NBER Working 
Paper no. 6943, http://www.nber.org/papers/w6943. 
Dee, T.S. (2005). A teacher like me: does race, ethnicity or gender matter? American Economic Review, vol. 95, 
no. 2, pp. 158-165. 
Diris, R. (2012). The economics of the school curriculum, PhD thesis, Maastricht University. 
Education Inspectorate (2007). Transition from primary to secondary education.  
http://www.onderwijsinspectie.nl/binaries/content/assets/Actueel_publicaties/2007/Aansluiting+vo+bo
+printversie.pdf 
van Elk, R., M. van der Steeg and D. Webbink (2009). The effect of early tracking on participation in higher 
education, CPB Document no. 182, http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/effect-early-tracking-participation-
higher-education.  
Fairlie, R.W., Hoffmann, F and Oreopoulos, P. (2014). A community college instructor like me: race and ethnic-
ity interactions in the classroom. American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 8, pp. 2567-2591.  
Gibbons, S. and A. Chevalier (2008). Assessment and age 16+ education participation, Research Papers in 
Education, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 113-123. 
Golsteyn, B.H.H. and T. Schils (2014). Gender gaps in primary school achievement: A decomposition into 
endowment and returns to IQ and non-cognitive factors, Economics of Education Review, 41: 176-187 
Hanushek, E. and L. Woessmann (2006). Does early tracking affect educational inequality and performance? 
Differences-in-differences evidence across countries, Economic Journal, vol. 116, no. 510, pp. c63-c76. 
Kautz, T., J.J. Heckman, R. Diris, B. ter Weel and L. Borghans (2014). Fostering and measuring skills: Improving 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills to promote lifetime success, Working Paper, University of Chicago. 
Lavy, V. (2008). Do gender stereotypes reduce girls’ human capital outcomes? Evidence from a natural exper-
iment, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92, no. 10-11, pp. 2083-2105. 
Lindahl, E. (2007). Comparing teachers’ assessments and national test results - evidence from Sweden, IFAU 
Working Paper no. 2007:24. 
Murnane, J., J.B. Willett and F. Levy (1995). The growing importance of cognitive skills in wage determination, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 251-266.  
OECD (2007). Thematic review of tertiary education - The Netherlands, Country Note, OECD, Paris. 
Segal, C. (2008). Classroom behavior, Journal of Human Resources, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 783-814.  
Timmermans, A., H. Kuyper and G. van der Werf (2012). Schooladviezen en onderwijsloopbanen. Voorkomen, 
risicofactoren en gevolgen van onder- en overadvisering, Gronings Instituut voor Onderwijs van Onder-
wijs, Rijksuniversteit Groningen. 
Woessmann, L. (2004). Institutional comparisons in educational production, Journal for Institutional Compari-
sons, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 3-6. 
  
Does the teacher beat the test? 
67 
Appendix 
This appendix presents supporting material. The data come from a unique dataset on 
the educational development of children in a given region (Limburg) of the Netherlands, 
collected by researchers from Maastricht University. These data are collected in a coop-
erative project with (primary and secondary) schools, school boards and municipalities 
to analyze school performance in order to foster educational improvement. After se-
lecting children for whom we have information on their test score, teacher assessment 
and track placement we retain a working sample of 𝑛𝑛 = 4,500 children.  
In Section A we discuss the bivariate correlation coefficients of all of our outcomes 
measures and covariates used in our analyses. In section B we investigate whether or 
not individual characteristics are able to predict whether children end up in our sample 
of analyses. Section C1 presents an initial overview of whether the differences between 
the test score, the teacher assessment and track placement are related to individual 
characteristics. Section C2 follows up on Section C1 and presents the marginal effects of 
the differences between the test score, the teacher assessment and track placement. In 
Section D1 we move to track switching where we first provide an overview of how 
switching is related to individual characteristics. We distinguish between switching up 
and down tracks. Afterwards in Section D2 we observe the marginal effects of probit 
models for switching.   
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A. Correlations 
Table A shows the bivariate correlation coefficients of our main variables of interest, 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 as well as the covariates used in our analyses. We observe that girls 
seem to have a slightly lower test score compared to boys. Second, older children seem 
to have a lower teacher assessment, test score and track placement while they seem to 
switch tracks more. This could be due to repetition. Third, children who have a father or 
mother that was born further away from Limburg seem to have a lower teacher as-
sessment, test score and track placement. Furthermore, children whose mother was 
born further away from Limburg seem to switch track more. Fourth, the education level 
of the father and mother is positively related to the teacher assessment, test score and 
track placement of the child and negatively related to switching tracks. Fifth, it seems 
that there is a negative relationship between the father and mother not doing paid 
work and teacher assessment, test score and track placement of the child. Sixth, it 
seems that there is a positive relationship between the child living with both parents 
and the teacher assessment, test score and track placement. Seventh, workdays per 
week seems to be negatively correlated with teacher assessment, test score and track 
placement. The group of children that receives the highest teacher assessment, test 
score and track placement is largest when the father and/or mother work 3-4 days per 
week. Correlations among teacher assessment, test score and track placement are high 
and positive. 
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B. Selection into the sample 
We address selection issues with regard to the sample we use for our analyses in Table 
B. Table B shows OLS estimates of whether characteristics of children are able to predict 
whether the child ends up in our sample for analyses or has missing data. The depend-
ent variable is whether the child ends up in our sample (1) or has missing data (0). Chil-
dren who end up in our sample for analyses are children for whom we have data on 
teacher assessment, test score and track placement in 7th grade.  
Table B shows that after controlling for primary and secondary school fixed effects 
and clustering the standard errors at the secondary school level there are almost no 
individual characteristics that predict whether children end up in our sample for analysis 
or not. We use primary and secondary school fixed effects since we are concerned 
mainly about selection within schools, where schools only provide us with data about 
their best performing children and might leave out data about lower performing chil-
dren. We expect that such selection would show up on children’s SES data, such as 
education levels of parents. We cluster standard errors at the secondary school level 
since observations of children are not independent within the secondary school they 
attend. We do not find evidence at a five percent significance level that any of the char-
acteristics of children is able to predict whether the child ends up in our sample for 
analyses. Since we do not find any observable characteristics of children that predict 
whether the child ends up in our sample, we assume that there are also no unobserva-
ble characteristics that distinguish the children in our sample from the children who are 
not in our sample. Note that there are missing observations in our analyses. This is due 
to the fact that we do not have information on all covariates for all children. Since we 
are specifically interested in whether any of these covariates predict selection into our 
sample of analyses we lose observations when data on covariates is missing. Further-
more, we only have elementary school fixed effects for children in the south of the 
region we obtained the data from.  
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Table B: Selection into the sample 
  Selection into sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.005 -0.009 0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Age 2nd quarter -0.002 0.022 0.003 0.021 0.021* 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Age 3rd quarter -0.032* -0.002 -0.029*** 0.020* 0.020* 
(0.018) (0.024) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Age 4th quarter 0.033* -0.003 0.005 0.014 0.014 
(0.019) (0.025) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Student born in other region NL -0.055* -0.007 -0.028 -0.020 -0.020 
(0.029) (0.045) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) 
Student born abroad -0.015 -0.037 -0.087*** -0.025 -0.025 
(0.044) (0.060) (0.027) (0.031) (0.029) 
Father born in other region NL -0.026 0.034 -0.020 0.029* 0.029* 
(0.022) (0.032) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) 
Father born abroad -0.037 0.012 -0.032* 0.007 0.007 
(0.029) (0.036) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) 
Mother born in other region NL 0.013 -0.014 -0.005 -0.022 -0.022 
(0.022) (0.032) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) 
Mother born abroad 0.050* 0.014 0.015 -0.010 -0.010 
(0.030) (0.037) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) 
Father has vocational education 0.040** 0.020 0.019* -0.011 -0.011 
(0.017) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Father has higher education 0.071*** 0.079*** 0.016 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.022) (0.029) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
Father has university education 0.080*** 0.105*** 0.031** 0.006 0.006 
(0.023) (0.030) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) 
Mother has vocational education 0.034** 0.079*** 0.019* 0.025** 0.025* 
(0.017) (0.023) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) 
Mother has higher education 0.071*** 0.096*** 0.012 0.016 0.016 
(0.023) (0.030) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
Mother has university education 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.004 0.020 0.020 
(0.025) (0.033) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) 
Father is unemployed -0.224** -0.352** -0.035 -0.191** -0.191 
(0.111) (0.168) (0.068) (0.088) (0.137) 
Father is sick/unable to work 0.081 -0.116 0.008 -0.030 -0.030 
(0.111) (0.152) (0.067) (0.080) (0.027) 
Father other labour market position -0.201 -0.086 -0.098 0.003 0.003 
(0.127) (0.148) (0.077) (0.078) (0.040) 
Mother is unemployed -0.014 0.089 0.006 -0.119 -0.119 
(0.100) (0.169) (0.061) (0.089) (0.086) 
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Mother is sick/unable to work 0.066 -0.013 0.033 -0.065 -0.065 
(0.126) (0.152) (0.077) (0.079) (0.049) 
Mother other labour market position 0.108** -0.059 0.053 -0.035 -0.035 
(0.054) (0.069) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) 
Student lives with both parents 0.027 0.037* 0.006 0.010 0.010 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
Father works parttime 3/4 days per 
week 
0.138 0.193 0.115 0.186* 0.186 
(0.120) (0.211) (0.073) (0.110) (0.183) 
Father works fulltime 0.124 0.181 0.130* 0.198* 0.198 
(0.118) (0.209) (0.071) (0.109) (0.182) 
Mother works parrtime 3/4 days per 
week 
-0.014 -0.011 0.002 0.004 0.004 
(0.024) (0.034) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) 
Mother works fulltime -0.056** -0.049 -0.018 0.002 0.002 
(0.025) (0.035) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) 
Student has repeated a grade in 
secondary school 
0.258*** 0.087 0.044** 0.013 0.013 
(0.028) (0.120) (0.018) (0.064) (0.019) 
Constant -0.162 0.533 -0.554* 0.893*** 0.893*** 
  (0.474) (0.337) (0.291) (0.204) (0.236) 
Primary school FE no yes no yes yes 
Secondary school FE no no yes yes yes 
SEs clustered at the SS no no no no yes 
Observations 4,861 1,872 4,861 1,872 1,872 
R-squared 0.186 0.561 0.707 0.884 0.884 
Note: Coefficients are from OLS regressions. The dependent variable has value 1 when the child is included in 
the analyses sample and value 0 when the child has missing data on teacher assessment or test score in 6th 
grade or track placement in 7th grade.  
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C1. Similarities of and differences between assessment measures and allocation 
Table C1 shows a number of statistics. The left-hand panel shows the relation between 
different individual characteristics and the objective and subjective assessment meas-
ure, the middle panel shows the relation between individual characteristics and the 
subjective assessment measure and track placement, the right-hand panel shows the 
relation between individual characteristics and the objective assessment measure and 
track placement.22  
We observe that girls more often seem to receive a teacher assessment that is high-
er compared to the test score, while they less often seem to receive a teacher assess-
ment that is lower compared to the test score. In addition, girls more often receive a 
track placement equal to the subjective assessment measure and more often have a 
test score that is lower compared to their track placement. Second, the education level 
of the child’s mother and father has a similar relation to the assessment measures and 
track placement. We observe that when a child’s parents have a higher education level 
the child more often receives a subjective assessment that is higher than the objective 
assessment and less often receives a subjective assessment that is lower than the ob-
jective assessment compared to when the child’s parents have a lower level of educa-
tion. The middle and right-hand panel show that children of parents who have a higher 
education level less often receive a subjective and objective assessment that is higher 
than track placement. This suggests that girls and children from parents who are highly 
educated not only get a more favorable assessment, compared to boys and children 
from parents who are lower educated, from the elementary school teacher but also 
from the secondary school with regard to track placement. Third, from the labor market 
position of the mother we observe that children who have mothers that are unem-
ployed more often receive a subjective assessment that is lower than the objective 
assessment and less often receive a subjective assessment that is higher than the objec-
tive assessment. Furthermore, children of mothers who are sick/unable to work less 
often receive a subjective assessment that is lower than track placement and more 
often receive an objective and subjective assessment that is higher than track place-
ment. In our data over 70 percent of the mothers who are unemployed and over 85 
percent of the mothers who are sick\unable to work completed only lower education or 
vocational education. Fourth, we observe a pattern related to the region of birth of the 
children and their parents. Children or parents born in another part of the Netherlands 
outside of Limburg or born abroad more often receive a subjective assessment higher 
than the objective assessment and more often receive a subjective and objective as-
sessment that is not equal to track placement. In most of the cases when the assess-
ment measures are not equal to track placement these children receive assessment 
                                                                
22 In Table 4 we disregard the labor market position of the father and the workdays per week of the father. 
Almost all fathers are employed and work fulltime. There are too little observations in the other categories to 
make any statements about this information.  
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measures that are lower than track placement. This is especially the case for children or 
parents born abroad. Finally, we observe a pattern in children’s birth quarters. There is 
an unofficial cut-off date for children’s birthdays where children born after 1 October 
often have to wait another year to start primary education. Therefore, the oldest chil-
dren are born in the fourth quarter. We observe that younger children more often re-
ceive a subjective assessment that is higher than the objective assessment. These chil-
dren also more often receive a subjective assessment that is higher than their track 
placement and an objective assessment that is lower than their track placement. When 
we look at the 6th grade test scores of these children we see that test scores rise with 
children’s age. Workdays per week mother and whether the child lives with both par-
ents does not show any pattern.  
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Table C1: Similarities of and differences between assessment measures and allocation 
  Objective and 
subjective assesment 
measures 
 Subjective 
assessment measures 
and track placement 
 Objective assessment 
measures and track 
placement 
  TAi < 
TSi 
TAi = 
TSi 
TAi > 
TSi 
TAi < 
TPi 
TAi = 
TPi 
TAi > 
TPi 
TSi < 
TPi 
TPi = 
TSi 
TSi > 
TPi 
Female Boys 6.19 81.70 12.11 7.81 87.34 4.85 18.48 75.60 5.91 
Girls 4.21 80.34 15.46 7.17 89.33 3.50 21.21 74.84 3.94 
Education father Lower education 8.14 79.04 12.82 9.66 85.96 4.37 19.13 73.96 6.92 
Vocational 5.32 81.31 13.37 7.89 87.62 4.49 20.43 73.92 5.65 
Higher education 3.95 81.21 14.83 5.93 91.38 2.68 19.77 76.69 3.53 
University 3.15 82.61 14.24 6.18 90.20 3.62 20.77 76.66 2.57 
Education 
mother 
Lower education 7.93 78.63 13.44 8.12 86.94 4.93 19.83 73.21 6.96 
Vocational 5.44 81.06 13.50 8.26 87.84 3.90 19.88 75.22 4.90 
Higher education 3.72 83.66 12.62 5.66 91.26 3.07 17.96 77.83 4.21 
University 2.57 82.48 14.95 6.59 90.84 2.57 22.35 75.08 2.57 
Labour market 
position father 
Employed 5.42 81.07 13.52 7.57 88.50 3.92 19.73 75.46 4.81 
Unemployed 1.32 85.53 13.16 7.89 86.84 5.26 27.63 60.53 11.84 
Sick/unable to work 5.15 81.44 13.40 6.19 90.72 3.09 18.56 78.35 3.09 
Other 5.97 79.10 14.93 5.97 85.07 8.96 16.42 77.61 5.97 
Labour market 
position mother 
Employed 5.49 81.02 13.49 7.81 88.33 3.86 19.68 75.25 5.07 
Unemployed 7.06 84.71 8.24 7.06 89.41 3.53 16.47 77.65 5.88 
Sick/unable to work 4.38 80.63 15.00 3.75 89.38 6.88 16.88 75.00 8.13 
Other 4.70 81.39 13.91 6.95 89.37 3.68 22.29 74.44 3.27 
Workdays per 
week father 
Fulltime 5.78 80.80 13.42 7.60 88.43 3.97 19.70 75.22 5.08 
Parttime 3-4 days 2.99 82.09 14.93 7.84 89.93 2.24 20.15 77.99 1.87 
Parttime 1-2 days          
Workdays per 
week mother 
Fulltime 6.00 79.75 14.25 8.42 86.65 4.93 19.35 75.27 5.38 
Parttime 3-4 days 5.16 81.98 12.86 7.64 89.42 2.95 19.69 75.22 5.09 
Parttime 1-2 days 5.44 81.17 13.39 8.37 87.87 3.77 18.83 77.82 3.35 
Living with both 
parents 
No 5.35 80.81 13.84 6.92 88.38 4.70 19.06 75.07 5.87 
Yes 5.52 81.18 13.30 7.60 88.60 3.80 19.99 75.05 4.96 
Region of birth 
child 
Limburg 5.41 81.87 12.72 7.31 89.07 3.61 19.52 75.44 5.04 
Netherlands 5.68 75.38 18.94 8.33 84.09 7.58 18.94 75.38 5.68 
Abroad 5.45 75.15 19.39 10.30 82.42 7.27 24.85 69.70 5.45 
Region of birth 
father 
Limburg 5.60 81.59 12.81 7.74 88.72 3.53 19.74 75.10 5.16 
Netherlands 4.21 81.50 14.29 4.95 90.11 4.95 16.48 78.75 4.76 
Abroad 5.54 77.83 16.63 9.24 84.53 6.24 23.79 71.36 4.85 
Region of birth 
mother 
Limburg 5.32 81.90 12.78 7.23 89.13 3.65 19.04 75.88 5.09 
Netherlands 4.83 80.69 14.48 7.14 87.45 5.41 19.69 75.10 5.21 
Abroad 6.54 76.87 16.59 9.81 85.05 5.14 24.30 70.79 4.91 
Birth quarter 
child 
1st 5.02 68.13 26.85 9.86 84.93 5.21 33.70 60.91 5.39 
2nd 5.81 67.08 27.10 9.66 83.63 6.71 32.47 60.82 6.71 
3rd 5.21 64.75 30.04 8.83 83.48 7.69 35.60 56.98 7.42 
4th 6.23 68.57 25.19 10.22 85.11 4.68 33.25 60.43 6.32 
Note: 𝑛𝑛 = 4,500 in total but some children have missing data on some of the covariates. The numbers in the rows 
in each section of columns add up to 100 percent. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  is the objective assessment measure based on the Cito 
Eindtoets (test score) in 6th grade. 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  is the subjective assessment measure based on teacher advice. 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is track 
placement in 7th grade. All are measured in 8 brackets. The last row for ‘work days per week father’ is missing. 
There are too little fathers that work 1-2 days per week to draw any conclusions based on this information.   
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C2. Marginal effects of similarities of and differences between assessment and 
allocation 
Table C2 presents marginal effects of differences between the objective and subjective 
assessment measures and track placement. The left-hand panel shows the relation 
between different individual characteristics and the objective and subjective assess-
ment measure, the middle panel shows the relation between individual characteristics 
and the subjective assessment measure and track placement, the right-hand panel 
shows the relation between individual characteristics and the objective assessment 
measure and track placement. We include elementary school fixed effects as we want 
to observe within school differences.23 In addition, all analyses in this paper include 
clustered standard errors either at the elementary school or secondary school level 
since we believe that the observations are not independent within schools. The margin-
al effects result from an ordered probit model in which we predict the probability that 
individual characteristics affect differences between assessment measures of differ-
ences between an assessment measure and track placement.24 
First, we observe that girls are less likely to receive a subjective assessment that is 
lower than or equal to the objective assessment and more likely to receive a subjective 
assessment that is higher than the objective assessment compared to boys. Further-
more, girls are more likely to receive an objective assessment that is lower than track 
placement and less likely to receive an objective assessment that is equal or higher than 
track placement compared to boys. This suggests that elementary schools tend to give a 
higher assessment to girls compared to boys and that secondary schools tend to place 
girls in higher tracks compared to boys. Second, children born abroad or fathers born in 
another part of The Netherlands outside Limburg are less likely to receive an objective 
assessment that is lower than track placement and more likely to receive an objective 
assessment that is equal to track placement. In addition, children who have fathers who 
were born abroad are more likely to receive a subjective assessment that is equal to the 
objective assessment and less likely to receive a subjective assessment that is higher 
than the objective assessment. While children who have mothers that were born 
abroad are more likely to have a subjective assessment that is lower than track place-
ment and less likely to have a subjective assessment that is higher than track place-
ment. Third, children whose mother is unemployed or sick/unable to work are less likely 
to receive a subjective assessment that is higher than the objective assessment. Fur-
thermore, these children are also less likely to receive an objective assessment that is 
lower than track placement. This suggests that primary and secondary schools seem to 
                                                                
23 Specifications without elementary school fixed effects show estimates of similar size and statistical signifi-
cance. This also suggests that different schools do not systematically over or under assess children or children 
with different characteristics.  
24 In Table 4 we disregard the labor market position of the father and the workdays per week of the father. 
Almost all fathers are employed and work fulltime. There are too little observations in the other categories to 
make any statements about this information. 
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value when a child’s mother is employed. In our sample mothers who are unemployed 
or sick/unable to work on average have a lower level of education. Fourth, secondary 
schools seem to value when mothers work fulltime as their children are more likely to 
receive a subjective assessment that is lower than track placement and less likely to 
receive a subjective assessment that is equal to or higher than track placement.  
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Table C2: Marginal effects of similarities of and differences between assessment and allocation 
Marginal effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  TA<TS TA=TS TA>TS TA<PL TA=PL TA>PL TS<PL TS=PL TS>PL 
Female -0.015** -0.043*** 0.058*** 0.008 -0.006 -0.002 0.068*** -0.062*** -0.006** 
(0.006) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011) (0.009) (0.002) (0.026) (0.023) (0.003) 
Age 2nd quarter 0.012 0.026** -0.038* 0.014 -0.012 -0.003 0.012 -0.011 -0.001 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.004) (0.037) (0.034) (0.003) 
Age 3rd quarter 0.001 0.004 -0.006 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 -0.032 -0.003 
(0.006) (0.017) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.003) (0.037) (0.034) (0.003) 
Age 4th quarter 0.006 0.014 -0.020 0.031 -0.027 -0.005 0.033 -0.030 -0.003 
(0.008) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.004) (0.040) (0.037) (0.003) 
Student born in NL 0.008 0.016 -0.024 0.068 -0.062 -0.006 -0.025 0.022 0.003 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.033) (0.047) (0.044) (0.004) (0.043) (0.037) (0.005) 
Student born abroad 0.003 0.008 -0.012 -0.007 0.005 0.002 -0.095** 0.077*** 0.017 
(0.018) (0.037) (0.054) (0.024) (0.017) (0.007) (0.041) (0.026) (0.015) 
Father born in NL 0.012 0.022* -0.033 -0.009 0.007 0.002 -0.063* 0.055* 0.008 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.025) (0.016) (0.011) (0.005) (0.035) (0.029) (0.006) 
Father born abroad 0.014 0.024*** -0.038* -0.006 0.005 0.001 -0.038 0.034 0.004 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.005) (0.046) (0.040) (0.006) 
Mother born in NL -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.009 -0.009 -0.001 
(0.007) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023) (0.019) (0.004) (0.050) (0.046) (0.004) 
Mother born abroad 0.005 0.012 -0.017 0.046* -0.041* -0.005** 0.065 -0.061 -0.004 
(0.013) (0.025) (0.038) (0.026) (0.025) (0.003) (0.064) (0.061) (0.003) 
Father has vocational 
education 
0.005 0.013 -0.018 -0.024* 0.018* 0.006 -0.035 0.031 0.003 
(0.007) (0.016) (0.022) (0.014) (0.009) (0.005) (0.035) (0.032) (0.004) 
Father has higher 
education 
-0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.036 -0.033 -0.003 
(0.007) (0.022) (0.029) (0.017) (0.013) (0.004) (0.050) (0.047) (0.003) 
Father has university 
education 
-0.004 -0.012 0.016 -0.018 0.013 0.005 0.036 -0.033 -0.003 
(0.006) (0.024) (0.030) (0.015) (0.010) (0.005) (0.048) (0.044) (0.003) 
Mother has 
vocational education 
0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.015 -0.012 -0.003 0.006 -0.005 -0.001 
(0.006) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016) (0.004) (0.039) (0.036) (0.003) 
Mother has higher 
education 
-0.002 -0.005 0.007 -0.023 0.016* 0.007 -0.052 0.047 0.006 
(0.007) (0.023) (0.030) (0.017) (0.009) (0.007) (0.040) (0.035) (0.006) 
Mother has 
university education 
-0.005 -0.017 0.022 -0.012 0.009 0.003 -0.006 0.005 0.001 
(0.006) (0.027) (0.033) (0.017) (0.012) (0.005) (0.048) (0.043) (0.004) 
Father is sick/unable 
to work 
-0.016*** -0.344* 0.360** 0.009 -0.007 -0.002 0.419** -0.411** -0.008*** 
(0.004) (0.179) (0.180) (0.032) (0.027) (0.005) (0.179) (0.179) (0.003) 
Father has other 
labour market 
position 
-0.004 -0.016 0.021 -0.046*** -0.269 0.316 -0.089 0.073 0.016 
(0.027) (0.135) (0.162) (0.010) (0.224) (0.222) (0.122) (0.079) (0.043) 
Mother is 
unemployed 
0.431 -0.342 -0.090*** 0.398 -0.391 -0.007* -0.146*** 0.084*** 0.062 
(0.316) (0.314) (0.008) (0.317) (0.317) (0.004) (0.032) (0.025) (0.057) 
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Mother is 
sick/unable to work 
0.588 -0.498 -0.090*** 0.033 -0.029 -0.004 -0.138*** 0.088*** 0.050* 
(0.373) (0.371) (0.008) (0.059) (0.055) (0.004) (0.022) (0.008) (0.029) 
Mother  has other 
labour market 
position 
0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.056 -0.051 -0.005 0.185 -0.178 -0.007** 
(0.010) (0.029) (0.040) (0.072) (0.069) (0.004) (0.128) (0.126) (0.003) 
Father works 
parttime 3/4 days 
per week 
0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.024 -0.021 -0.004 0.018 -0.017 -0.001 
(0.008) (0.022) (0.031) (0.024) (0.022) (0.003) (0.046) (0.043) (0.003) 
Mother works 
parttime 3/4 days 
per week 
-0.009 -0.026 0.035 0.041 -0.032* -0.009 0.012 -0.011 -0.001 
(0.008) (0.021) (0.029) (0.026) (0.019) (0.008) (0.044) (0.040) (0.004) 
Mother works 
fulltime 
-0.009 -0.029 0.038 0.077** -0.065** -0.013* 0.039 -0.036 -0.003 
(0.007) (0.026) (0.033) (0.035) (0.029) (0.007) (0.046) (0.042) (0.004) 
Student lives with 
both parents 
0.004 0.015 -0.019 0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.000 
(0.005) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.011) (0.003) (0.033) (0.030) (0.003) 
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
Note: Ordered probit regressions with marginal effects. Every three columns represent one ordered probit 
regression of three levels. Standard errors are clustered at the elementary school level. All estimates include 
elementary school fixed effects and control variables for area code of residence and region. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  is the objec-
tive assessment measure based on the Cito Eindtoets (test score) in 6th grade. 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  is the subjective assess-
ment measure based on teacher advice. 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is track placement in 7th grade. All are measured in 8 brackets. 
***, **, * represents significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
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D1. Similarities of and switching between tracks 
Table D1 shows the percentages of children who switch tracks between 7th and 9th 
grade.25 We observe that girls overall switch less than boys, however, there are more 
girls that switch up and more boys that switch down. Second, the higher the education 
level of the parents the fewer children switch between tracks. Children who have par-
ents who have obtained lower education or vocational education are more likely to 
switch between tracks. As mentioned before this might be an artifact of our data since 
children’s track placement is correlated with their parents’ education level. Third, we 
observe that children whose mother is unemployed switch more. Switching both up and 
down tracks is more common compared to children whose mother is employed. Fourth, 
we observe that children whose mother works fulltime switch more compared to chil-
dren whose mother works part-time. Especially switches down appear more often. 
Fifth, children who do not live with both parents switch more often, both switches up 
and down are more common. The last three effects are likely related to parents’ educa-
tion level. In at least two thirds of the cases when the child does not live with both par-
ents the parents have either obtained lower education or vocational education. These 
findings are consistent with children of higher educated parents more often receiving a 
subjective assessment compared to the objective assessment. Finally, when the chil-
dren’s parents were born abroad the child more often switches down tracks. This is 
consistent with the finding that children’s whose parents were born abroad more often 
receive a subjective assessment that is higher compared to the objective assessment. 
We do not observe a pattern in children’s quarter of birth.  
  
                                                                
25 In Table 5 we disregard the labor market position of the father and the workdays per week of the father. 
Almost all fathers are employed and work fulltime. There are too little observations in the other categories to 
make any statements about this information. 
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Table D1: Similarities of and differences between switching tracks 
 Switch  Switch up  Switch down 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Female Boys 76.03 23.97 93.34 6.66 81.46 18.54 
Girls 77.63 22.37 92.57 7.43 83.62 16.38 
Education father Lower education 71.94 28.06 90.93 9.07 78.52 21.48 
Vocational 76.98 23.02 92.33 7.67 84.10 15.90 
Higher education 81.40 18.60 94.15 5.85 86.35 13.65 
University 85.54 14.46 95.54 4.46 89.46 10.54 
Education mother Lower education 71.00 29.00 89.86 10.14 78.65 21.35 
Vocational 77.41 22.59 92.85 7.15 83.85 16.15 
Higher education 85.39 14.61 96.23 3.77 88.86 11.14 
University 84.80 15.20 95.08 4.92 89.00 11.00 
Labour market position 
father 
Employed 78.05 21.95 93.01 6.99 83.86 16.14 
Unemployed 80.90 19.10 92.13 7.87 87.64 12.36 
Sick/unable to work 75.83 24.17 90.83 9.17 84.17 15.83 
Other 67.57 32.43 94.59 5.41 71.62 28.38 
Labour market position 
mother 
Employed 78.02 21.98 93.08 6.92 83.79 16.21 
Unemployed 71.84 28.16 88.35 11.65 82.52 17.48 
Sick/unable to work 79.03 20.97 91.94 8.06 85.48 14.52 
Other 78.24 21.76 93.70 6.30 83.40 16.60 
Workdays per week 
father 
Fulltime 77.76 22.24 92.90 7.10 83.60 16.40 
Parttime 3-4 days 81.97 18.03 94.90 5.10 86.39 13.61 
Parttime 1-2 days             
Workdays per week 
mother 
Fulltime 76.50 23.50 92.50 7.50 82.67 17.33 
Parttime 3-4 days 80.05 19.95 94.42 5.58 84.71 15.29 
Parttime 1-2 days 78.33 21.67 91.67 8.33 85.83 14.17 
Living with both parents No 72.69 27.31 92.71 7.29 78.59 21.41 
Yes 79.27 20.73 93.07 6.93 85.01 14.99 
Region of birth child Limburg 77.75 22.25 93.19 6.81 83.53 16.47 
Netherlands 77.51 22.49 89.36 10.64 84.50 15.50 
Abroad 78.97 21.03 94.36 5.64 84.62 15.38 
Region of birth father Limburg 78.34 21.66 93.37 6.63 84.12 15.88 
Netherlands 78.81 21.19 91.52 8.48 84.77 15.23 
Abroad 73.84 26.16 92.05 7.95 80.43 19.57 
Region of birth mother Limburg 78.62 21.38 93.41 6.59 84.41 15.59 
Netherlands 77.65 22.35 91.68 8.32 82.87 17.13 
Abroad 73.63 26.37 91.89 8.11 80.73 19.27 
Birth quarter child 1st 77.74 22.26 93.77 6.23 82.56 17.44 
2nd 76.35 23.65 92.20 7.80 82.78 17.22 
3rd 76.46 23.54 92.42 7.58 82.54 17.46 
4th 75.65 24.35 93.38 6.62 81.29 18.71 
Note: 𝑛𝑛 = 4,937. For the analysis of switching we use all children for whom we have information on track 
placement from 7th-9th grade to keep sample size as large as possible. For 4,019 of these children we have 
information on their teacher advice (TAi) and test score (TSi) in 6th grade. The numbers in each row section 
add up to 100 percent. The last row for ‘work days per week father’ is missing. There are too little fathers that 
work 1-2 days per week to draw any conclusions based on this information.   
Chapter 3 
82 
D2. Marginal effects of similarities of and differences between track switching 
Table D2 reports marginal effects of similarities of and differences between switching. 
The first column presents estimates from overall switching, while the second and third 
column specify switching up or switching down. 26 We include secondary school fixed 
effects as we want to observe within school differences. In addition, standard errors are 
clustered at the secondary school level as the individual observations are not independ-
ent within schools. The marginal effects result from probit models in which we predict 
the probability that individual characteristics affect switching, switching up and switch-
ing down.27 
From Table D2 we observe that girls are less likely to switch and especially less likely 
to switch down tracks compared to boys. This indicates that elementary schools are 
correct to more often award girls with a higher subjective assessment than their objec-
tive assessment compared to boys and that secondary schools are correct to more 
often place girls in a higher track than their objective assessment recommended. Sec-
ond, children born in the Netherlands but outside Limburg are less likely to switch and 
especially less likely to switch down tracks compared to children born in Limburg. This 
indicates that the elementary school was correct in more often giving these children a 
subjective assessment that was higher than the objective assessment. Third, we observe 
that children whose fathers a higher educated are increasingly less likely to switch be-
tween tracks and especially to switch down tracks. This indicates that elementary 
schools were correct to less often give these children a subjective assessment that is 
lower than their objective assessment. Furthermore, secondary schools also seem to 
have been correct when they less often place children of higher educated parents in a 
track that is lower than the subjective or objective assessment. Finally, children who live 
with both parents are less likely to switch and especially less likely to switch down 
tracks. This effect is likely related to the education level of the children’s parents. We do 
not find a pattern for the other covariates in the model.  
 
  
                                                                
26 The estimated coefficients of switch up and switch down do not exactly add up to the estimated coefficient 
of overall switching. This is due to the fact that there are 65 children that switch both up and down between 
7th and 9th grade. These children are captured twice in the switch up/down but only once with regard to 
overall switching. We keep these children in our analyses as we want to document all switches.  
27 In Table 5 we disregard the labor market position of the father and the workdays per week of the father. 
Almost all fathers are employed and work fulltime. There are too little observations in the other categories to 
make any statements about this information. 
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Table D2: Marginal effects of similarities of and differences between switching 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Switch Switch up Switch down 
Female -0.035* 0.005 -0.051*** 
(0.020) (0.006) (0.016) 
Age 2nd quarter -0.007 0.001 -0.026 
(0.024) (0.006) (0.023) 
Age 3rd quarter 0.009 -0.001 -0.005 
(0.031) (0.007) (0.031) 
Age 4th quarter 0.017 -0.001 0.011 
(0.028) (0.007) (0.028) 
Student born in other region NL -0.066** 0.005 -0.053* 
(0.029) (0.007) (0.029) 
Student born abroad -0.015 -0.006 -0.030 
(0.047) (0.009) (0.024) 
Father born in other region NL 0.025 0.005 -0.012 
(0.035) (0.011) (0.026) 
Father born abroad 0.017 0.005 0.015 
(0.035) (0.015) (0.029) 
Mother born in other region NL 0.017 0.002 0.019 
(0.033) (0.007) (0.032) 
Mother born abroad 0.011 -0.006 0.018 
(0.037) (0.008) (0.036) 
Father has vocational education -0.032 0.001 -0.042** 
(0.022) (0.003) (0.019) 
Father has higher education -0.042** 0.003 -0.043*** 
(0.021) (0.004) (0.014) 
Father has university education -0.065*** -0.001 -0.063*** 
(0.017) (0.006) (0.019) 
Mother has vocational education -0.009 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.018) (0.008) (0.023) 
Mother has higher education -0.041 -0.004 -0.036 
(0.027) (0.008) (0.026) 
Mother has university education -0.017 0.000 -0.026 
(0.028) (0.008) (0.029) 
Father is sick/unable to work 0.155   0.144 
(0.277)   (0.293) 
Father other labour market position -0.017 0.054 -0.058 
(0.097) (0.090) (0.068) 
Mother is unemployed 0.064   0.052 
(0.148)   (0.131) 
Mother is sick/unable to work -0.091   -0.042 
(0.063)   (0.080) 
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Mother other labour market position -0.021 -0.009 -0.029 
(0.060) (0.010) (0.051) 
Student lives with both parents -0.055** 0.006 -0.061*** 
(0.023) (0.008) (0.024) 
Father works parttime 3/4 days per week 0.931*** 0.996*** 0.930*** 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.011) 
Father works fulltime 0.266*** 0.028 0.205*** 
(0.020) (0.031) (0.010) 
Mother works parrtime 3/4 days per week -0.025 -0.013 -0.002 
(0.041) (0.012) (0.041) 
Mother works fulltime -0.006 -0.009 0.001 
(0.039) (0.009) (0.039) 
Student has repeated a grade in secondary school -0.055 -0.011 -0.029 
(0.037) (0.012) (0.040) 
Secondary school FE yes yes yes 
Observations 2,019 864 1,853 
Note: Probit regressions with marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the secondary school level. All 
estimates include control variables for the test score and teacher advice in 6th grade, track placement in 7th 
grade, area code of residence and region. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is the objective assessment measure based on the Cito 
Eindtoets (test score) in 6th grad. 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  is the subjective assessment measure based on teacher advice. 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is 
track placement in 7th grade. All are measured in 8 brackets. ***, **, * represents significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level respectively. 
  
Does the teacher beat the test? 
85 
E. Robustness check: taking into account the covariation between the teacher 
assessment (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻) and the test score (𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻).  
Table E1 reports a robustness check to show that the teacher’s assessment (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴) has 
added value in predicting children’s track placement in 7th and 9th grade on top of 
what is already explained by the test score (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇). The table shows estimated coefficients 
of the predictive value of the teacher’s assessment for ordered probit models after 
correcting for the predictive power of the test score. In the first step, we regress track 
placement on the test score. In the second step, we fix the parameter for the test score 
that we estimated in the first step. Afterwards, we regress track placement on the 
teacher’s assessment, all control and dummy variables and the fixed parameter for the 
test score. This provides us with the predictive power of the teacher’s assessment after 
correcting for the covariation between the teacher’s assessment and the test score. 
Columns 1 and 3 show the estimated parameter for the test score that we keep fixed in 
columns 2 and 4. In columns 2 and 4 we observe that after correcting for the covariance 
between the teacher’s assessment and the test score the teacher’s assessment still has 
a statistically significant positive coefficient. This indicates that the teacher’s assessment 
has added value for track placement in both 7th and 9th grade on top of the predictive 
power of the test score. Analysis with OLS provide similar results.  
Table E1: Robustness check 
  Track placement 
  7th grade  9th grade 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test score (TS) 2.104*** 2.104 1.960*** 1.960 
  (0.137) (0.000) (0.111) (0.000) 
Teacher assessment (TA)   1.237***   1.028*** 
    (0.257)   (0.169) 
cut1 -2.275 -4.637*** -5.276*** -8.269*** 
cut2 -0.994 -2.830* -3.876*** -6.133*** 
cut3 -0.579 -2.143 -2.858** -4.649*** 
cut4 0.469 -0.500 -1.855 -3.288*** 
cut5 1.545 1.017 -0.003 -0.955 
cut6 2.262 1.942     
cut7 3.504** 3.523**     
Controls  yes yes yes yes 
Primary school FE yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
 
  
Chapter 3 
86 
F. Robustness check: is switching related to the availability of school types in the 
region? 
Tables F1 and F2 report descriptive statistics about the percentage of children that 
switch tracks and the level of comprehensiveness of schools. It is possible that it is easi-
er for children to switch tracks when they go to a school that offers all tracks, a com-
prehensive school. First, the tables show that the most switching happens in schools 
that only offer pre-vocational tracks and that the least switching happens in schools 
that offer pre-higher and pre-university education. This can be a mechanical effect from 
our data since we observe children until 9th grade which means that it is likely that we 
capture almost all of the switching in the pre-vocational tracks but not all of the switch-
ing in the pre-higher education and pre-university tracks. Students in the pre-higher 
education and pre-university tracks can still switch in later grades. Second, table F2 
shows that more children switch in a comprehensive school (both in absolute as well as 
in relative terms) compared to children in non-comprehensive schools. It is likely that 
this effect is driven by track switches in pre-vocational education.  
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Table F1: robustness check, is switching related to the availability of school types in the region? (column 
totals) 
  Switch  
 pre-vocational  
tracks 
pre-higher/ 
pre-uni 
theoretical pre-
vocational/pre-
higher/pre-uni 
comprehensive Total 
No 481 1,575 952 771 3,779 
  58.16 90.62 77.84 67.10 76.54  
Yes 346 163 271 378 1,158 
  41.84 9.38 22.16 32.90 23.46  
Total 827 1,738 1,223 1,149 4,937 
  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Table F2: robustness check, is switching related to the availability of school types in the region? (row totals)  
  Switch  
 pre-vocational  
tracks 
pre-higher/pre-uni theoretical pre-
vocational/pre-
higher/pre-uni 
comprehensive Total 
No 481 1,575 952 771 3,779 
  12.73 41.68 25.19 20.40 100.00  
Yes 346 163 271 378 1,158 
  29.88 14.08 23.40 32.64 100.00  
Total 827 1,738 1,223 1,149 4,937 
  16.75 35.20 24.77 23.27 100.00  
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4.1 Introduction 
Across countries different methods are used to assess children’s ability levels and to 
select children into tracks. A teacher’s assessment and a cognitive test are frequently 
used measures in this process. Tests are frequently used to measure children’s cognitive 
ability as they are assumed to provide objective assessments of ability levels, whereas 
teacher’s assessments are more likely to be subjective and biased (e.g., Dee, 2005; 
Burgess and Greaves, 2013; Fairlie et al., 2014). It is often assumed that teachers take 
into consideration all available information when assessing a child’s ability level, or at 
least that teachers make an accurate selection of the available information. However, it 
is not clear how teachers weight the information that becomes available after children 
participate in a cognitive test. Both the teacher and the test attempt to measure the 
same unobserved variable, the child’s ability level.  
This study investigates to what extent and for which children teachers adjust their 
initial assessment of children’s ability after observing these children’s score on a high-
stakes math and language test at the end of 6th grade. Previous research in chapter 3 of 
this dissertation and Timmermans et al. (2013) shows that the teacher’s assessment 
and the test score are the two most important determinants of children’s track alloca-
tion and schooling outcomes in secondary education. However, up to now it remains 
unclear to what extent an independent teacher’s assessment is equally accurate or 
significantly better (or worse) at predicting children’s ability levels without the added 
benefit of a test score to guide the teacher’s assessment process. We use a unique 
dataset that allows us to distinguish the initial teacher’s assessment, the test score and 
the final teacher’s assessment. This allows us to show how teachers use the test score 
to adjust their own initial assessment of children’s ability level and it highlights that 
certain groups are more affected by this adjustment process than others. Furthermore, 
this gives us insights into the accuracy and confidence with which teachers measure 
children’s ability levels.  
The research methodology of this study consists of three steps. The first step is to 
determine what factors predict the final teacher’s assessment. We investigate the pre-
dictive power of the initial teacher’s assessment and the cognitive test score in deter-
mining the final assessment. In the second step we investigate the effect size of having 
a different test score, compared to the initial teacher’s assessment, on the final teach-
er’s assessment. The third step is to investigate whether the adjustment the teacher 
makes is heterogeneous across gender and social-economic status.  
This study takes advantage of a dataset that has information on the teacher’s as-
sessment before and after the test score is known.28 The children for which we have 
information in our dataset took the test in February 2009. On the official test form the 
                                                                
28 This test is a high-stakes standardized test called the ‘Eindtoets Basisonderwijs’ which is taken by approxi-
mately 85 percent of all 6th grade children in the Netherlands every year. The other 15 percent of children 
attend schools that use another standardized test of which we do not have data.    
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teacher has been asked to indicate, by ticking a box, what his assessment of the child 
would be at that moment. The teacher has to indicate this in terms of eight different 
levels, which are shown in Figure 1. After the child has completed the test, the form is 
sent back to the test agency for scoring and the teacher’s assessment is recorded.29 
During the first week of March the schools receive the children’s test scores and teach-
ers announce their final assessment of the children’s ability levels. The final teacher’s 
assessment and the test score are determinants of children’s track placement in sec-
ondary schools. These events occur in a period of approximately four weeks. This short 
period makes it unlikely that children are able to significantly improve their ability in this 
period. The data for the empirical analysis include 2,661 children. The data are con-
structed from administrative data from primary and secondary school tracking systems 
as well as questionnaire data when these children were in 6th grade in 2009. The ques-
tionnaire data include measures about demographics and social-economic status.  
The most important findings from this study are as follows. First, both the initial 
teacher’s assessment and the test score are significant predictors of the final teacher’s 
assessment. It seems that these measures capture different information relating to 
children’s ability levels. This is consistent with the findings reported in chapter three of 
this dissertation. Second, having a higher (lower) test score compared to the initial 
teacher’s assessment has a significant positive (negative) effect on children’s final 
teacher’s assessment. This finding suggests that, on average, teachers adjust their initial 
assessment upwards by 0.443 track and downwards by 0.424 track, after observing the 
children’s test score. The size of these effects suggests that teachers adjust their as-
sessment by approximately 19 percent of a standard deviation. It thereby highlights the 
importance of test scores in the assessment process. Finally, we observe that teachers 
heterogeneously adjust their assessment across the gender and social-economic status 
of children. The adjustments are on average less favourable for girls compared to boys 
and more favourable for children from a higher social-economic background compared 
to children from a lower social-economic background.  The downwards adjustment for 
girls is approximately 1.4 times as large as for boys and the downwards adjustment for 
children of low educated parents is approximately 1.5 to 2.0 times as large as for chil-
dren of high educated parents.  
The content of this paper relates to the economic literature on human capital for-
mation. Human capital theory relates investments in education to later life productivity, 
health, and several labour-market outcomes such as wages and the probability of un-
employment. Human capital can be broadly defined to include skills and knowledge but 
also includes non-cognitive skills.  A part of the stock of human capital is accumulated 
from a level of innate ability that is growing in schooling and non-schooling investments 
(e.g., Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Cunha and Heckman, 2007). When teachers assess 
children’s ability levels and recommend a track allocation for children in secondary 
                                                                
29 See Figure 1 for a copy of the official test form.  
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education, teachers to a large extent influence the type and amount of investments 
children will be able to make in terms of human capital accumulation. Children who 
receive a low teacher’s assessment will likely conduct different human capital invest-
ments compared to children who receive a high assessment. In order for children to 
receive the best suited track allocation we need information on their ability level. In the 
Dutch education system this information is provided by teacher’s assessments and test 
scores which attempt to measure children’s true ability level.  
This paper also contributes to the literature on the relation between objective and 
subjective assessment measures for successive performance in school. Research has 
shown that systematic differences exist between teacher’s assessments and test scores. 
These systematic differences are correlated with observable characteristics of different 
groups in society. For example, studies by Burgess and Greaves (2013), Dee (2005; 
2007), Fairlie et al. (2014), Ferguson (2003), Lavy (2008), Lindahl (2007) and Plewis 
(1997) show that interactions between teachers’ and children’s behaviour or teachers’ 
expectations, are related to differences between test results and teacher’s assessments 
across gender and ethnic minorities. Girls are on average awarded more generous 
teacher’s assessments compared to their test scores, while the evidence for ethnic 
minorities is mixed and depends on the specific ethnic minority. Furthermore, Cornwell 
et al. (2012) show that teacher’s assessments and test scores differ systematically be-
tween children, where boys are generally graded less favourably by their teachers com-
pared to their test scores. 
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on statistical discrimination or 
stereotyping. If teachers adjust their assessments heterogeneously across groups, 
based on some form of bias or prejudice and not because the new information obtained 
from the test score provides them with more accurate information compared to a pre-
vious assessment, this is consistent with statistical discrimination or stereotyping where 
teachers systematically over-assess high-achieving groups and under-assess low-
achieving groups. The adjustments could be made because teachers base their assess-
ments on the level they expect children to perform at. This could lead to assessments 
based on group characteristics rather than on the children’s individual ability level (e.g., 
Phelps, 1972; Akerlof and Kranton, 2002; Jussim and Harber, 2005; Lavy and Sand, 
2005).    
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives background information regarding 
the educational system and the strategy of this paper. Section 3 describes the data and 
presents statistics of the main variables used in the analyses. Section 4 presents the 
results. Section 5 addresses the policy perspective of the main findings and section 6 
concludes.  
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Figure 1: Official test form 
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4.2 Background and strategy 
The main strength of the research strategy of this paper is that we observe the timeline 
of events in the data. Within a time span of approximately three weeks we observe the 
initial teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment, respec-
tively. We use this timing of events to identify the adjustment teachers make in as-
sessing children’s ability. 
4.2.1 Background   
The test was made during three days on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of February in 2009. The 
completed test forms were sent back to the test agency by regular mail on the last day 
of the test. During the first week of March 2009 schools received the children’s test 
scores and teachers made their final assessment. This final assessment was communi-
cated to children and parents. Due to the short time span between the different teach-
er’s assessments we assume that it is unlikely that children have significantly changed 
their math and language skills. Furthermore, we assume that the factors that affect the 
initial teacher’s assessment affect the final teacher’s assessment to the same extent. 
The only difference is that in the final teacher’s assessment the teacher is able to weigh 
in the children’s test score. Furthermore, we assume that there is no reason to expect 
strategic behaviour on the side of the children. The teacher notes the initial teacher’s 
assessment on the front page of the test form along with other information about the 
child, as indicated by the test agency. In 2009 parents and children are not informed 
about this initial teacher’s assessment that is noted on the test form.30 Therefore, we 
do not expect that children’s motivation depends on the initial teacher’s assessment.  
4.2.2 Strategy 
The analysis first focuses on the determinants of the final teacher’s assessment. We 
estimate equation (1) to observe whether the test score or the initial teacher’s assess-
ment shows a stronger correlation with the final teacher’s assessment. Second, we 
estimate equation (2) to observe the relation, between children who have a higher or 
lower test score compared to the initial teacher’s assessment, on children’s final teach-
er’s assessment. This analysis looks at whether teachers adjust their initial assessment 
after observing the children’s test scores. Third, the analysis looks at whether the effect 
is heterogeneous across groups. An example of these analyses for gender is estimated 
by equation (3). Similar equations are estimated for the parental education level. Final-
ly, we investigate whether or not there is a difference between the language and math 
components of the test in determining the final assessment and we investigate in more 
                                                                
30 Parents are not informed of this particular initial teacher’s assessment since this form directly goes to the 
test agency for examination. It is possible that the teacher informs children’s parents separately of his initial 
teacher’s assessment.   
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detail the estimates of gender and the parental education levels. In all estimations, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 
refers to a set of control variables, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 refers to primary school dummy variables, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 re-
fers to classroom dummy variables and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 represents the error term. 
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, (1) 
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 > 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎4𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 < 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, (2) 
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 > 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 + 𝑎𝑎4𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 < 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,  (3) 
In all analyses standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. Furthermore, 
primary school dummy variables and classroom dummy variables are used to capture 
school effects, such as certain school policies and other things that all children present 
in a particular school in our dataset have in common. Classroom dummies serve as a 
dummy variable for teachers. Since every classroom (usually) has a different fulltime 
teacher, we try to capture the teacher effect with these dummy variables. We interpret 
the coefficients as within primary school and within classrooms effects. The dummy 
variables capture the between effects.   
The test scores and the teacher’s assessment are both measures of children’s ability 
that contain measurement error. The test is a snapshot of a child’s performance on 
math and language, where measurement error can occur due to the timing of the test, 
test circumstances, physical and mental fitness of the child on the particular point in 
time and the inherent measurement error related to measuring ability. The teacher’s 
assessment, however, should incorporate the performance of children in class and on 
tests on multiple occasions. Furthermore, the teacher’s assessment incorporates chil-
dren’s classroom behaviour, personality and background characteristics, which are 
important determinants of future success (e.g., Segal, 2008; Segal, 2013; Bertrand and 
Pan, 2013). Measurement error due to the timing of the test or the test circumstances 
is assumed to be less severe for the teacher’s assessment. However, a possible concern 
with the assessment made by teachers is the possibility of (unintended) prejudice that 
teachers could have due to a child’s social-economic background or gender.  
4.3 Data 
The dataset contains children who attended 6th grade in 2009. It includes information 
from school tracking systems, questionnaires among children and their parents as well 
as test scores.31 The goal of both the teacher’s assessment and the test score is to pro-
                                                                
31 Scores on the test in 6th grade can be distinguished in brackets that are consistent with these 9 track combi-
nations.  
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vide an advice of the most appropriate level of education for a child in secondary 
school.   
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the main variables of interest, the initial teacher’s 
assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment, across the different 
tracks.32 A description of the Dutch education system and the different tracks in sec-
ondary education can be found in Chapter 2. The numbers in each row add up to 100 
percent. Approximately 50 percent of all children receive an initial teacher’s assess-
ment, test score and final teacher’s assessment to attend pre-vocational education in 
secondary school. The other 50 percent is divided between pre-higher vocational edu-
cation and pre-university education.33 At first sight, the distributions of the teacher’s 
assessments and the test scores seem to be generally consistent. However, there are 
some differences. The largest difference between the initial teacher’s assessment and 
the final teacher’s assessment seems to occur for children who are on the margin be-
tween pre-vocational education (T1c/d) and pre-higher vocational education (T1d/2). 
Furthermore, there seems to be a jump in the number of children who receive a teach-
er’s assessment to attend pre-university education (T3) between the initial teacher’s 
assessment and the final teacher’s assessment. It is likely that this leads to a higher 
track placement in secondary school. Figure 2 shows the same pattern. Since track 
placement is strongly related to later life outcomes, these changes are likely to offer 
children a different education and labour-market perspective after secondary school 
(Onderwijsraad, 2014). 
Table 1: the distributions of the teacher assessments and the test score 
  T1a T1a/b T1b T1b/c T1c/d T1d/2 T2 T2/3 T3 
Initial teacher assessment 4.74 3.76 8.23 0.71 18.19 15.3 18.23 15.75 15.11 
Test score 3.38 3.34 6.28 3.8 17.55 19.5 18.68 16.5 10.97 
Final teacher assessment 5.52 2.33 8.23 0.41 6.09 24.01 17.02 14.05 22.32 
Note: All rows add up to 100 percent. N=2661. See figure 1 for a schedule of the different educational tracks.  
 
                                                                
32 Note that the initial teacher assessment and the final teacher assessment are never measured on a contin-
uous scale. 
33 There are more sub-tracks in pre-vocational education compared to pre-higher vocational and pre-
university education. This is also reflected in the lower amount of children per track in pre-vocational educa-
tion. We distinguish nine educational tracks based on the initial teacher’s assessment. The final teacher’s 
assessment and the test score are recoded so that all variables are comparable on the same scale.  The result 
is that for the final teacher’s assessment and the test we combine track T1c with T1c/d and track T1d with 
T1d/2. In this paper we define a difference between any of the three main variables as a difference of one 
track. We consider a difference of one track as appropriate as the teacher is the only decision maker regard-
ing the initial and final teacher’s assessments and there is (almost) no time delay between the different 
measures of ability.  
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Figure 2: Difference between initial and final teacher assessment 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. In our sample we have approximately the same 
percentage of boys and girls, who are on average 12 years old. Most children were born 
in Limburg but there are also children who were born in other regions of the Nether-
lands and children who were born abroad. The same description applies to the birth 
region of both the father and the mother of the child. The average parental education 
level suggests that they have completed vocational education. On average, fathers 
seem to be slightly higher educated than mothers. Most parents, both the father and 
the mother, report to be employed. Almost all fathers are employed whereas mothers 
are more frequently (compared to fathers) unemployed or do not participate in the 
labour market. Approximately 76 percent of the children lives with both parents.34 The 
initial teacher’s assessment is measured on a scale from 1-9 where the average corre-
sponds to the track T1d/2. The final teacher’s assessment has an average track recom-
mendation that is higher and slightly closer to the T2 track. Finally, the original test 
score is measured on a scale from 501-550. Based on information provided by the insti-
tution that supplies the test in 6th grade, the test score is rescaled to be comparable to 
the scale of the teacher’s assessments. The differences in the mean and the standard 
deviations for the three main variables of interest are relatively small. 
                                                                
34 We do not have information on whether the parents are married. The corresponding questionnaire ques-
tion is: “Do you live at home with both parents?” 
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Table 3 shows the bivariate correlation coefficients and their statistical significance 
for the main variables of interest.35 The correlation coefficients between the initial 
teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment are all high and 
positive. They are also statistically significant. Given the information in Table 1 and the 
fact that these variables measure the same latent variable this is not surprising. An 
interesting observation is that the correlation coefficient between the test score and 
the final teacher’s assessment is higher than the correlation coefficient between the 
test score and the initial teacher’s assessment. A likely explanation for this finding is 
that teachers adjust their initial assessment after observing the children’s test score, 
which provides us with a first indication that teachers on average update their assess-
ment after observing the test score.  
Table 2: descriptive statistics 
  N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Female 2660 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 
Age (in months) 2661 147.32 6.63 125 147 179 
Region of birth child 2283 1.13 0.44 1 1 3 
1. Limburg   91.40%         
2. The Netherlands outside Limburg   4.60%         
3. Abroad   4.00%         
Region of birth father 2267 1.34 0.68 1 1 3 
Region of birth mother 2276 1.33 0.67 1 1 3 
Education father 2167 2.32 1.10 1 2 4 
1. Lower education   28.60%         
2. Vocational education   32.00%         
3. Higher education   18.40%         
4. University education   21.00%         
Education mother 2176 2.14 1.02 1 2 4 
Labor market position father 2220 1.15 0.57 1 1 4 
1. Employed   92.70%         
2. Unemployed   2.20%         
3. Sick/unable to work   2.80%         
4. Other   2.30%         
Labor market position mother 2230 1.54 1.09 1 1 4 
Child lives with both parents 2082 0.76 0.43 0 1 1 
Initial teacher assessment 2661 6.12 2.21 1 6 9 
Test score 2661 6.10 2.02 1 6 9 
Final teacher assessment 2661 6.44 2.26 1 7 9 
Note: The same description of region of birth of the child applies to the father and the mother. Similarly, the 
same description of education father and labor market position father apply to the mother.  
                                                                
35 Appendix A shows the correlation coefficients of the other variables in our analysis. 
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Table 3: correlation coefficients 
  Initial teacher assessment Test score Final teacher assessment 
Initital teacher assessment 1     
Test score 0.8320*** 1   
Final teacher assessment 0.8967*** 0.8680***  1 
Note: Bivariate correlation coefficients. *** represents significance at the 1 percent level. These variables are 
all measured on a scale from 1-9.  
4.3.2 Selection 
For 2,661 children we have information about the main variables of interest: the initial 
teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment. These data 
have been collected from 127 primary schools and 35 secondary schools. This is a sub-
set of the original dataset that covers 3,303 children in primary education. Possible 
selection issues with regard to the analysis are addressed. It is investigated whether or 
not individual characteristics of children explain if they end up in our sample for analy-
sis. The main concern regarding a possible selection bias is that schools only report data 
on their well-performing children and fail to report data on their poorer performing 
children. Children who are older turn out to be slightly less likely to be included in the 
sample used for analysis, whereas children who live with both parents are slightly more 
likely to be included in the sample. Furthermore, there seems to be a small effect of 
father’s parental education: children whose father has finished vocational education or 
higher vocational education are slightly more likely to be included in the sample com-
pared to children whose father has finished lower education only. This effect is not 
present for fathers with university education, which is our highest level of education 
measured. Additionally, there seems to be no difference between the determinants of 
selection into the sample for children for whom we have and for whom we do not have 
information on the test score. Finally, there seems to be no selection at the school level. 
There are no schools for which a large number of children drop out of our sample for 
analysis.36 
4.4 Results 
This section reports the estimation results. It starts with a number of a basic statistics 
about the differences in test scores and first and final assessment. The section contin-
ues with presenting the estimated coefficients of updating by teachers and heterogene-
ity across different groups. It concludes with a number of robustness checks. The most 
salient results are shown in the main text and an elaborate appendix reports the results 
from using different interaction terms, estimation techniques, a decomposition of the 
                                                                
36 See Appendix B for the analysis of selection into the sample.  
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difference between the math and language component of the cognitive test score and 
performance in secondary school. 
4.4.1 Differences between assessment measures 
Table 4 and 5 display the differences between the initial teacher’s assessment, the test 
score and the final teacher’s assessment. Table 4 shows that differences between the 
initial teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment occur in 
every track. Each column shows the differences for each track. The first three rows of 
the first column show that 42.1 percent of the children received the same track rec-
ommendation from the test score as initially judged by the teacher (TS=ITA). In 57.9 
percent of the cases the test score recommended a higher track than the initial teach-
er’s assessment. The picture that emerges from the top three rows suggests that the 
higher (lower) the track, the more often the test score is lower (higher) than the initial 
teacher’s assessment. The difference is mainly present between the lower levels of the 
pre-vocational education tracks and all higher tracks. 
Second, the middle part of Table 4 shows the difference between the final teacher’s 
assessment  and the test score. The final teacher’s assessment is often lower than the 
test score in the lower tracks, whereas the final teacher’s assessment is often higher 
than the test score in the higher tracks. A possible explanation for this finding might be 
that teachers give some children a higher assessment based on other characteristics 
than their test score, for example non-cognitive skills or social-economic background 
(e.g., Cornwell et al. 2011).  
Third, the last part of Table 4 shows the difference between the final teacher’s as-
sessment and the initial teacher’s assessment. A downward adjustment of the teacher’s 
assessment seems to be more likely to occur for those children whose teacher’s as-
sessment is at the level of pre-vocational education. An upward adjustment is more 
likely for children with assessments at the level of one of the middle tracks. Overall, the 
most consensus between the different measures occurs in the outer (lowest and high-
est) recommended tracks. In these tracks the uncertainty about children’s ability is 
likely lower than for children who are recommended to the middle tracks. Some of 
these findings might be driven by a floor and/or ceiling effect as children in the highest 
recommended track cannot go further up and children in the lowest recommended 
track cannot go further down.  
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Table 4: differences in TS, ITA and FTA 
  Tracks (ITA) 
  T1a T1a/b T1b T1b/c T1c/d T1d/2 T2 T2/3 T3 
TS - ITA                   
TS < ITA 0.0 17.0 21.5 21.1 21.3 29.5 40.2 43.9 48.0 
TS = ITA 42.1 24.0 21.5 10.5 40.1 38.8 34.6 40.6 52.0 
TS > ITA 57.9 59.0 57.0 68.4 38.6 31.7 25.2 15.5 0.0 
FTA - TS                   
FTA < TS 45.2 43.0 38.8 21.1 19.4 13.5 9.9 8.6 0.7 
FTA = TS 44.4 45.0 28.8 42.1 36.2 42.3 39.1 35.3 55.5 
FTA > TS 10.3 11.0 32.4 36.8 44.4 44.2 50.9 59.9 43.8 
FTA - ITA                   
FTA < ITA 0.0 30.0 17.8 21.1 13.0 7.1 15.9 15.0 8.0 
FTA = ITA 71.4 19.0 47.5 0.0 19.4 55.0 50.9 44.2 92.0 
FTA > ITA 28.6 51.0 34.7 78.9 67.6 37.8 33.2 40.8 0.0 
TS = Test score, ITA = Initial teacher assessment, FTA = Final teacher assessment. Percentages of students per 
variable TS - ITA, FTA -TS and FTA-ITA by ITA. All columns add up to 100 percent.  
 
Table 5 shows that there are differences between these three variables across gender 
and parental education levels. The first row in the first column shows that 32.4 percent 
of the children have a lower test score than their initial teacher’s assessment. In 38.5 
percent of the cases the test score and the initial teacher’s assessment recommend the 
same track and in 29.1 percent of the cases the test score was higher than the initial 
teacher’s assessment.  
Overall, the first column suggests that the test score is generally slightly lower than 
the teacher’s assessments and the final teacher’s assessment seems to increase com-
pared to the initial teacher’s assessment, as can also be seen from Table 2. The last final 
part of the table (FTA-ITA) shows updating between the initial teacher’s assessment and 
the final teacher’s assessment for approximately 50 percent of all children, where 12.7 
percent is adjusted downwards and 37.3 percent is adjusted upwards.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 show the differences by gender. Girls less often than 
boys have a test score that is higher than the initial teacher’s assessment and girls more 
often than boys have a final teacher’s assessment that is higher than the test score. This 
suggests that teachers give girls more favourable assessments conditional on their test 
score, compared to boys. We find no apparent difference between girls and boys re-
garding updating between the initial and the final teacher’s assessment.  
Columns 5-8 of Table 5 display the difference for mother’s education level and col-
umns 9-12 show the differences for father’s education level. The higher the mother’s 
education level, the more often the test score seems to be lower than or equal to the 
initial teacher’s assessment and the less often the test score seems to be higher than 
the initial teacher’s assessment. This could suggest that teachers give more favourable 
initial assessments to children from higher educated parents. Furthermore, the higher 
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the mother’s education level, the less often the final teacher’s assessment is lower than 
the test score and the more often the final teacher’s assessment is higher than the test 
score. Finally, the higher the mother’s education level, the less often the final teacher’s 
assessment is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment and the more often the final 
teacher’s assessment is equal to the initial teacher’s assessment.  
These results are similar for the father’s education level (in columns 9-12 of Table 5). 
It seems that the higher the parental education level the more often children’s initial 
and final teacher’s assessments are equal and the less often the final teacher’s assess-
ment is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment. However, for children of higher 
educated parents the final teacher’s assessment is less often higher than the initial 
teacher’s assessment, compared to children of lower educated parents. An explanation 
for this finding could be the ceiling effect that might occur for children of higher edu-
cated parents. If we assume that children of higher educated parents already have a 
very high initial teacher’s assessment there is less room for more upwards adjustment. 
The same reasoning applies for children of lower educated parents, there is less room 
for downwards adjustment.   
Table 6 shows the determinants of the final teacher’s assessment. The estimated 
coefficients are based on OLS models, and Appendix E shows similar results using or-
dered probit models. The initial teacher’s assessment and the test score are both posi-
tively correlated with the final teacher’s assessment and statistically significant. Col-
umns 1-4 show that the estimates of the initial teacher’s assessment and the test score 
are almost not affected when the other characteristics of children are added to the 
model. As of column 5 both the initial teacher’s assessment and the test score are joint-
ly added to the model. In columns 5-7 we observe that the initial teacher’s assessment 
seems to be a slightly better predictor of the final teacher’s assessment than the test 
score. The estimates only slightly change from column 5 to column 6 which seems to 
indicate that these estimates are representative for all schools, the estimates are al-
most equal when the dummy variable for the different schools are added to the model. 
Finally, from column 6 to column 7 we see a slight drop in the coefficients of the initial 
teacher’s assessment and the test score. This is due to the inclusion of the classroom 
dummy variables. In column 7 the estimate for the initial teacher’s assessment is not 
significantly different from the estimate of the test score. Furthermore, conditional on 
the initial teacher’s assessment and the test score there are almost no other character-
istics that are significantly related to the final teacher’s assessment. Including both of 
the ability measures seems to soak up a lot of the variation in the children’s characteris-
tics, leaving them insignificant.37 
 
                                                                
37 It is possible that the differences between the tracks are not linear. Therefore, the results of an ordered 
probit regression can be found in appendix E. These coefficients show similar results for the relation between 
the initial teacher assessment, the test score and the final teacher assessment.  
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Table 6: determinants of the final teacher assessment 
  Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Initial teacher assessment 0.917*** 0.863***     0.596*** 0.545*** 0.407*** 
  (0.016) (0.020)     (0.024) (0.033) (0.030) 
Test score     0.969*** 0.894*** 0.425*** 0.426*** 0.334*** 
      (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038) (0.040) 
Female   -0.049   0.027   -0.004 -0.082 
    (0.065)   (0.065)   (0.056) (0.052) 
Age (in months)   -0.012**   -0.022***   -0.009** -0.005 
    (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.004) (0.004) 
Child born in other region NL    -0.120   0.079   -0.036 0.026 
    (0.146)   (0.180)   (0.147) (0.110) 
Child born abroad   0.231   0.291   0.217 -0.021 
    (0.161)   (0.198)   (0.141) (0.156) 
Father born in other region NL   0.142   -0.025   0.078 0.140* 
    (0.112)   (0.135)   (0.105) (0.083) 
Father born abroad   0.008   0.074   0.064 -0.022 
    (0.126)   (0.137)   (0.114) (0.107) 
Mother born in other region NL   0.071   0.006   0.028 0.001 
    (0.100)   (0.103)   (0.082) (0.072) 
Mother born abroad   -0.058   -0.123   -0.089 -0.086 
    (0.123)   (0.127)   (0.104) (0.103) 
Father has vocational education   0.142*   0.213**   0.141** 0.121 
    (0.079)   (0.089)   (0.066) (0.074) 
Father has higher education   0.192*   0.303***   0.179** 0.181* 
    (0.102)   (0.097)   (0.085) (0.093) 
Father has university education   0.148   0.340***   0.172** 0.123 
    (0.091)   (0.080)   (0.074) (0.082) 
Mother has vocational education   0.146*   0.167*   0.115 0.022 
    (0.086)   (0.088)   (0.075) (0.082) 
Mother has higher education   0.326***   0.302***   0.208** 0.081 
    (0.099)   (0.102)   (0.086) (0.091) 
Mother has university education   0.255**   0.240*   0.128 0.069 
    (0.109)   (0.132)   (0.105) (0.101) 
Father is unemployed   -0.244   -0.138   -0.201 -0.281 
    (0.224)   (0.242)   (0.200) (0.182) 
Father is sick/unable to work   -0.287   0.022   -0.171 -0.270 
    (0.242)   (0.203)   (0.184) (0.179) 
Father has other labour market 
position 
  -0.092   -0.509***   -0.182 0.027 
  (0.194)   (0.179)   (0.148) (0.161) 
Mother is unemployed   -0.046   0.040   0.011 0.226 
    (0.166)   (0.192)   (0.142) (0.143) 
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  Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mother is sick/unable to work   0.039   0.176   0.104 0.097 
    (0.131)   (0.164)   (0.126) (0.170) 
Mother has other labour market 
position 
  -0.114   -0.127   -0.098 -0.113 
  (0.105)   (0.097)   (0.089) (0.084) 
Child lives with both parents   0.012   -0.047   -0.030 -0.120* 
    (0.073)   (0.072)   (0.062) (0.061) 
Constant 0.823*** -2.718*** 0.549*** -2.091* 0.210** -4.102*** -2.943*** 
  (0.120) (0.866) (0.151) (1.245) (0.106) (0.835) (0.760) 
School FE no yes no yes no yes yes 
Classroom FE no no no no no no yes 
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,986 1,404 1,986 1,404 1,986 1,404 1,404 
R-squared 0.808 0.845 0.747 0.815 0.853 0.880 0.923 
Note: Coefficients are from ordinary least squared regressions with the final teacher assessment as the de-
pendent variable measured on a scale from 1-9. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. 
***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively. Other control variables in all the 
regressions are area code of residence and region.  
4.4.2 Updating  
A key question in this paper is whether differences between the initial teacher’s as-
sessment and the test score change the final teacher’s assessment. Table 7 reports the 
estimated coefficients of several OLS models where the dependent variable is the final 
teacher’s assessment and the two most important independent variables are ‘test score 
> initial teacher’s assessment’ and ‘test score < initial teacher’s assessment’. The varia-
ble ‘test score > initial teacher’s assessment’ equals one if the test score is higher than 
the initial teacher’s assessment and zero otherwise. The variable ‘test score < initial 
teacher’s assessment’ equals one if the test score is lower than the initial teacher’s 
assessment and zero otherwise. Adding both dummy variables to the model creates 
‘test score = initial teacher’s assessment’ as the baseline for the estimates. Columns 1 
and 2 show that having a test score that is higher than the initial teacher’s assessment is 
positively related to having a higher final teacher’s assessment. Columns 3 and 4 show 
the opposite: having a test score that is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment is 
negatively related to having a higher final teacher’s assessment. Column 5 shows the 
estimates of both variables when they are jointly added to the model. In columns 6 and 
7 school dummy variables and classroom dummy variables are added, respectively. The 
estimates are robust to the inclusion of control variables, school dummies and class-
room dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the school level to take into account 
the correlation between children at the same school. Children who obtain a test score 
that is higher than the initial teacher’s assessment, are adjusted upwards in the final 
teacher’s assessment. The average upward adjustment is 0.443 track. When the test 
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score is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment, the final teacher’s assessment is on 
average adjusted downwards by 0.424 track.38 On a scale from 1-9 these are considera-
ble adjustments. This translates into an average adjustment of approximately 19 per-
cent of the standard deviation of the final teacher’s assessment. These results are con-
sistent with expectations that teachers adjust their assessments of children’s ability 
based on information provided by the test score. Table 7 shows that teachers adjust or 
update their assessments of children’s ability based on information that is provided by 
the test score. When the test score is higher (lower) than the initial teacher’s assess-
ment this has a positive (negative) effect on the final teacher’s assessment.  
Table 7: determinants of the final teacher assessment II 
  Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Test score > Initial teacher 
assessment 
0.924*** 0.798***     0.700*** 0.594*** 0.443*** 
(0.061) (0.068)     (0.060) (0.065) (0.080) 
Test score < Initial teacher 
assessment 
    -0.764*** -0.755*** -0.525*** -0.581*** -0.424*** 
    (0.056) (0.075) (0.053) (0.070) (0.074) 
Initial teacher assessment 0.991*** 0.929*** 0.958*** 0.906*** 1.002*** 0.945*** 0.691*** 
  (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.021) (0.035) 
Female   -0.019   -0.017   -0.002 -0.077 
    (0.061)   (0.060)   (0.059) (0.055) 
Age (in months)   -0.012***   -0.010**   -0.011** -0.004 
    (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.004) (0.004) 
Child born in other region NL   -0.098   -0.080   -0.072 0.002 
    (0.147)   (0.142)   (0.142) (0.111) 
Child born abroad   0.218   0.190   0.189 -0.028 
    (0.155)   (0.145)   (0.144) (0.154) 
Father born in other region NL   0.082   0.125   0.084 0.145 
    (0.105)   (0.115)   (0.111) (0.090) 
Father born abroad   -0.001   0.072   0.051 -0.041 
    (0.125)   (0.119)   (0.122) (0.112) 
Mother born in other region 
NL 
  0.107   0.093   0.115 0.065 
  (0.092)   (0.097)   (0.091) (0.083) 
Mother born abroad   -0.022   -0.038   -0.016 -0.042 
    (0.116)   (0.117)   (0.113) (0.107) 
Father has vocational 
education 
  0.147**   0.156**   0.157** 0.128* 
  (0.069)   (0.076)   (0.070) (0.076) 
                                                                
38 It is possible that the differences between the tracks are not linear. Therefore, the results of an ordered 
probit regression can be found in appendix F. These coefficients show similar results. When the test score is 
higher than the initial teacher assessment this has a significant positive effect on the final teacher assessment 
and when the test score is lower compared to the initial teacher assessment this has a significant negative 
effect on the final teacher assessment.  
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Father has higher education   0.186**   0.232**   0.218** 0.198** 
    (0.093)   (0.096)   (0.091) (0.095) 
Father has university 
education 
  0.167**   0.176**   0.183** 0.126 
  (0.080)   (0.086)   (0.078) (0.084) 
Mother has vocational 
educatio 
  0.123   0.086   0.083 -0.011 
  (0.080)   (0.080)   (0.078) (0.084) 
Mother has higher education   0.286***   0.223**   0.217** 0.067 
    (0.088)   (0.095)   (0.088) (0.092) 
Mother has university 
education 
  0.202*   0.125   0.115 0.034 
  (0.104)   (0.109)   (0.104) (0.101) 
Father is unemployed   -0.254   -0.180   -0.203 -0.259 
    (0.220)   (0.214)   (0.216) (0.198) 
Father is sick/unable to work   -0.260   -0.216   -0.213 -0.304 
    (0.209)   (0.218)   (0.199) (0.190) 
Father has other labour 
market position 
  -0.101   -0.158   -0.150 0.080 
  (0.179)   (0.179)   (0.168) (0.170) 
Mother is unemployed   0.040   -0.054   0.012 0.247* 
    (0.144)   (0.155)   (0.144) (0.148) 
Mother is sick/unable to work   0.087   0.059   0.090 0.079 
    (0.131)   (0.126)   (0.126) (0.172) 
Mother has other labour 
market position 
  -0.049   -0.114   -0.066 -0.090 
  (0.100)   (0.098)   (0.095) (0.086) 
Child lives with both parents   -0.013   -0.015   -0.027 -0.117* 
    (0.069)   (0.066)   (0.064) (0.064) 
Constant 0.110 -3.189*** 0.828*** -3.678*** 0.286*** -3.806*** -2.742*** 
  (0.113) (0.782) (0.113) (0.829) (0.109) (0.781) (0.756) 
School FE no yes no yes no yes yes 
Classroom FE no no no no no no yes 
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,986 1,404 1,986 1,404 1,986 1,404 1,404 
R-squared 0.836 0.862 0.832 0.864 0.845 0.872 0.920 
Note: Coefficients are from ordinary least squared regressions with the final teacher assessment as the de-
pendent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 
percent significance levels respectively. Other control variables include area code of residence and region.  
4.4.3 Heterogeneity in gender and education level of parents 
It is also interesting to investigate whether or not teachers differ in these adjustments 
or in the magnitude of these adjustments for different groups of children. Heterogenei-
ty in teacher adjustments across groups indicates that children’s characteristics are 
related to how teachers assess their ability level. The primary goal is to investigate 
whether or not there are such effects present in the dataset. At this stage it is not pos-
sible to estimate what the consequences of these differences in treatment are for chil-
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dren’s later outcomes nor is it possible to determine whether or not the teacher is right 
or wrong in making these adjustments. 
Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients from OLS models where characteristics of 
children are interacted with a dummy for the positive or negative difference between 
the test score and the initial teacher’s assessment. Table 8 reports estimates for the 
gender of the child and parental education levels. Columns 1 and 2 report the effects 
related to gender. The estimated coefficients do not suggest the presence of significant 
differences between boys and girls when the test score is higher than the initial teach-
er’s assessment. However, when the test score is lower than the initial teacher’s as-
sessment teachers seem to adjust boys’ final assessment downwards by 0.366 tracks on 
average, while teachers seem to adjust girls’ final assessment downwards by 0.515 
tracks on average. This difference is statistically significant at 5 percent. A possible ex-
planation for this finding is that teachers more often give girls the benefit of the doubt 
by giving them a slightly higher initial teacher’s assessment conditional on their test 
score. Likewise, it is also possible that teachers underestimate boys in their initial as-
sessment. Possibly this is due to better classroom behaviour of girls at this age (e.g. 
Bertrand and Pan, 2011; Entwisle, Alexander & Olsen, 2007; Segal, 2008 and Segal, 
2013). As a result, teachers could be more disappointed with the performance of girls 
(compared to boys) when their test score is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment.  
The results for the parental education levels in Table 8 suggest a trend in the magni-
tude of the estimated coefficients for the relation of the difference between the test 
score and the initial teacher’s assessment to the final teacher’s assessment.39 The effect 
of having a test score that is higher than the initial teacher’s assessment is on average 
positive across all parental education levels, while the effect of having a test score that 
is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment is on average negative for the final teach-
er’s assessment across all parental education levels. The interesting aspect is that hav-
ing a higher educated parent is much more beneficial when the test score deviates from 
the initial teacher’s assessment compared to having a lower educated parent. When the 
test score is higher than the initial teacher’s assessment, the magnitude of the relation 
increases for children with higher educated parents. The positive effect of having a 
mother with a university education is 1.3 times as large compared to the effect of hav-
ing  a mother with a low level of education. For fathers the estimated effect is slightly 
larger (1.4) but not significantly so.  
                                                                
39 The baseline for the regression coefficients of gender and the education level of parents is when the test 
score is equal to the initial teacher assessment. The baseline for the interaction coefficients in the first column 
of table 8 is when the test is lower or equal to the initial teacher assessment and the gender is boys (gen-
der=0). Compared to these baseline estimates all reported coefficients in column 1 are significantly different. 
However, in column 1 the reported interaction coefficients for boys and girls are not significantly different 
from each other. The baseline for the effects of the education level of mothers in column 3 in table 8 is when 
the test score is lower or equal to the initial teacher assessment and the education level of the mother/father 
is lower education (education level=1). Compared to these baseline estimates all reported coefficients in 
column 3 are significantly different.   
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When the test score is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment the magnitude of 
the relation steadily decreases for children with higher educated parents. The positive 
effect of having a mother with a university education is 1.5 times as large compared to 
the effect of having a mother with lower education. For fathers the effect is even 2.0 
times as large. The effect sizes of different education levels for mothers are not signifi-
cantly different from the lower education level, however, the effect sizes of different 
education levels of fathers are significantly different from the lower education level.  
There might be several explanations for these findings. First, it is possible that chil-
dren from higher educated parents have more developed non-cognitive skills that influ-
ence their performance in school (e.g. Blanden et al., 2007; Garcia et al., 2017). These 
non-cognitive skills are unobserved in our model. Second, teachers might be aware that 
higher educated parents likely have higher income and more resources available to 
supports their children’s educational needs, and are more able to make investments 
such as tutoring or other aids (e.g. Ben-Porath, 1967; Heckman et al., 2005). Third, 
there could be intergenerational mobility where higher educated parents are better 
able to support their children in school as these parents have followed a similar or high-
er track in school themselves (e.g. Black and Devereux, 2010). Fourth, teachers are 
aware that higher educated parents make more investments in their children by stimu-
lating their children more to perform well in school compared to lower educated par-
ents. Higher educated parents might also better understand the importance of educa-
tion compared to lower educated parents (e.g. Guryan et al., 2008). Schools indicate 
that they incorporate children’s behavioural characteristics, whether children have a 
stable home situation, the involvement of parents in their children’s education and the 
opportunities that parents have to support their children, into teacher’s assessments 
(Inspectorate of Education, 2014). Overall, we conclude that gender and parental edu-
cation levels seem to be related to how teachers adjust their assessment of children’s 
ability after observing the test score.       
 
    Ta
bl
e 
8:
 d
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 o
f t
he
 fi
na
l t
ea
ch
er
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t I
II 
- i
nt
er
ac
tio
n 
ef
fe
ct
s 
 
Fi
na
l t
ea
ch
er
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t  
  
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
(1
0)
 
  
Bo
ys
 
G
irl
s 
M
ot
he
r S
ES
 1
 
M
ot
he
r S
ES
 2
 
M
ot
he
r S
ES
 3
 
M
ot
he
r S
ES
 4
 
Fa
th
er
 S
ES
 1
 
Fa
th
er
 S
ES
 2
 
Fa
th
er
 S
ES
 3
 
Fa
th
er
 S
ES
 4
 
Te
st
 >
 IT
A 
0.
39
3*
**
 
0.
39
5*
**
 
0.
33
3*
* 
0.
44
2*
**
 
0.
49
8*
**
 
0.
44
9*
**
 
0.
44
2*
**
 
0.
54
1*
**
 
0.
65
3*
**
 
0.
63
7*
**
 
(0
.1
01
) 
(0
.1
13
) 
(0
.1
49
) 
(0
.1
19
) 
(0
.1
47
) 
(0
.1
45
) 
(0
.1
52
) 
(0
.1
25
) 
(0
.1
88
) 
(0
.1
57
) 
Av
er
ag
e 
te
st
 
sc
or
e 
53
7.
9 
53
7.
2 
53
5.
7 
53
8.
7 
54
1.
5 
54
1.
4 
53
6 
53
8.
3 
54
1.
2 
54
0.
3 
Te
st
 <
 IT
A 
-0
.3
66
**
* 
-0
.5
15
**
* 
-0
.4
72
**
* 
-0
.4
94
**
* 
-0
.3
31
**
 
-0
.3
08
**
 
-0
.5
72
**
* 
-0
.3
26
**
* 
-0
.2
35
* 
-0
.2
93
**
 
(0
.0
89
) 
(0
.0
99
) 
(0
.1
38
) 
(0
.1
31
) 
(0
.1
41
) 
(0
.1
33
) 
(0
.1
51
) 
(0
.1
18
) 
(0
.1
23
) 
(0
.1
20
) 
Av
er
ag
e 
te
st
 
sc
or
e 
53
5.
9 
53
4.
7 
53
2.
5 
53
4.
6 
53
9.
5 
54
0.
1 
53
1.
9 
53
4.
9 
53
8.
1 
53
8.
5 
N
ot
e:
 S
ES
1:
 lo
w
er
 e
du
ca
tio
n,
 S
ES
2:
 v
oc
at
io
na
l e
du
ca
tio
n,
 S
ES
3:
 h
ig
he
r 
ed
uc
at
io
n,
 S
ES
4:
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
 e
du
ca
tio
n.
 C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 a
re
 fr
om
 o
rd
in
ar
y 
le
as
t s
qu
ar
ed
 r
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 w
ith
 
th
e 
fin
al
 t
ea
ch
er
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t 
as
 t
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e.
 S
ta
nd
ar
d 
er
ro
rs
 a
re
 c
lu
st
er
ed
 a
t 
th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
 le
ve
l. 
**
*,
 *
*,
 *
 r
ep
re
se
nt
 1
, 5
 a
nd
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 
le
ve
ls 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 A
ll 
co
nt
ro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 u
se
d 
in
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
an
al
ys
es
 a
re
 in
cl
ud
ed
 p
lu
s 
ar
ea
 c
od
e 
of
 r
es
id
en
ce
 a
nd
 r
eg
io
n.
 T
he
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 in
 b
ol
d 
ar
e 
sig
ni
fic
an
tly
 d
iff
er
en
t 
fr
om
 th
e 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
gr
ou
p;
 th
e 
ot
he
r g
en
de
r, 
m
ot
he
r S
ES
1 
an
d 
fa
th
er
 S
ES
1.
 T
he
 fu
ll 
ta
bl
e 
w
ith
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 c
an
 b
e 
fo
un
d 
in
 a
pp
en
di
x 
C.
  
 
The impact of cognitive tests on teachers updating their assessments 
111 
Chapter 4 
112 
4.4.4 Robustness checks 
To look further into the heterogeneity across groups we investigated three-way interac-
tions between gender, parental education levels and the difference between the test 
score and the initial teacher’s assessment on the final teacher’s assessment. There 
seem to be no statistically significant differences between gender and parental educa-
tion levels when the test score is higher than the initial teacher’s assessment. However, 
when the test score is lower than the initial teacher assessment, we obtain estimated 
coefficients that suggest that there could be differences between gender and parental 
education. These results are documented in Appendix D and are consistent with the 
results from Table 8. 
Several other papers have noted that there exists a difference in math and language 
scores between boys and girls (e.g., Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko, 2006; Dee, 2007; Fryer 
& Levitt, 2010; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2010). We investigate whether gender is related 
to the test score on the math and language component of the test and whether the 
final teacher’s assessment is more dependent on the math or the language component 
of the test. The estimated coefficients in Appendix G suggest that on average girls have 
a lower overall test score than boys. Girls have a significantly higher score on the lan-
guage component and a significantly lower score on the math component of the test 
compared to boys. However, we do not find a significant difference in the relation be-
tween the language score and the final teacher’s assessment and the math score and 
the final teacher’s assessment when we standardize the language score and the math 
score.40 Both measures seem to have a similar relation to the final teacher’s assess-
ment.  
When we finally investigate the interaction between gender and having a be-
low/above average language or math score, we find that compared to the reference 
level; lower than average language score and boys, being a girl with a below average 
score on language has a significantly negative relation to the final teacher’s assessment. 
The estimated coefficients are shown in Appendix H. It seems that girls are more nega-
tively affected by having a below average language score compared to boys. For both 
boys and girls having an above average language score is significantly positively related 
to the final teacher’s assessment. However, the adjustment effect for boys on the final 
teacher’s assessment is significantly higher than the adjustment effect for girls. A possi-
ble explanation for this finding is that this result is more expected from girls than from 
boys and therefore the teacher is more surprised by boys’ performance. The estimated 
coefficients suggest that there is no difference between boys and girls who have a be-
low or an above average math score on the final assessment. 
                                                                
40 This analysis is not in the table.  
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4.5 Policy perspective 
The results in this research suggest that teachers adjust their initial assessment of chil-
dren’s ability level based on the additional information they obtain from the test score. 
Teachers adjust their assessment heterogeneously across gender and parental educa-
tion levels. It is likely that the estimated coefficients that we obtain represent a lower 
bound of the adjustment effect based on the test score. This is likely the case because 
teachers have knowledge about children’s previous test scores and they are likely corre-
lated with their test score in 6th grade. If teachers would not have this information 
about previous test scores, the adjustment effect based on the test score would in all 
likelihood be larger.  
The policy implications of these findings depend on whether teachers are biased 
against certain groups or if teachers recognize that they made an incorrect initial as-
sessment and correctly adjust their assessment based on the test score. In the first 
case, the teacher is biased against certain groups and the heterogeneous adjustment 
across groups is a reflection of this bias that is likely already present in the initial teach-
er’s assessment. Even in this case the teachers’ adjustment can be efficient depending 
on the reasons for the adjustment. For example, teachers might believe that children 
from highly educated parents are more likely to successfully complete a higher level of 
secondary education because their parents have more resources available for additional 
schooling or that children from highly educated parents are endowed with a different 
set of non-cognitive skills that are more beneficial for the successful completion of sec-
ondary education compared to children from lower educated parents. This might vio-
late the idea of equal opportunities for all children regardless of their gender and social-
economic background, but it might be efficient if the teacher is correct in his judgement 
that these children are more successful in completing secondary education. In the sec-
ond case, the teacher is not biased against certain groups but he recognizes that he 
made an incorrect initial assessment. Now the adjustment is a reflection of additional 
information that has become available in terms of the test score.  
To assess the value of a separate measure of children’s ability levels we can com-
pare how well the initial teacher’s assessment and the final teacher’s assessment pre-
dict children’s performance in the form of children’s track allocation in secondary edu-
cation in 9th grade. This question relates to the topic and the analysis in Chapter 3, 
which is about track switching between 7th and 9th grade. The results in Appendix I seem 
to suggest that on average the final teacher’s assessment is more accurate in predicting 
children’s track allocation in 9th grade compared to the initial teacher’s assessment. 
Regardless of whether teachers adjust their initial assessment due to a bias against 
certain groups or due to the availability of new information, the test score seems to be 
a valuable addition. In the first case, the test score can be used as an objective measure 
of children’s ability that can (partly) compensate for teachers’ bias. The test score can 
indicate that children have the skills/knowledge to attend a certain level of secondary 
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education. In this setting, the test ensures the (more) equal opportunities of children 
across groups. In the second case, the test score provides additional information to 
teachers that was previously not known. This additional information helps to reduce the 
measurement error in determining children’s ability level and increases the probability 
of allocating children to their most appropriate track in secondary education.       
4.6 Conclusions 
Up to the schoolyear 2014-2015 two measures of children’s ability level are used to 
allocate children to tracks in secondary school, the test score and the final teacher’s 
assessment. One of the most attractive features of test scores is that they are assumed 
to reflect an objective assessment of children’s ability level, whereas the teacher’s as-
sessment is subjective and could be (unintentionally) biased by prejudice. The ad-
vantage of the teacher’s assessment is that it is able to incorporate more information 
than the test score.  
This paper addresses the question to what extent and for whom teachers adjust 
their initial assessment of children’s ability level after observing the children’s test 
score. If teachers have all information necessary to make an accurate assessment of 
children’s ability levels than adjustments based on the test score should not be neces-
sary. However, the estimates in this paper show that teachers significantly adjust their 
initial assessments based on the test score. Apparently, the test score provides infor-
mation that is not previously known to the teacher or information that was not yet 
incorporated into the teacher’s assessment. The estimates show that teachers adjust 
their initial assessment heterogeneously across gender and parental education levels. 
We observe that girls and children whose parents obtained a low level of education 
receive a  disadvantageous adjustment compared to boys and children whose parents 
obtained a higher level of education.  
Whether the adjustment to the initial teacher’s assessment is due to teachers’ bias 
against certain groups or due to the availability of new information cannot be causally 
determined by the dataset that is used in this paper. Policy implications depend on 
which of these two channels drives the obtained results. Nevertheless, this paper shows 
that regardless of which of these two options is correct, the information that is provided 
by the test score in 6th grade provides valuable additional information to teachers about 
children’s ability levels.   
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Appendix 
This appendix presents supporting material. In Section A we discuss the bivariate corre-
lation coefficients of all of our outcome measures and covariates used in our analyses. 
In section B we investigate whether or not individual characteristics are able to predict 
whether children end up in our sample for analyses. Section C presents the interaction 
table of the determinants of the final teacher’s assessment. Section D follows up on 
section C and presents the three way interaction table of the determinants of the final 
teacher’s assessment. Section E presents the results of an ordered probit regression 
corresponding to table 6. Section F presents the results of an ordered probit regression 
corresponding to table 7. Section G and section H present differences between math 
and language scores. Section I presents how the initial teacher’s assessment and the 
final teacher’s assessment predict children’s track allocation in 9th grade.  
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A. Correlations 
Table A shows the bivariate correlation coefficients of our main variables of interest, the 
initial teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment as well as 
the covariates used in the analysis. First of all, we observe that the correlation coeffi-
cients between our main variables of interest are all high and significant. The correla-
tion coefficient between the test score and the final teacher’s assessment is higher than 
the correlation coefficient between the test score and the initial teacher’s assessment. 
This might be the first indication that teachers adjust their assessment after observing 
children’s test score. Seconds, girls seem to have a lower test score compared to boys, 
but they do not seem to have lower teacher’s assessments. Third, children who are 
older seem to have a lower test score and lower teacher’s assessments. Fourth, the 
region of birth of the child and the mother does not seem to be related to the test score 
or to the teacher’s assessments. However, when fathers are born further away from 
Limburg there seems to be a negative relationship with the children’s test score and the 
teacher’s assessments. Fifth, the education level of both the mother and the father is 
significantly positively related to the children’s test score and the teacher’s assess-
ments. Sixth, fathers and mothers who are not employed show a negative relation to 
the children’s test score and the teacher’s assessments. Finally, children who report to 
live with both their mother and father seem to have a higher test score and teacher’s 
assessments compared to children who do not live with both parents. Overall, the co-
variates used in the analysis do not show any surprising relationships with the children’s 
test score and the teacher’s assessments.  
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B. Selection into the sample 
We address selection issues with regard to the sample we use for our analyses in Table 
B. Table B shows probit and OLS estimates of whether characteristics of children are 
able to predict whether the child ends up in our sample for analyses. The dependent 
variable is whether the child ends up in our sample (1) or has missing data (0). Children 
who end up in our sample for analyses are children for whom we have data on the ini-
tial teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment.  
Table B shows that after controlling for primary school fixed effects and clustering 
the standard errors at the primary school level there are almost no individual character-
istics that predict whether children end up in our sample for analysis or not. We use 
primary school fixed effects since we are concerned mainly about selection within 
schools, where schools only provide us with data about their best performing children 
and might leave out data about lower performing children. We expect that such selec-
tion would show up on children’s SES data, such as the education levels of their parents. 
We cluster standard errors at the primary school level since observations of children are 
likely not independent within the primary school they attend. The results show that 
children who are older are less likely to be represented in our sample for analyses. 
When parents have vocational or higher education or the child lives with both parents, 
the child is approximately 4 percentage points more likely to end up in our sample 
compared to when the parents have lower education or the child does not live with 
both parents, however, we do not see this result for children whose parents have com-
pleted university education. In column 2 and column 5 we only use those children for 
whom we have information on their test score. There are only a few children for whom 
we have information on teacher’s assessments but not on their test score. There does 
not seem to be a difference between the characteristics of children for whom we have a 
test score and for whom we do not have a test score. We find minor evidence that 
there are observable characteristics of children that are able to predict whether the 
child ends up in the sample. Since we do not find strong evidence that observable char-
acteristics of children predict whether the child ends up in our sample, we assume that 
there are also no unobservable characteristics that distinguish the children in our sam-
ple from the children who are not in our sample. Note that there are missing observa-
tions in our analyses. This is due to the fact that we do not have information on all co-
variates for all children. Since we are specifically interested in whether any of these 
covariates predict selection into our sample for analyses we lose observations when 
data on covariates is missing. Furthermore, we only have primary school fixed effects 
for children in the south of the region where we obtained the data from.  
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Table B: Selection into the sample 
  Selection into sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.059 0.056 -0.031 0.004 0.004 -0.012 
  (0.101) (0.102) (0.050) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) 
Age (in months) -0.027** -0.023** -0.012** -0.003** -0.003* -0.005** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Child born in other region NL 0.188 0.240 -0.011 0.027 0.032 -0.003 
  (0.282) (0.246) (0.141) (0.030) (0.024) (0.053) 
Child born abroad 0.319 0.219 -0.258* 0.020 0.014 -0.095 
  (0.276) (0.273) (0.151) (0.027) (0.028) (0.058) 
Father born in other region NL -0.017 0.043 -0.028 -0.005 0.000 -0.011 
  (0.221) (0.229) (0.109) (0.024) (0.025) (0.041) 
Father born abroad 0.143 0.167 0.044 0.019 0.020 0.014 
  (0.212) (0.215) (0.108) (0.021) (0.021) (0.040) 
Mother born in other region NL -0.185 -0.201 0.005 -0.016 -0.016 0.002 
  (0.182) (0.192) (0.111) (0.018) (0.019) (0.042) 
Mother born abroad -0.132 -0.148 0.197* -0.013 -0.013 0.073* 
  (0.178) (0.178) (0.110) (0.021) (0.021) (0.041) 
Father has vocational education 0.376*** 0.403*** -0.010 0.042** 0.042** -0.003 
  (0.139) (0.145) (0.068) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) 
Father has higher education 0.468*** 0.479*** 0.091 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.033 
  (0.167) (0.169) (0.089) (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) 
Father has university education 0.184 0.168 -0.020 0.021 0.018 -0.007 
  (0.156) (0.156) (0.082) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) 
Mother has vocational education -0.036 -0.129 -0.026 -0.000 -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.135) (0.135) (0.067) (0.015) (0.014) (0.025) 
Mother has higher education 0.266 0.194 0.105 0.032 0.024 0.038 
  (0.205) (0.204) (0.088) (0.021) (0.020) (0.032) 
Mother has university education 0.317 0.256 -0.116 0.031 0.024 -0.045 
  (0.197) (0.195) (0.118) (0.019) (0.019) (0.045) 
Father is unemployed 0.201 0.151 0.007 0.013 0.010 0.003 
  (0.386) (0.388) (0.160) (0.038) (0.039) (0.060) 
Father is sick/unable to work -0.062 0.159 0.038 -0.003 0.024 0.017 
  (0.329) (0.343) (0.198) (0.042) (0.035) (0.074) 
Father has other labour market 
position 
0.550 0.528 0.194 0.070 0.066 0.071 
(0.335) (0.341) (0.219) (0.047) (0.048) (0.079) 
Mother is unemployed -0.344 -0.317 0.106 -0.004 0.001 0.041 
  (0.403) (0.436) (0.191) (0.042) (0.041) (0.068) 
Mother is sick/unable to work 0.132 0.228 -0.123 0.025 0.034 -0.045 
  (0.243) (0.248) (0.128) (0.026) (0.024) (0.049) 
Mother has other labour market 
position 
0.160 0.171 0.146 0.021 0.023 0.053 
(0.165) (0.170) (0.089) (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) 
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  Selection into sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Child lives with both parents 0.326** 0.288** 0.051 0.038** 0.033* 0.019 
  (0.134) (0.137) (0.067) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) 
Constant 5.358** 5.333** 0.342 1.491*** 1.421*** 0.849** 
  (2.170) (2.168) (1.175) (0.254) (0.253) (0.400) 
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS 
School FE yes yes no yes yes no 
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,091 1,041 2,363 2,363 2,304 2,363 
Note: The coefficients are from probit regressions and ordinary least squares regressions with a dummy 
variable for selection into the sample as the dependent variable.  Selected into the sample equals 1, all other 
observations equal 0. In column 2 and 5 only children for whom we have information on the test score are 
included. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 percent 
significance levels respectively. Other control variables in all the regressions are areas code of residence and 
region.  
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C. Determinants of the final teacher’s assessment – interaction table 
Table C reports the interaction table of the estimates from ordinary least squares re-
gressions where characteristics of children are interacted with a dummy for the positive 
or negative difference between the test score and the initial teacher’s assessment. 
These results have also been discussed in table 8 in the main section of this paper. The 
table reports estimates for the gender of the child and the education level of the father 
and the mother. Column 1 and 2 report the effects related to the gender of the child. 
The estimates for gender show no significant difference between boys and girls when 
the test score is higher than the initial teacher’s assessment. However, when the test 
score is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment teachers adjust boys’ final assess-
ment downwards with 0.366 tracks on average while teachers adjust girls’ final assess-
ment downwards with 0.515 tracks on average. This difference is statistically significant 
at 5 percent.  
The results for the education level of the mother and the father show that there is a 
clear trend in the magnitude of the coefficients regarding the difference between the 
test score and the initial teacher’s assessment to the final teacher’s assessment.41 The 
effect of having a test score that is higher than the initial teacher’s assessment is on 
average positive across all education levels of mothers and fathers while the effect of 
having a test score that is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment is on average 
negative for the final teacher’s assessment across all education levels of mothers and 
fathers. The interesting aspect is that having a highly educated parent is much more 
beneficial when the test score deviates from the initial teacher’s assessment than is 
having a lower educated parent. When the test score is higher than the initial teacher’s 
assessment the magnitude of the relation increases for children with higher educated 
parents. However, even though a clear trend is visible the differences between the 
effect sizes of different education levels for mothers and fathers are not significantly 
different from the effect of the lower education level. When the test score is lower than 
the initial teacher’s assessment the magnitude of the relation steadily decreases for 
children with higher educated parents. The effect sizes of different education levels for 
mothers are not significantly different from the lower education level, however, the 
effect sizes of different education levels of fathers are significantly different from the 
lower education level.   
                                                                
41 The baseline for the regression coefficients of gender and the education level of parents is when the test 
score is equal to the initial teacher’s assessment. The baseline for the interaction coefficients in the first 
column of table 8 is when the test is lower or equal to the initial teacher’s assessment and the gender is boys 
(gender=0). Compared to these baseline estimates all reported coefficients in column 1 are significantly 
different. However, in column 1 the reported interaction coefficients for boys and girls are not significantly 
different from each other. The baseline for the effects of the education level of mothers in column 3 in table 8 
is when the test score is lower or equal to the initial teacher’s assessment and the education level of the 
mother/father is lower education (education level=1). Compared to these baseline estimates all reported 
coefficients in column 3 are significantly different.   
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Table C: Determinants of the final teacher’s assessment – interaction table 
  Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Test > ITA & boys 0.393***           
  (0.101)           
Test > ITA & girls 0.395***           
  (0.113)           
Test < ITA & boys   -0.366***         
    (0.089)         
Test < ITA & girls   -0.515***         
    (0.099)        
Test > ITA & lower educ mother     0.333**       
      (0.149)       
Test > ITA & vocational educ mother     0.442***       
      (0.119)       
Test > ITA & higher educ mother     0.498***       
      (0.147)       
Test > ITA & university educ mother     0.449***       
      (0.145)       
Test > ITA & lower educ father       0.442***     
        (0.152)     
Test > ITA & vocational educ father       0.541***     
        (0.125)     
Test > ITA & higher educ father       0.653***     
        (0.188)     
Test > ITA & university educ father       0.637***     
        (0.157)     
Test < ITA & lower educ mother         -0.472***   
          (0.138)   
Test < ITA & vocational educ mother         -0.494***   
          (0.131)   
Test < ITA & higher educ mother         -0.331**   
          (0.141)   
Test < ITA & university educ mother         -0.308**   
          (0.133)   
Test < ITA & lower educ father           -0.572*** 
            (0.151) 
Test < ITA & vocational educ father           -0.326*** 
            (0.118) 
Test < ITA & higher educ father           -0.235* 
            (0.123) 
Test < ITA & university educ father           -0.293** 
            (0.120) 
Constant -2.555*** -2.642*** -2.522*** -2.559*** -2.619*** -2.532*** 
  (0.897) (0.905) (0.903) (0.902) (0.898) (0.913) 
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  Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Classroom FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 
R-squared 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920 
Note: Coefficients are from ordinary least squared regressions with the final teacher assessment as the de-
pendent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 
percent significance levels respectively. All control variables used in previous analyses are included plus area 
code of residence and region.  
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D. Determinants of the final teacher’s assessment – three-way 
interaction table 
Table D reports the interaction table of the estimates from ordinary least squares re-
gressions where characteristics of children are interacted with a dummy for the positive 
or negative difference between the test score and the initial teacher’s assessment.  
The table reports estimates for the interactions between the test being higher/lower 
than the initial teacher’s assessment, gender of the child and the education level of the 
father or the mother. There are no significant differences found between gender and 
parents’ education level when the test score is higher than the initial teacher’s assess-
ment. This is in line with the results from table 8.42  
However, when the test score is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment we find 
that there is a significant difference between the gender of a child and the relation to 
the final teacher’s assessment when the mother has vocational education.  Girls’ aver-
age teacher’s assessment is adjusted significantly more downwards in this case. This 
same result occurs with fathers’ education level. Furthermore, we find differences be-
tween fathers’ education level when the test score is lower than the initial teacher’s 
assessment. First, there is a significant difference for boys when the father has lower 
education compared to when the father has higher education. The negative effect of 
having a test score that is lower than the initial teacher’s assessment is much lower for 
boys whose father has completed higher education. Second, there are significant differ-
ences between girls’ adjustment when the father has lower education compared to 
when the father has higher or university education. In these cases the children whose 
father has lower education receive a significantly greater adjustment downwards in 
their final teacher’s assessment. 
  
                                                                
42 The baseline for the regression coefficients is when the test score is equal to the initial teacher’s assess-
ment. The baseline for the interaction coefficients in the first column of table D is when the test is lower or 
equal to the initial teacher’s assessment and the gender is boys (gender=0) and the education level of the 
mother is lower education (education=1). Compared to this baseline estimate some of the reported coeffi-
cients in column 1 are significantly different. However, in column 1 the reported interaction coefficients are 
not significantly different from each other. 
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Table D: Determinants of the final teacher’s assessment – three-way interaction table 
Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test > ITA & boys & lower educ mother 0.255       
  (0.185)       
Test > ITA & boys & vocational educ mother 0.264*       
  (0.159)       
Test > ITA & boys & higher educ mother 0.489***       
  (0.179)       
Test > ITA & boys & university educ mother 0.296*       
  (0.172)       
Test > ITA & girls & lower educ mother 0.142       
  (0.224)       
Test > ITA & girls & vocational educ mother 0.371**       
  (0.160)       
Test > ITA & girls & higher educ mother 0.139       
  (0.227)       
Test > ITA & girls & university educ mother 0.333       
  (0.239)       
Test > ITA & boys & lower educ father   0.397*     
    (0.230)     
Test > ITA & boys & vocational educ father   0.436***     
    (0.149)     
Test > ITA & boys & higher educ father   0.737***     
    (0.247)     
Test > ITA & boys & university educ father   0.492***     
    (0.164)     
Test > ITA & girls & lower educ father   0.343     
    (0.216)     
Test > ITA & girls & vocational educ father   0.520***     
    (0.182)     
Test > ITA & girls & higher educ father   0.381*     
    (0.228)     
Test > ITA & girls & university educ father   0.645**     
    (0.269)     
Test < ITA & boys & lower educ mother     -0.429**   
      (0.185)   
Test < ITA & boys & vocational educ mother     -0.435**   
      (0.171)   
Test < ITA & boys & higher educ mother     -0.319*   
      (0.168)   
Test < ITA & boys & university educ mother     -0.208   
      (0.164)   
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Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Test < ITA & girls & lower educ mother     -0.621***   
      (0.202)   
Test < ITA & girls & vocational educ mother     -0.639***   
      (0.156)   
Test < ITA & girls & higher educ mother     -0.388**   
      (0.182)   
Test < ITA & girls & university educ mother     -0.426**   
      (0.173)   
Test < ITA & boys & lower educ father       -0.478** 
        (0.215) 
Test < ITA & boys & vocational educ father       -0.177 
        (0.162) 
Test < ITA & boys & higher educ father       -0.153 
        (0.170) 
Test < ITA & boys & university educ father       -0.166 
        (0.150) 
Test < ITA & girls & lower educ father       -0.652*** 
        (0.219) 
Test < ITA & girls & vocational educ father       -0.410** 
        (0.173) 
Test < ITA & girls & higher educ father       -0.217 
        (0.173) 
Test < ITA & girls & university educ father       -0.333* 
        (0.178) 
Constant -2.377*** -2.448*** -2.585*** -2.558*** 
  (0.782) (0.788) (0.790) (0.806) 
School FE yes yes yes yes 
Classroom FE yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 
R-squared 0.915 0.915 0.915 0.915 
Note: Coefficients are from ordinary least squared regressions with the final teacher assessment as the de-
pendent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 
percent significance levels respectively. All control variables used in previous analyses are included plus area 
code of residence and region.  
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E: Determinants of the final teacher’s assessment – ordered probit 
regression for table 6. 
In table 6 we presented OLS regression coefficients of the determinants of the final 
teacher’s assessment. However, it is possible that the differences between the tracks 
are not linear. Therefore, we estimate the same equation with an ordered probit model. 
The coefficients of this model can be found in table E.  
The first two rows in table E show the coefficients of the relation between the initial 
teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment. The table re-
ports ordered probit coefficients and not marginal effects since we are interested in the 
difference between the two independent variables and not the exact size of the effects. 
In the first column we observe that the initial teacher’s assessment is able to explain a 
larger part of the distance between the lowest and the highest final teacher’s assess-
ment than the test score, 0.067 versus 0.058. The coefficients for the initial teacher’s 
assessment and the test score do not seem to have a significantly different relation with 
the final teacher’s assessment, p-value of 0.262. This result is in line with the results 
obtained from the ordinary least squares regressions in table 6.  
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Table E: Ordered probit regression for table 6 
  Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Initial teacher assessment 0.786*** 0.778*** 0.724*** 
  (0.054) (0.051) (0.043) 
Test score 0.684*** 0.659*** 0.552*** 
  (0.066) (0.049) (0.041) 
Female -0.232** -0.021 -0.059 
  (0.092) (0.074) -0.065 
Age (in months) -0.008 -0.012* -0.013*** 
  (0.008) (0.006) -0.005 
Child born in other region NL 0.093 -0.084 -0.097 
  (0.213) (0.205) (0.170) 
Child born abroad -0.025 0.263 0.291 
  (0.270) (0.199) (0.199) 
Father born in other region NL 0.448*** 0.191 0.163 
  (0.163) (0.168) (0.142) 
Father born abroad -0.134 -0.054 -0.031 
  (0.193) (0.158) (0.123) 
Mother born in other region NL -0.121 -0.030 -0.069 
  (0.168) (0.139) (0.121) 
Mother born abroad -0.102 -0.069 -0.082 
  (0.208) (0.158) (0.136) 
Father has vocational education 0.276** 0.186** 0.170** 
  (0.124) (0.090) (0.081) 
Father has higher education 0.372** 0.258* 0.230* 
  (0.173) (0.143) (0.126) 
Father has university education 0.108 0.212* 0.218** 
  (0.136) (0.112) (0.100) 
Mother has vocational education 0.091 0.149 0.084 
  (0.137) (0.112) (0.100) 
Mother has higher education 0.237 0.417*** 0.346*** 
  (0.151) (0.117) (0.099) 
Mother has university education 0.370** 0.477*** 0.404*** 
  (0.187) (0.159) (0.138) 
Father is unemployed -0.632** -0.331 -0.371* 
  (0.271) (0.255) (0.210) 
Father is sick/unable to work -0.190 -0.049 -0.160 
  (0.287) (0.253) (0.221) 
Father has other labour market position 0.376 -0.168 -0.127 
  (0.273) (0.214) (0.205) 
Mother is unemployed 0.506* 0.081 -0.087 
  (0.267) (0.238) (0.195) 
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  Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Mother is sick/unable to work 0.070 0.117 0.033 
  (0.239) (0.169) (0.164) 
Mother has other labour market position -0.266* -0.099 -0.130 
  (0.142) (0.126) (0.112) 
Child lives with both parents -0.254** -0.061 -0.033 
  (0.113) (0.092) (0.078) 
Constant cut1 8.200*** 8.755*** 6.716*** 
  (1.468) (1.131) (0.843) 
Constant cut2 9.453*** 9.750*** 7.627*** 
  (1.476) (1.146) (0.868) 
Constant cut3 11.282*** 11.396*** 9.126*** 
  (1.531) (1.173) (0.902) 
Constant cut4 11.398*** 11.491*** 9.211*** 
  (1.538) (1.171) (0.901) 
Constant cut5 12.504*** 12.336*** 9.941*** 
  (1.564) (1.192) (0.924) 
Constant cut6 16.022*** 14.698*** 12.029*** 
  (1.659) (1.204) (0.938) 
Constant cut7 18.082*** 16.170*** 13.353*** 
  (1.697) (1.230) (0.968) 
Constant cut8 19.908*** 17.541*** 14.582*** 
  (1.716) (1.239) (0.972) 
Initial teacher assessment / (C8-C1) 0.067 0.089 0.092 
Test score / (C8-C1) 0.058 0.075 0.070 
Difference ITA - TS (p-values) 0.262 0.153 0.012 
School FE yes yes no 
Classroom FE yes no no 
Clustered SEs yes yes yes 
Observations 1,404 1,404 1,404 
Note: Coefficients are from ordered probit regressions with the final teacher assessment as the dependent 
variable measured on a scale from 1-9. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * 
represent 1,5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively. Other control variables in all regressions are 
area code of residence and region.  
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F: Determinants of the final teacher’s assessment – ordered probit 
regression for table 7 
In table 7 we presented OLS regression coefficients of the determinants of the final 
teacher’s assessment. However, it is possible that the differences between the tracks 
are not linear. Therefore, we estimate the same equation with an ordered probit model. 
The coefficients of this model can be found in table F.  
The first two rows in table F show the coefficients of the relation between the ‘test 
score > initial teacher’s assessment’ and the ‘test score < initial teacher’s assessment’ 
and the final teacher’s assessment. The table reports ordered probit coefficients and 
not marginal effects since we are only interested in the sign and significance of these 
two estimates. In all three columns we observe that there is a significantly positive rela-
tionship between the ‘test score > initial teacher’s assessment’ and the final teacher’s 
assessment and a significantly negative relationship between the ‘test score < initial 
teacher’s assessment’ and the final teacher’s assessment. This result is in line with the 
results obtained from the ordinary least squares regressions in table 7.  
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Table F: Ordered probit regression for table 7 
  Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Test score > Initial teacher assessment 0.786*** 0.742*** 0.710*** 
  (0.123) (0.095) (0.084) 
Test score < Initial teacher assessment -0.965*** -0.972*** -0.804*** 
  (0.136) (0.094) (0.078) 
Initial teacher assessment 1.322*** 1.327*** 1.193*** 
  (0.073) (0.055) (0.049) 
Female -0.214** -0.020 -0.063 
  (0.092) (0.075) (0.066) 
Age (in months) -0.006 -0.013** -0.015*** 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Child born in other region NL 0.046 -0.143 -0.141 
  (0.212) (0.187) (0.164) 
Child born abroad 0.015 0.222 0.282 
  (0.258) (0.197) (0.207) 
Father born in other region NL 0.506*** 0.221 0.171 
  (0.172) (0.172) (0.143) 
Father born abroad -0.188 -0.066 -0.046 
  (0.194) (0.159) (0.128) 
Mother born in other region NL 0.032 0.118 0.058 
  (0.184) (0.144) (0.129) 
Mother born abroad -0.026 0.042 0.023 
  (0.211) (0.167) (0.149) 
Father has vocational education 0.281** 0.195** 0.186** 
  (0.124) (0.093) (0.081) 
Father has higher education 0.405** 0.313** 0.262** 
  (0.170) (0.139) (0.124) 
Father has university education 0.105 0.223* 0.222** 
  (0.140) (0.114) (0.101) 
Mother has vocational education -0.004 0.086 0.040 
  (0.137) (0.110) (0.097) 
Mother has higher education 0.188 0.405*** 0.347*** 
  (0.151) (0.116) (0.096) 
Mother has university education 0.268 0.407*** 0.360*** 
  (0.177) (0.150) (0.133) 
Father is unemployed -0.575** -0.308 -0.333 
  (0.291) (0.259) (0.212) 
Father is sick/unable to work -0.280 -0.105 -0.212 
  (0.295) (0.258) (0.223) 
Father has other labour market position 0.448 -0.106 -0.071 
  (0.283) (0.228) (0.210) 
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  Final teacher assessment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Mother is unemployed 0.511** 0.043 -0.107 
  (0.257) (0.215) (0.185) 
Mother is sick/unable to work 0.012 0.082 0.034 
  (0.233) (0.159) (0.155) 
Mother has other labour market position -0.188 -0.047 -0.087 
  (0.145) (0.130) (0.115) 
Child lives with both parents -0.242** -0.053 -0.025 
  (0.117) (0.091) (0.075) 
Constant cut1 8.153*** 8.131*** 5.823*** 
  (1.434) (1.085) (0.783) 
Constant cut2 9.390*** 9.092*** 6.721*** 
  (1.442) (1.099) (0.807) 
Constant cut3 11.149*** 10.660*** 8.161*** 
  (1.492) (1.101) (0.822) 
Constant cut4 11.258*** 10.750*** 8.241*** 
  (1.500) (1.101) (0.823) 
Constant cut5 12.305*** 11.535*** 8.928*** 
  (1.526) (1.125) (0.845) 
Constant cut6 15.784*** 13.799*** 10.952*** 
  (1.611) (1.150) (0.866) 
Constant cut7 17.775*** 15.194*** 12.217*** 
  (1.649) (1.169) (0.890) 
Constant cut8 19.526*** 16.493*** 13.391*** 
  (1.674) (1.192) (0.903) 
School FE yes yes no 
Classroom FE yes no no 
Clustered SEs yes yes yes 
Observations 1,404 1,404 1,404 
Note: Coefficients are from ordered probit regressions with the final teacher assessment as the dependent 
variable measured on a scale from 1-9. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * 
represent 1,5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively. Other control variables in all regressions are 
area code of residence and region.  
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G. Differences between math and language scores I 
We investigate whether children’s gender is related to their score on the math and 
language component of the test. These results have also been discussed in the results 
section of this paper.  
We find that on average girls have a lower overall test score than boys. Girls have a 
significantly higher score on the language component and a significantly lower score on 
the math component of the test compared to boys. In column 1-3 we find that there are 
few other covariates that affect the test score, the math score and the language score. 
We find that fathers that have an ‘other labour market position’ such as being retired or 
being a stay at home parent have a positive relation to children’s test score. This result 
is likely driven by a small number of fathers as most fathers are employed. Furthermore, 
we observe that having a mother who is born abroad has a negative relation to a child’s 
language score and there is a positive relation between mothers who are highly educat-
ed and their children’s language score. Finally, adding the classroom dummy variables 
captures a lot of variation as can be observed from the increase in the r-squared. It 
seems that between classrooms the impact of parents’ education level on test scores is 
substantial. Within classrooms this relation seems to disappear. It is possible that chil-
dren are sorted into certain schools based on their parents education level.  
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Table G: Differences between math and language scores  
  Test score Math score Language 
score 
Test score Math score Language 
score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Girls -0.232*** -3.576*** 1.025** -0.181 -3.458*** 1.583** 
  (0.079) (0.499) (0.493) (0.120) (0.589) (0.613) 
Age (in months) 0.007 -0.030 0.052 -0.063*** -0.330*** -0.293*** 
  (0.007) (0.042) (0.040) (0.012) (0.059) (0.062) 
Child born in other region NL 0.011 0.494 -0.602 -0.113 0.383 -1.464 
  (0.185) (1.062) (1.071) (0.234) (1.166) (1.329) 
Child born abroad 0.067 -0.007 0.043 0.379 2.239 0.848 
  (0.208) (1.184) (1.314) (0.329) (1.666) (1.819) 
Father born in other region NL 0.104 0.831 0.078 0.023 0.298 -0.231 
  (0.137) (0.699) (0.796) (0.172) (0.883) (0.970) 
Father born abroad -0.193 -1.601 0.116 -0.325 -1.961 -1.081 
  (0.151) (1.011) (0.808) (0.245) (1.236) (1.308) 
Mother born in other region NL 0.066 0.814 0.130 0.199 1.263 1.030 
  (0.117) (0.806) (0.707) (0.184) (1.034) (0.940) 
Mother born abroad -0.106 0.371 -1.502* 0.070 0.925 -0.380 
  (0.146) (0.862) (0.844) (0.181) (0.935) (1.075) 
Father has vocational education -0.042 -0.496 0.237 0.279** 1.052 1.564** 
  (0.098) (0.600) (0.586) (0.129) (0.698) (0.691) 
Father has higher education -0.049 -0.988 0.058 0.559*** 1.834** 2.777*** 
  (0.113) (0.629) (0.758) (0.182) (0.883) (1.018) 
Father has university education -0.151 -0.258 -1.315 0.488*** 2.520*** 1.969* 
  (0.132) (0.686) (0.964) (0.168) (0.833) (1.007) 
Mother has vocational education 0.008 -0.171 0.173 0.395** 1.613** 2.078** 
  (0.086) (0.507) (0.592) (0.162) (0.808) (0.851) 
Mother has higher education 0.174 0.166 1.351** 1.128*** 4.473*** 6.187*** 
  (0.111) (0.624) (0.658) (0.186) (0.885) (1.075) 
Mother has university education 0.099 -0.813 2.024*** 1.262*** 4.490*** 7.718*** 
  (0.128) (0.750) (0.741) (0.190) (0.939) (1.038) 
Father is unemployed -0.137 -1.405 -0.082 -0.041 -0.387 0.099 
  (0.206) (1.357) (1.331) (0.284) (1.650) (1.620) 
Father is sick/unable to work -0.254 -0.701 -1.005 -0.023 0.208 0.202 
  (0.261) (1.885) (1.285) (0.343) (1.914) (1.998) 
Father has other labour  
market position 
0.509** 2.302* 2.960*** -0.668** -2.704* -3.528* 
(0.208) (1.336) (1.090) (0.314) (1.513) (2.034) 
Mother is unemployed 0.059 0.573 0.368 -0.258 -1.153 -1.195 
  (0.282) (1.399) (1.798) (0.383) (1.795) (2.174) 
Mother is sick/unable to work -0.003 -0.311 1.516 -0.146 -1.026 1.311 
  (0.167) (1.017) (1.222) (0.260) (1.330) (1.426) 
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  Test score Math score Language 
score 
Test score Math score Language 
score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mother has other labour  
market position 
-0.074 -0.436 -0.984 -0.218 -0.797 -1.927* 
(0.109) (0.688) (0.655) (0.187) (0.978) (1.026) 
Child lives with both parents -0.009 -0.373 -0.045 0.213* 0.762 0.991 
  (0.089) (0.557) (0.483) (0.128) (0.698) (0.669) 
Constant 7.227*** 59.319*** 77.372*** 16.792*** 99.837*** 126.599*** 
  (1.363) (7.450) (7.568) (2.115) (10.300) (10.479) 
School FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Classroom FE yes yes yes no no no 
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 
R-squared 0.814 0.724 0.759 0.334 0.304 0.324 
Note: Coefficients are from ordinary least squared regressions with the test score, the math score or the 
language score as the dependent variable. The test score is measured on a scale from 1-9, the language score 
ranges from 34 to 100 and the math score ranges from 10 to 60. Standard errors are clustered at the primary 
school level. ***, **, * represent 1,5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively. Other control variables in 
all regressions are area code of residence and region.  
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H. Differences between math and language scores II 
We investigate whether the final teacher’s assessment is more dependent on the math 
or the language component of the test. These results have also been discussed in the 
results section of this paper.  
We do not find a significant difference in the relation between the language score 
and the final teacher’s assessment and the math score and the final teacher’s assess-
ment. Both measures seem to have a similar positive relation to the final teacher’s as-
sessment. Furthermore, when we look at the interaction between gender and having a 
below/above average language or math score, in column 4, we find that compared to 
the reference level; lower than average language score and boys, being a girl with a 
below average score on language has a significantly negative relation to the final teach-
er’s assessment. It seems that girls are more negatively affected by having a below 
average language score compared to boys. For both boys and girls having an above 
average language score is significantly positively related to the final teacher’s assess-
ment. However, the adjustment effect for boys on the final teacher’s assessment is 
significantly more positive than the adjustment effect for girls. In column 5 we find that 
there is no difference between boys and girls who have a below or an above average 
math score on the final assessment.  
The regressions in column 1-3 are performed with standardized test scores for math 
and language. We do not find a significant difference between the predictive power of 
math and language test scores for the final teacher’s assessment. 
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Table H: Differences between math and language scores II 
  FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lower than avg language & girls       -0.303***   
        (0.111)   
Higher than avg language & boys       0.397***   
        (0.103)   
Higher than avg langage & girls       0.304***   
        (0.104)   
Lower than avg math & girls         -0.122 
          (0.116) 
Higher than avg math & boys         0.393*** 
          (0.114) 
Higher than avg math & girls         0.345*** 
          (0.118) 
Language score 0.041***   0.040***     
  (0.005)   (0.005)     
Math score   0.035*** 0.034***     
    (0.006) (0.006)     
ITA 0.478*** 0.474*** 0.404*** 0.520*** 0.511*** 
  (0.029) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) 
Girls -0.189*** -0.022 -0.079     
  (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)     
Age (in months) -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) -0.005 
Child born in other region NL 0.041 0.000 0.037 0.043 -0.029 
  (0.105) (0.116) (0.106) (0.105) (0.119) 
Child born abroad -0.009 -0.006 0.000 0.031 0.005 
  (0.170) (0.144) (0.154) (0.162) (0.146) 
Father born in other region NL 0.172** 0.146* 0.142* 0.194** 0.172* 
  (0.081) (0.087) (0.085) (0.082) (0.091) 
Father born abroad -0.082 -0.022 -0.037 -0.086 -0.037 
  (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.111) 
Mother born in other region NL 0.018 -0.005 -0.010 0.019 0.005 
  (0.078) (0.075) (0.073) (0.078) (0.076) 
Mother born abroad -0.048 -0.123 -0.074 -0.046 -0.107 
  (0.107) (0.105) (0.099) (0.109) (0.111) 
Father has vocational education 0.096 0.123 0.115 0.092 0.115 
  (0.076) (0.083) (0.075) (0.080) (0.081) 
Father has higher education 0.157* 0.194* 0.197** 0.139 0.158 
  (0.094) (0.099) (0.093) (0.096) (0.096) 
Father has university education 0.120 0.076 0.134 0.093 0.065 
  (0.083) (0.091) (0.082) (0.085) (0.089) 
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  FTA FTA FTA FTA FTA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mother has vocational education 0.018 0.031 0.024 0.001 0.021 
  (0.081) (0.085) (0.081) (0.081) (0.083) 
Mother has higher education 0.078 0.128 0.079 0.109 0.127 
  (0.089) (0.095) (0.090) (0.093) (0.095) 
Mother has university education 0.016 0.128 0.049 0.067 0.103 
  (0.099) (0.100) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) 
Father is unemployed -0.323* -0.277 -0.275 -0.344* -0.273 
  (0.183) (0.179) (0.178) (0.180) (0.183) 
Father is sick/unable to work -0.328* -0.344* -0.289 -0.356* -0.339* 
  (0.196) (0.190) (0.181) (0.204) (0.202) 
Father has other labour market position 0.070 0.110 -0.001 0.073 0.148 
  (0.167) (0.158) (0.158) (0.166) (0.153) 
Mother is unemployed 0.208 0.204 0.213 0.215 0.201 
  (0.150) (0.155) (0.145) (0.150) (0.159) 
Mother is sick/unable to work 0.025 0.098 0.046 0.048 0.062 
  (0.176) (0.168) (0.169) (0.173) (0.162) 
Mother has other labour market position -0.086 -0.111 -0.083 -0.112 -0.138 
  (0.087) (0.086) (0.083) (0.085) (0.091) 
Child lives with both parents -0.116* -0.105* -0.108* -0.117* -0.119* 
  (0.065) (0.062) (0.058) (0.068) (0.065) 
Constant -4.315*** -3.201*** -5.666*** -1.472* -1.998** 
  (0.845) (0.813) (0.859) (0.815) (0.800) 
School FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Classroom FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 
R-squared 0.918 0.915 0.924 0.914 0.913 
Note: Coefficients are from ordinary least squared regressions with the final teacher assessment (FTA) as the 
dependent variable.  Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * represent 1,5 and 10 
percent significance levels respectively. Other control variables in all regressions are area code of residence 
and region.  
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I. How ITA and FTA predict track allocation in 9th grade 
Table I presents the results of how well the initial teacher’s assessment and the final 
teacher’s assessment predict children’s track allocation in 9th grade. The coefficients in 
column 1-4 are from ordered probit regressions and the coefficients in column 5 are 
from ordinary least squared regressions. Both the initial teacher’s assessment and the 
final teacher’s assessment have a significantly positive relation with children’s track 
allocation in 9th grade, as expected. In column 3 and column 4 we observe that the final 
teacher’s assessment has a stronger correlation with the children’s track allocation in 
9th grade than the initial teacher’s assessment. In both column 3 and column 4 the dif-
ference between the covariates is significant at the 5 percent level. In column 4 we 
observe that the coefficients of the initial teacher’s assessment and the final teacher’s 
assessment decrease after adding the test score to the model indicating that these 
measures partly measure the same latent variable. The test score still seems to capture 
different aspects of children’s ability than what is accounted for by the initial teacher’s 
assessment and the final teacher’s assessment. This could be due to different things 
such as measurement error, the three ability measures can capture different parts of 
children’s ability level, the teacher might not have considered (all of) the information 
provided by the test score to be relevant.  
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Table I: How ITA and FTA predict track allocation in 9th grade 
  Track in 9th grade 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Initial teacher assessment 0.541***   0.219*** 0.179*** 0.330*** 
  (0.015)   (0.031) (0.031) (0.044) 
Final teacher assessment   0.563*** 0.373*** 0.300*** 0.397*** 
    (0.016) (0.031) (0.036) (0.063) 
Test score        0.137*** 0.304*** 
        (0.031) (0.049) 
Girls 0.121** 0.143*** 0.139*** 0.150*** 0.264*** 
  (0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.079) 
Age (in months) -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.010** -0.010** -0.024*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Child born in other region NL 0.023 0.097 0.068 0.087 0.104 
  (0.135) (0.106) (0.110) (0.113) (0.213) 
Child born abroad 0.091 -0.013 0.005 0.017 0.089 
  (0.131) (0.133) (0.120) (0.120) (0.189) 
Mother born in other region NL 0.007 -0.026 -0.020 -0.028 -0.032 
  (0.083) (0.063) (0.065) (0.064) (0.125) 
Mother born abroad 0.017 0.050 0.039 0.024 0.027 
  (0.084) (0.078) (0.072) (0.071) (0.136) 
Father born in other region NL -0.005 -0.094 -0.058 -0.068 -0.054 
  (0.088) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.136) 
Father born abroad -0.036 -0.055 -0.039 -0.020 -0.016 
  (0.100) (0.094) (0.088) (0.085) (0.139) 
Mother has vocational education 0.171** 0.113 0.116 0.117* 0.154 
  (0.081) (0.072) (0.071) (0.069) (0.104) 
Mother has higher education 0.282*** 0.162** 0.161** 0.147** 0.300*** 
  (0.087) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071) (0.113) 
Mother has university education 0.282*** 0.210** 0.187** 0.165** 0.487*** 
  (0.091) (0.087) (0.082) (0.081) (0.149) 
Father has vocational education 0.095 0.036 0.042 0.053 0.092 
  (0.073) (0.074) (0.071) (0.070) (0.107) 
Father has higher education 0.168* 0.100 0.097 0.107 0.258* 
  (0.101) (0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.144) 
Father has university education 0.181* 0.138 0.126 0.145* 0.327** 
  (0.092) (0.086) (0.085) (0.087) (0.151) 
Mother is unemployed -0.352** -0.336** -0.335** -0.320** -0.511** 
  (0.175) (0.130) (0.138) (0.137) (0.220) 
Mother is sick/unable to work -0.170 -0.191 -0.184 -0.160 -0.286* 
  (0.126) (0.132) (0.124) (0.115) (0.161) 
Mother has other labour market position 0.024 0.075 0.067 0.063 0.101 
  (0.089) (0.087) (0.082) (0.081) (0.140) 
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  Track in 9th grade 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Father is unemployed 0.026 0.168 0.117 0.114 0.109 
  (0.153) (0.125) (0.120) (0.121) (0.211) 
Father is sick/unable to work 0.077 0.257* 0.184 0.201 0.355* 
  (0.169) (0.138) (0.133) (0.130) (0.192) 
Father has other labour market position -0.116 -0.130 -0.082 -0.118 -0.232 
  (0.168) (0.135) (0.138) (0.135) (0.217) 
Child lives with both parents 0.166*** 0.168*** 0.162*** 0.149*** 0.203** 
  (0.064) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.087) 
Constant 0.718 3.250*** 1.730** 1.087   
  (0.903) (0.734) (0.816) (0.814)   
Constant cut1         0.015 
          (1.378) 
Constant cut2         2.295* 
          (1.337) 
Constant cut3         2.944** 
          (1.354) 
Constant cut4         4.190*** 
          (1.329) 
Constant cut5         6.039*** 
          (1.325) 
Initial teacher assessment/(C5-C1)         0.0548 
Final teacher assessment/(C5-C1)         0.0659 
Difference ITA-FTA (p-values)     0.0122 0.0484 0.4754 
School FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,404 
R-squared 0.764 0.793 0.808 0.813   
Note: Coefficients in column 1-4 are from ordinary least squared regressions. Coefficients in column 5 are 
from ordered probit. The dependent variable in all columns is the students' track allocation in 9th grade. 
Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * represent 1,5 and 10 percent significance 
levels respectively. Other control variables in all regressions are area code of residence and region.  
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Chapter 5: 
The impact of changing incentives on 
achievement tests and assessment measures: 
Evidence from a policy change in 
the Netherlands 
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5.1 Introduction 
Throughout children’s educational career achievement tests and assessments are used 
to monitor children’s ability level and evaluate their progress. Achievement tests are 
generally regarded as objective measures of a specific set of children’s skills. Teacher’s 
assessments are generally seen as more inclusive, taking into account a wider range of 
children’s skills and personality characteristics. However, this also makes the teacher’s 
assessment subjective and vulnerable to bias. Therefore, one could think about a 
teacher’s assessment as the aggregation of the information that the teacher has availa-
ble, and one can think of a test as an aggregate measure of the skills of a child. An im-
portant question to understand the meaning of assessments and tests is whether the 
way information is aggregated is stable or varies when the incentives of the assessment 
or the test change.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a change in the incentives changes 
the way teachers incorporate available information into their teacher’s assessment. We 
use a recent policy change in the Netherlands regarding the use of information for the 
transition from primary to secondary school to investigate the effect of circumstance on 
the test and the teacher’s assessments. As of the schoolyear 2014-2015, the Dutch 
government decided that children take the final test only after the teacher has made his 
assessment and that the track allocation decision is based solely on the teacher’s as-
sessment. This change potentially has an impact on how available information is incor-
porated in the teacher’s assessment.  
The policy change has two main components. First, the moment at which children 
take the standardized test in 6th grade is delayed from February until April. Second, the 
teacher’s assessment of children’s ability level in 6th grade becomes the measure that 
determines at which track level children are allocated at the start of secondary school. 
Before the policy change, the teacher’s final assessment is the teacher’s assessment 
that is most important for children’s track placement. However, after the policy change, 
the teacher’s initial assessment became the most important teacher’s assessment and 
the final teacher’s assessment serves as a correction.43 (Rijksoverheid, 2013; Rijksover-
heid, 2016a).  
Due to the policy change the test score becomes low-stakes for some children. Chil-
dren who are already satisfied with their teacher’s assessment no longer have an incen-
tive to perform well on the test to improve their track allocation in secondary school. 
For children who are not yet satisfied with their track allocation the test remains high-
                                                                
43 The only time when the 6th grade test score is relevant for track placement is when the test score and the 
teacher’s assessment do not correspond about a child’s track placement and the test score indicates a higher 
track placement compared to the teacher’s assessment. In this case, the teacher has to reconsider, but not 
necessarily adjust, the child’s assessment. Of the children who qualify for a reconsideration of their teacher’s 
assessment approximately 20 percent receives a new teacher’s assessment (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur 
en Wetenschap, 2016). 
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stakes. If they receive a significantly better test score compared to their teacher’s as-
sessment, the teacher has to reconsider the assessment and the child might receive a 
higher teacher’s assessment that provides access to a higher track in secondary school. 
Second, it is possible that due to the policy change the heterogeneity in the teacher’s 
assessment across gender and ses increases as the teacher’s assessment is now more 
based on subjective measures and less on objective measures. Third, since the teacher 
can no longer use the child’s 6th grade test score as input for the teacher’s assessment it 
is likely that the teacher reverts to earlier test scores as inputs for this assessment. This 
could imply that earlier test scores become more important for children’s track alloca-
tion and that selection effectively starts at an earlier age.  
We investigate these questions in three steps. First, we observe the initial teacher’s 
assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment before and after the poli-
cy change and investigate if changes occur. Second, we split these results by gender and 
the education level of the mother and the father to investigate whether there is heter-
ogeneity across gender and ses for the test score and the teacher’s assessments. Third, 
we investigate if teachers start to use earlier test scores as inputs for their assessment 
now that they can no longer use the 6th grade test score. We investigate if there is an 
increase in the predictive power of the 5th grade test score for the teacher’s assess-
ments after the policy change.  
The most important findings from this study are as follows. First, we observe that on 
average there does not seem to  be a change in the test score. However, the initial and 
final teacher’s assessment seem to be more alike following the policy change, where 
the final teacher’s assessment appears to be 12 percent of a standard deviation lower 
on average. Second, we find that the effect of the policy change on the test score and 
the teacher’s assessments is heterogeneous across gender and the parental education 
level: girls seem to score significantly higher on the test while boys seem to score signif-
icantly lower and children whose parents have completed a higher level of education 
seem to receive a higher initial and final teacher’s assessment compared to children 
whose parents have only completed a lower level of education. Finally, we find that 
teachers seem to put more emphasis on children’s 5th grade test score for their teach-
er’s assessments following the policy change. The estimates suggest that the additional 
effect of the 5th grade test score on the initial teacher’s assessment is on average ap-
proximately 15 percent of a standard deviation and the additional effect, on top of the 
initial teacher’s assessment, is approximately 7 percent of a standard deviation for the 
final teacher’s assessment.  
This study takes advantage of a dataset that provides information about four yearly 
cohorts of children before and after the policy change, between 2012 and 2015. The 
dataset contains cross-sectional data with information on children’s test scores in 
grades 3-6 in primary education, the teacher’s assessments of the children’s ability level 
in 6th grade as well as children’s demographic and social-economic background infor-
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mation obtained from questionnaires. Our dataset for the analyses consists of 8531 
children.  
This paper contributes to a similar set of literature as Feron et al. (2016). First, the 
consequences of using objective and subjective assessment measures for tracking and 
successive performance e.g. Dee (2005), Lindahl (2007), Lavy (2008), Gibbons and 
Chevalier (2008), Cornwell et al. (2012) and Burgess and Greaves (2013). Second, this 
paper contributes to the literature on early school tracking e.g. Hanushek and Woess-
mann (2006) and Brunello and Checci (2007). Being allocated to a track is also related to 
human capital formation (e.g., Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Cunha and Heckman, 
2007).  
We proceed as follows. First, we discuss the policy change and the research strate-
gy. Afterwards section 3 describes the data and the descriptive statistics of our key 
variables. Section 4 presents the results of our analyses. Section 5 concludes. We pre-
sent additional results and detailed data descriptions in the appendix to this paper.  
5.2 Background and strategy 
5.2.1 The policy change 
The Dutch government has decided that as of the schoolyear 2014-2015 all children in 
6th grade are obligated to take part in a final test.44 Schools have the option to choose 
between a number of different tests that have been approved by the government. For 
the analyses in this paper we use data from a test called the ‘Centrale Eindtoets’. This 
test is the most widely used final test as approximately 86 percent of all 6th grade chil-
dren take this test in 2015. The test takes six hours and is spread over three sessions on 
three consecutive days in which it measures children’s knowledge in the areas of lan-
guage and math. Before the schoolyear 2014-2015 the test was taken in February, 
however, as of the schoolyear 2014-2015 the test is delayed by approximately two 
months and is taken between the 15th of April and the 15th of May. Approximately three 
weeks after taking the test the school receives a report for every individual child. This 
report shows the child’s results per subject. The report also contains the test score the 
child obtained as well as an explanation regarding the advice for the child’s best suitable 
track allocation in secondary school. Next to receiving reports for every individual child, 
the school also receives a report at the school level which shows the results for all chil-
dren in this school. This second report provides an indication of how the results of this 
school relate to the national average. (College voor Toetsing en Examens (CvTE), 2015). 
Due to the policy change the teacher’s assessment of children’s ability level has be-
come the guiding measure in children’s track allocation in secondary school. The final 
                                                                
44 There are exceptions for children in special needs education. See CvTE (2015) for more detailed infor-
mation.  
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test in 6th grade is seen as an independent and objective second measure of children’s 
ability level next to the teacher’s assessment, or a so-called ‘second opinion’ (Rijksover-
heid, 2013). Every child in 6th grade receives a teacher’s assessment of his/her ability 
level before the 1st of March, which is the final date for application to secondary 
schools. The teacher’s assessment states which type of track allocation is best suited for 
a child in secondary school. The teacher’s assessment should be based on children’s 
learning achievements, ability and development during the entire primary school peri-
od. Due to the new timing of the assessment measures in 6th grade, children have to 
apply at a secondary school based on their teacher’s assessment as their 6th grade test 
score is not available yet. Furthermore, secondary schools are only allowed to place 
children into tracks based on their teacher’s assessment. If the child’s test score later 
appears to be higher than the teacher’s initial assessment, the teacher has to re-assess 
his assessment and he/she can choose to give the same or a higher assessment. It is not 
possible for a teacher to give a lower assessment. In case the teacher’s assessment is 
adjusted upwards, the child can still be placed in a higher track in secondary school 
(CvTE, 2015). A timeline of the events before and after the policy change can be found 
in Figure 1.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: timeline of events 
 
Timeline before policy change
January July1st March:
dealine for final 
teacher's 
assessment and 
registration at 
secondary 
school
February: 
teacher's give 
initial 
assessment 
and children 
take final test
Until 1st
March: 
Teacher can 
adjust initial
assessment 
upwards after 
observing the 
test score
Test 
scores 
known
Timeline after policy change
January July1st March:
dealine for 
initial teacher's 
assessment and 
registration at 
secondary 
school
15th April - 15th 
May: children 
take final test
Teacher can 
adjust initial
assessment 
upwards after 
observing the 
test score
Test
scores 
known
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5.2.2 Reasons for the policy change 
The government has formulated three main reasons as to why the test should be de-
layed until later in the schoolyear. First, there is a concern that in the last months in 6th 
grade less teaching time in spend on basic skills, such as language and math, and more 
time is spend on ‘fun’ activities. The idea is that children are less motivated to pay at-
tention because they have already taken their final test and know which track they will 
be placed in in secondary school. Furthermore, schools might be less motivated to 
spend additional teaching time on language and math as the school’s performance 
benchmark, that the Inspectorate of Education uses for schools’ quality assessment, has 
already taken place. Delaying the test by a few months might stimulate schools and 
children to spend more teaching time on language and math skills. Second, when the 
test is taken later in the schoolyear, secondary schools receive more accurate and time-
ly information about children’s level of language and math skills and the skills deprecia-
tion is likely to be lower. The idea is that when these skills are not maintained they will 
start to deteriorate, for example over a summer vacation. Roeleveld et al. (2011) find 
evidence that children’s scores on language and math start to decrease in the second 
half of 6th grade. Third, by delaying the test taking procedure the timing of the two 
assessment measures ensures that the teacher’s assessment is used for children’s track 
allocation in secondary school as the test score is not yet available. The assumption is 
that the teacher’s assessment takes into account children’s ability, their learning 
achievements, their development during the entire primary school period and children’s 
concentration, motivation and persistence (Rijksoverheid, 2016a; Rijksoverheid, 2016b).  
5.2.3 Possible implications and strategy 
This paper investigates the effect of this policy change on the teacher’s assessments in 
6th grade. This paper also investigates whether this effect is heterogeneous across 
groups such as children’s gender and their social-economic background measured by 
the parental education level. In order to investigate this question we assume that in the 
year of the policy change (schoolyear 2014-2015) there are no other changes that affect 
our measurements.45 Furthermore, we note that any effect we find is likely to be a 
lower bound as the full effect of this policy change might not materialize after one year. 
It is possible that for the full effect to be visible the new system needs to be in place for 
a while so that teachers, parents and children are able to adapt to the new situation.  
                                                                
45According to the College voor Toetsen en Examens (CvTE) (2015) the final test in 2015 builds on the previous 
“Eindtoets Basisonderwijs” from Cito and is regarding content, form and test taking possibilities comparable 
to previous editions of the “Eindtoets Basisonderwijs”. However, the CvTE (2016) argues that there are sever-
al changes made to the final test in 2015 that make a comparison to the earlier “Eindtoets Basisonderwijs” 
difficult. These changes are: in the language component of the test the topics “grammatica” en “interpunctie” 
are added, the part study skills is now incorporated in the language and math components of the test, the 
topic “kaartlezen” is not included in the new test, the topic “tabellen en grafieken” is not equal to the topic 
“verbanden” in the new test and the number and proportions of the language and math components differ.  
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The policy change can have several implications for the behavior of children, parents 
and teachers. As a result of the policy change, the 6th grade test becomes a less im-
portant selection and allocation measure and the teacher’s assessments become a 
more important selection and allocation measure for children’s track allocation in sec-
ondary school. Also, after the policy change the initial teacher’s assessment becomes 
more important than the final teacher’s assessment. It is possible that children, parents 
and teachers respond to these changes. For schools the situation does not change, 
because the test scores remain an outcome by which the Inspectorate of Education 
measures schools’ value added. 
We describe three effects that might occur as a response to the policy change. First, 
it is possible that the 6th grade test turns from a high-stakes test into a low-stakes test. 
The teacher’s assessment is binding for children’s track placement in secondary school. 
Therefore,  for all children (and parents) who are satisfied with the teacher’s assess-
ment the test is no longer a determinant for children’s track placement and they might 
exert less effort. For these children the test becomes a low-stakes test. Nevertheless, 
for all children (and parents) who are not satisfied with the teacher’s assessment, the 
6th grade test remains a high-stakes test as the test is their only option to receive a 
higher teacher’s assessment. For these children the test is still a determinant for their 
track placement in secondary school and they might exert more effort. With a lower 
motivation to perform well on the test it is likely that the average test score drops, 
while with a higher motivation it is likely that the average test score rises. By looking at 
the average effect of the policy change on the test score, these effects might cancel 
out. In the empirical analysis we take into account the possible presence of both effects. 
Furthermore, if children’s motivation to perform well on the test decreases it is likely 
that the test is no longer an accurate reflection of the children’s language and math 
skills. This also has consequences for the other functions of the test, such as giving sec-
ondary schools more accurate and timely information about children’s level of language 
and math skills as well as the quality control measure used by the Inspectorate of Edu-
cation. 
Second, due to the policy change children’s track placement is determined by the 
teacher’s assessment. In general, the teacher’s assessment is considered to be a more 
subjective measure of children’s ability compared to the test score. It is unclear what 
information the teacher exactly incorporates into his assessment and to what extent 
the different inputs are weighted. There are no guidelines that determine how teachers 
have to weigh these different types of information (Sluijter, 2013; OECD, 2016). There-
fore, assuming that parents want their children to receive the highest possible educa-
tion track, parents could start to put more pressure on teachers to adjust their chil-
dren’s teacher’s assessment upwards. If teachers are susceptible to this pressure it is 
likely that the teacher’s assessments will rise. Nevertheless, as the teacher can only 
revise his initial teacher’s assessment upwards after receiving the information about 
children’s test scores, it is also possible that teachers become more careful regarding 
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their assessments. As a result, the average teacher’s assessment might decrease. Falk 
and Zimmermann (2011) find that people show a preference for consistency. One of 
their findings is that there is a preference for consistency, especially if there is an early 
commitment. It is possible that the inequality in the teacher’s assessment for children 
from different social-economic backgrounds increases due to the policy change. Tim-
mermans et al. (2015) show that the teacher’s assessment can be disadvantageous for 
children from lower social-economic backgrounds even if they have a similar perfor-
mance as other children. Furthermore, Feron (2017) shows that teachers heterogene-
ously adjust their teacher’s assessment depending on the parental education level. 
Third, after the policy change, the teacher does not have the information previously 
provided by the 6th grade test score to incorporate into the teacher’s assessment. This 
might affect the teacher’s assessment as Feron (2017) shows that teachers adjust their 
assessment after receiving new information from the test score. If teachers can no 
longer use the 6th grade test score for the teacher’s assessment it is possible that 
teachers consequently revert to earlier measures of the children’s performance, such as 
earlier tests of language and math skills in primary school. The most recent test before 
the 6th grade final test are tests in 5th grade that measure children’s math and language 
skills. If, in the new system, teachers revert to the 5th grade test score to incorporate 
into their assessment it is possible that the timing for selection and allocation into 
tracks takes place earlier in children’s school career. We investigate whether the predic-
tive power of the 5th grade test score increases in the new system compared to the old 
system.   
Strategy 
First, we use descriptive statistics to look at trends in the test score and the teacher’s 
assessment over time, both for all children in our sample and for subgroups by gender 
and the parental education level. Second, we estimate equation (1), (2) and (3) by run-
ning OLS regressions, with the test score and the teacher’s assessment as dependent 
variables, to investigate whether these measures show deviations compared to previ-
ous years before the policy change. We use different models to correct for control vari-
ables, a time trend, primary school fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the 
level of the primary schools. Inclusion of a time trend ensures that our estimates do not 
incorporate any potential pre-existing time trend in the data. The primary school fixed 
effects ensure that our estimates do not include effects that are specific to a particular 
school. Furthermore, we use clustered standard errors as children who attend the same 
school might have specific common characteristics that are picked up by the standard 
errors. Additionally, we use the predicted 6th grade test score, based on the test scores 
in the 3rd, 4th and 5th grade, to avoid endogeneity of the 6th grade test score due to the 
policy change.  
𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡_345𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (1) 
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡_345𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎4𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(2) 
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡_345𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎4𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
  (3) 
In all estimations, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 refers to a set of control variables, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 refers to the primary school 
dummy variables, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 refers to the dummy variables for the time trend and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 represents 
the error term. Furthermore, we use propensity score matching to observe whether our 
results are robust. Our data consist of different cohorts of children in every schoolyear 
meaning that when we apply the before-after analyses we create a cross sectional esti-
mate of the effect. With propensity score matching we aim to get a more precise pic-
ture of the true effect as we attempt to compare children with similar characteristics 
before and after the policy change. Second, we use interaction terms to look at hetero-
geneity across subgroups for gender and the parental education level in relation to the 
test score and the teacher’s assessment.  
Third, we investigate whether the predictive power of the 5th grade test score for 
the teacher’s assessment has increased after the policy change. We estimate equations 
(4) and (5) by running OLS regressions and observe the interaction effect between the 
dummy variable for the schoolyear after the policy change and the 5th grade test score 
variable. This interaction effect should indicate whether teachers make more use of the 
5th grade test score to establish their teacher’s assessment after the policy change. As a 
robustness check we run a placebo analysis where we exclude all data from the year 
after the policy change and observe whether we find a similar effect in the previous 
schoolyear. If teachers start to make more use of the 5th grade test score for their 
teacher’s assessment as a result of the policy change, we expect to find no significant 
effect for this analyses in the previous schoolyear.  
𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡_34𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎4𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_5𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎5𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_5𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (4) 
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡_34𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎4𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎5𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_5𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎6𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇_5𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (5) 
5.3 Data 
The data consists of four yearly cohorts of children who attended 6th grade between 
2012 and 2015 and contains information from school tracking systems, including the 
test score and the teacher’s assessment in 6th grade, as well as questionnaires answered 
by children and their parents which provide information on children’s social-economic 
background. Furthermore, we have information on children’s test scores in grades 3 
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through 5.46 We first describe the most important aspects of the data before presenting 
our main results.  
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the distributions of the main variables of interest, the initial teacher’s 
assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment, across the different 
tracks.47 A description of the Dutch education system and the different tracks in sec-
ondary education can be found in Chapter 2. For the teacher’s assessments the num-
bers in each row add up to 100 percent. Approximately 50 percent of children have an 
initial teacher’s assessment to attend pre-vocational education. The other 50 percent of 
children is divided between pre-higher vocational and pre-university education.  
Table 1: description of the ITA, the test score and the FTA 
A 
ITA T1a T1a/b T1b T1b/c T1c/d T1d/2 T2 T2/3 T3 
2015 4.41 1.48 10.42 0 19.9 9.52 20.52 8.74 25.01 
2014 3.89 3.67 10.63 0 18.29 15.49 16.35 14.52 17.16 
2013 5.08 3.61 8.68 0 18.59 15.54 15.39 17.57 15.54 
2012 3.82 3.96 9.37 0 21.02 15.19 16.12 14.68 15.84 
2012-2015 4.3 3.07 9.8 0 19.53 13.63 17.33 13.53 18.81 
B 
avg test score by FTA T1a T1a/b T1b T1b/c T1c/d T1d/2 T2 T2/3 T3 
2015 519.2 524.0 527.3   532.9 536.3 540.2 543.4 546.8 
2014 521.2 516.5 525.4   530.1 535.7 538.9 542.6 547.4 
2013 523.4 521.5 527.3   530.0 535.4 538.9 541.8 546.9 
2012 523.5 524.8 523.3   530.9 536.4 538.9 542.0 546.8 
2012-2015 522.1 523.2 527.0   531.0 536.0 539.4 542.3 547.0 
 
  
                                                                
46 In our data the FTA in 2015 is measured by the question: ”Now that you know the child’s test score what 
would your teacher’s assessment be?”. This question makes a comparison with the FTA in previous years 
easier as in previous years teachers could adjust the FTA upwards and downwards. This question might in-
crease the noise in the measure of FTA for 2015 which could lead to an underestimation of the estimated 
effects. This question might also lead to more bias as it is a self-reported measure. In this last case, the teach-
er is more likely to let the FTA reflect his ITA.  
47 There are more sub-tracks in pre-vocational education compared to pre-higher vocational and pre-
university education. This is also reflected in the lower amount of children per track in pre-vocational educa-
tion. We distinguish nine educational tracks based on the initial teacher’s assessment. The final teacher’s 
assessment and the test score are recoded so that all variables are comparable on the same scale. The result 
is that for the final teacher’s assessment and the test we combine track T1c with T1c/d and track T1d with 
T1d/2. 
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C 
FTA T1a T1a/b T1b T1b/c T1c/d T1d/2 T2 T2/3 T3 
2015 4.56 0.78 10.38 0 21.34 7.26 22.08 7.34 26.26 
2014 7.50 0.22 1.78 0 26.17 7.77 16.30 17.86 22.40 
2013 8.33 0.10 0.36 0 28.24 5.94 15.85 15.44 25.75 
2012 7.55 0.47 0.42 0 28.52 7.04 14.91 19.38 21.71 
2012-2015 6.82 0.42 3.69 0 25.79 7.01 17.58 14.52 24.16 
Note: For ITA and FTA all rows add up to 100 percent. N=8531. See Chapter 2 for an overview of the educa-
tional tracks.  
 
Between 2012 and 2015 there appears to be a shift towards more initial teacher’s as-
sessments for pre-higher vocational and pre-university education tracks and less initial 
teacher’s assessments for the pre-vocational education tracks, from 53.4 percent of 
initial teacher’s assessments for pre-vocational education in 2012 to 45.7 percent in 
2015. Approximately 45 percent of children have a final teacher’s assessment to attend 
pre-vocational education and 55 percent of children have a final teacher’s assessment 
to attend pre-higher vocational or pre-university education. There does not appear to 
be a shift towards the higher tracks in the final teacher’s assessment. For the final 
teacher’s assessment it is apparent that there is a shift away from double teacher’s 
assessments in the higher tracks in 2015. In panel B of Table 1 we observe the average 
test score per track. The test score seems to be relatively stable across time. The aver-
age overall test score seems to be slightly higher in 2015 compared to previous years. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. Children in 6th grade are on average 12 
years old and our sample consists of slightly more girls than boys. Parents have on aver-
age completed vocational education and there are more fathers who have paid work 
compared to mothers. Most parents are born in the region (Limburg) and 80 percent of 
the children in our sample report to live with both parents.48 The initial teacher’s as-
sessment and the final teacher’s assessment are measured on a scale from 1-9. The 
average initial and final teacher’s assessment corresponds to a T1d/2 track (vmbo-
t/havo track). The average final teacher’s assessment is approximately 0.3 track higher 
than the average initial teacher’s assessment. The test score is measured on a scale 
from 501-550.   
In Table 3 we observe that correlations are high, positive and significant among all of 
our main variables of interest.49 We observe some interesting changes over time. First, 
the correlation between the final teacher’s assessment and the test scores in 5th grade 
has gone up over time. This indicates that teachers in 2015 make more use of test 
scores in earlier grades compared to the years before. Second, the correlation between 
the test score in 6th grade and the test score in 5th grade has gone down. 
  
                                                                
48 The corresponding survey question is: “Do you live at home with both parents?”  
49 See Appendix A for the full correlation table that includes all variables.  
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Table 2: descriptive statistics 
  N Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
Initial teacher assessment 8531 6.18 2.24 1 6 9 
6th grade test score 8531 537.54 8.88 501 539 550 
Final teacher assessment 8531 6.46 2.25 1 7 9 
5th grade test score 5094 0.04 0.88 -3.77 0.13 2.38 
lvs test scores (3rd-5th grade) 5156 0.01 0.76 -3.60 0.07 2.38 
Boys 8531 0.47 0.50 0 0 1 
Age (in months) 8531 143 5.59 87 142 173 
Education mother 8531 2.24 0.88 1 2 4 
Education father 8531 2.33 0.98 1 2 4 
1. Lower education   22.15%         
2. Vocational education   35.27%         
3. Higher education   28.76%         
4. University education   13.82%         
Labor market participation mother 8368 0.82 0.38 0 1 1 
Labor market participation father 8176 0.92 0.27 0 1 1 
Region of birth mother 8453 1.29 0.62 1 1 3 
Region of birth father 8398 1.30 0.64 1 1 3 
1. Limburg   79.39%         
2. The Netherlands outside Limburg   10.87%         
3. Abroad   9.74%         
Child lives with both parents 8515 0.80 0.40 0 1 1 
Note: The description of the variables education and region of birth apply to both the father and the mother. 
Chrildren's test scores from earlier years: grade 3-5 are standardized. For these measures we use various tests 
on spelling, comprehensive reading and math. We standardize all of these tests separately and take the 
average of these standardized tests per year for every child.  
 
Third, the correlation between the initial teacher’s assessment and the final teacher’s 
assessment has gone up. This is consistent with the idea that the test score is not used 
as much as a correction mechanism as in previous years. Fourth, the correlation be-
tween the test score in 6th grade and the initial teacher’s assessment has gone down. In 
2015, due to the policy change, the initial teacher’s assessment is the teacher’s assess-
ment that is relevant for children’s track placement in secondary education. The teach-
er can no longer use the information provided by the test score in this assessment. 
Possibly this explains the lower correlation. Finally, the correlation between the test 
score in 6th grade and the final teacher’s assessment has gone down. Based on this first 
description in terms of simple correlations, it seems that there is less congruence be-
tween the test score and the teacher’s assessment after the policy change, compared 
to earlier years.50  
                                                                
50 If we observe the correlations for the smaller sample of 4255 children which we use later on in the analyses, 
we also see an increase in the correlation between the 5th grade test score and the ITA from 0.77 in 2012 to 
0.80 in 2015.  
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5.3.2 Selection  
For 8,531 children we have information on the main variables of interest, the initial 
teacher’s assessment, the final teacher’s assessment, the 6th grade test score, gender, 
age and the parental education level. These data include 190 primary schools in Lim-
burg. For 5,156 of these children we have obtained information on the test scores in 3rd, 
4th and/or 5th grade recorded in the school tracking systems. This is a subset of the orig-
inal dataset that consists of 22,297 children.  
Possible selection issues with regard to the analyses are addressed. We investigate if 
characteristics of children explain if they end up in our sample for analyses. The main 
concern regarding selection bias is that schools only report data on their well-
performing children and neglect to report data on their poorer performing children. 
There seems to be a small effect of mother’s parental education: children whose moth-
er has finished vocational education, higher vocational education or university educa-
tion are slightly more likely to be included in the sample compared to children whose 
mothers have finished lower levels of education only. This effect is not present for fa-
ther’s education levels. Additionally, there seems to be no difference between the de-
terminants of selection into the sample for children for whom we have and for whom 
we do not have information on the test score. Finally, there seems to be no selection at 
the school level. There are no schools for which a large number of children drop out of 
our sample for analysis.51 
5.4 Results 
This section presents our estimation results. First, we investigate whether there has 
been a change in the teacher’s assessments and the test score after the policy change. 
Second, we investigate  whether these effects are heterogeneous across gender and 
parental education level. Finally, we investigate if the predictive power of the 5th grade 
test score for the teacher’s assessments has increased following the policy change. This 
section concludes with two robustness checks. The most salient results are shown in the 
main text and an appendix reports additional supportive findings.   
5.4.1 Before-after results 
The four panels in Table 4 show the values of the initial teacher’s assessment, the test 
score, the final teacher’s assessment and the predicted test score for the gender of the 
child and the education level of the mother and the father. Panel A shows the values for 
the initial teacher’s assessment. Girls seem to have a slightly lower initial teacher’s as-
                                                                
51 See Appendix B for the analysis of selection into the sample.  
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sessment than boys and the assessment went slightly up over time for both genders. 
The second panel shows the values of the test score. Overall, girls have a lower test 
score. However, in 2015 girls have a higher test score than boys. Panel C shows the 
values of the final teacher’s assessment. The values of the final teacher’s assessment 
slightly decrease over time. This is in line with a conclusion of the Inspectorate of Edu-
cation (2014) who finds that as of 2011 there is a slightly downward trend in the teach-
er’s assessment. Panel D shows the predicted test score based on the children’s earlier 
test scores in grades 3-5. Panel D shows that the predicted test scores are in line with 
the actual test scores for the years 2012-2014. However, for 2015 the predicted test 
score seems higher than the actual test score. Furthermore, the predicted test score 
shows that girls still score slightly lower than boys on the test. The average initial teach-
er’s assessment, test score and final teacher’s assessment all increase with the educa-
tion level of the father and the mother.  
When comparing the average initial teacher’s assessment with the average final 
teacher’s assessment we observe that the average final teacher’s assessment seems to 
be higher than the average initial teacher’s assessment. Teachers seems to give higher 
final recommendations for tracks compared to their initial recommendations. Feron 
(2017) shows that teachers adjust their initial assessment after receiving information 
about children’s test score. In 2015, the final teacher’s assessment is slightly lower 
compared to previous years. The initial teacher’s assessment is slightly higher in 2015 
compared to previous years. Possibly this is due to the fact that 2015 is the first year in 
which the initial teacher’s assessment is already the relevant teacher’s assessment for 
children’s track placement in secondary school. Therefore, the initial teacher’s assess-
ment closely resembles the final teacher’s assessment of previous years. However, the 
initial teacher’s assessment remains lower than the final teacher’s assessment in 2015. 
Furthermore, since the initial teacher’s assessment has become the relevant teacher’s 
assessment it is possible that teacher’s find it now more important to stay consistent in 
their teacher’s assessment, as the initial teacher’s assessment was already the formal 
assessment.  
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The data and the methodology of this paper do not allow for a strict causal interpreta-
tion of our findings. However, under the assumptions that there are no other significant 
changes that occurred simultaneously to the policy change and that the children in the 
different cohorts are comparable we interpret our results as an indication of a causal 
relationship. Table 5 shows the effect of the policy change on the initial teacher’s as-
sessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment.52 The first set of regres-
sions with the initial teacher’s assessment as the dependent variable shows that condi-
tional on the children’s predicted test score, the average initial teacher’s assessment in 
schoolyear 2014-2015 does not differ from previous schoolyears.53 The second set of 
estimates shows that the average test score in schoolyear 2014-2015 does not differ 
from previous schoolyears. Other estimates conditional on the predicted test score 
and/or the initial teacher’s assessment confirm this finding.54 The third set of estimates 
shows that the average final teacher’s assessment in schoolyear 2014-2015 seems to be 
significantly lower than the average final teacher’s assessment in previous years. Based 
on the coefficient of -0.260 in column 10 of table 5 the final teacher’s assessment 
seems to decrease by 12 percent of a standard deviation. Other estimates conditional 
on the predicted test score and/or the initial teacher’s assessment confirm this find-
ing.55  
  
                                                                
52 The effect of the policy change is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the schoolyear is 2014-2015 and equals 
0 for all other schoolyears.  
53 The predicted test score is a prediction of children’s 6th grade test score based on their earlier test scores in 
grades 3-5. We use the predicted test score since the actual test score in schoolyear 2014-2015 might have 
been influenced by children’s response to the new policy.  
54 An interaction term with the year of the policy change and the ITA does not show a relation with the test 
score.  
55 In these estimates we include the control variables ‘positive difference ITA – predicted test score’  and 
‘negative difference ITA – predicted test score’ to observe whether and how children react to the teacher’s 
assessment they received. If the dummy ‘positive difference ITA – test score’ equals 1 the child received a 
teacher’s assessment that was higher than the predicted test score, if the dummy ‘negative difference ITA – 
test score’ equals 1 the child received a teacher’s assessment that was lower than the predicted test score. 
We expect that if the teacher’s assessment is lower than the predicted test score children will perform better 
than expected on the test score. If the teacher’s assessment is higher than the predicted test score we expect 
that children (and parents) are satisfied with the teacher’s assessment and have no incentive to perform well 
on the test, which for these children is now a low-stakes test.  
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5.4.2 Heterogeneity in gender and education level of parents 
Our estimates suggest that on average the policy change does not seem to affect the 
initial teacher’s assessment and the test score but it seems to result in significantly 
lower final teacher’s assessments. We want to investigate whether these effects differ 
across gender and the education level of parents as the teacher’s assessments are now 
based on more subjective measures. Previous research by Attali, Neeman and Schlosser 
(2011) suggests that boys and girls respond with a different effort level to low-stakes 
and high-stakes test. Furthermore, research by Timmermans et al. (2015) and Feron 
(2017) shows that teacher’s assessments and adjustments to teacher’s assessments can 
differ based on the parental education level.   
Panel A of Table 6 shows the estimates of the interaction effects for the initial 
teacher’s assessment, the test score, the final teacher’s assessment with gender. The 
first two columns show the interaction effect for the initial teacher’s assessment. The 
estimates in column 2 seem to suggest that there is no difference in the effect on the 
initial teacher’s assessment between boys and girls. Columns 3-6 report the estimates 
of the interaction effect for the test score. In column 6 we observe that there is a signif-
icant difference related to the policy change on the test score for boys and girls. It 
seems that girls generally have a significantly higher test score, with a coefficient of 
0.795, after the policy change. Furthermore, boys have a significantly lower test score 
after the policy change with a coefficient of (0.795 – 1.067) -0,272. Columns 7-10 report 
the estimates of the interaction effect for the final teacher’s assessment. In column 10 
we observe that there seems to be a significantly negative effect of the policy change 
on the final teacher’s assessment, however, this effect does not differ across gender.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports the estimates of the interaction effects for the initial 
teacher’s assessment, the test score, the final teacher’s assessment with the education 
level of the mother. The first two columns show the interaction effect for the initial 
teacher’s assessment. The estimates in column 2 suggest that in the years before the 
policy change the children with higher educated parents, compared to children whose 
parents have only lower education, obtain a higher initial teacher’s assessment. We 
observe only a slight effect of mother’s education on the initial teacher’s assessment 
after the policy change: only the interaction coefficient for mothers who have university 
education is significant at the 10 percent level. Columns 3-6 report the estimates of the 
interaction effect for the test score. The estimates in column 6 show that there are no 
interaction effects between mothers’ education level and the policy change on chil-
dren’s test score. Columns 7-10 report the estimates of the interaction effect for the 
final teacher’s assessment. In column 10 we observe that children whose mothers have 
university education, compared to children whose mothers only have finished lower 
education, have a significantly higher final teacher’s assessment with a coefficient of 
0.245. Children from university educated mothers seems to have a 0.245 higher final 
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teacher’s assessment compared to mothers who have only finished lower education. 
Based on the coefficient of 0.245 this effect is 11 percent of a standard deviation.   
Panel C of Table 6 reports the estimates of the interaction effects for the initial 
teacher’s assessment, the test score, the final teacher’s assessment with the education 
level of the father. The first two columns show the interaction effect for the initial 
teacher’s assessment. The estimates in column 2 suggest that children whose parents 
have a higher level of education receive higher initial teacher’s assessments compared 
to children whose parents only have finished lower levels of education. There do not 
appear to be interaction effects between the policy change and the education level of 
the father. Columns 3-6 report the interaction effect for the test score. The estimates in 
column 6 suggest that overall there is no effect of the policy change or the father’s 
education level on the test score, except for fathers who completed higher education. 
Children of these fathers seem to have a slightly higher test score after the policy 
change. This effect is not present in other education levels. Columns 7-10 report the 
interaction effect for the final teacher’s assessment. The estimates in column 10 sug-
gest that there seems to be an interaction effect with the education level of fathers: 
children of fathers who completed higher or university education seem to receive a 
higher final teacher’s assessment compared to children whose fathers only completed 
lower education. These coefficients represent 8 and 10 percent of a standard deviation 
respectively.  
The estimates for the initial teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teach-
er’s assessment across gender and parental education level show heterogeneity. The 
effects on the test score are different for boys and girls, where girls score higher on the 
test after the policy change. A possible explanation for this effect is that boys and girls 
respond differently to low-stakes and high-stakes tests. Attali, Neeman and Schlosser 
(2011) find that males exhibit a larger difference in performance between low-stakes 
and high-stakes examinations. This is in line with the interaction effect we find for gen-
der. The effect for the parental education level indicates that children whose mothers 
and father have completed higher levels of education receive higher teacher’s assess-
ments following the policy change compared to children whose parents have only com-
pleted lower levels of education. This is in line with previous findings of Timmermans et 
al (2015) and Feron (2017). One possible mechanism at work here could be that higher 
educated parents put more pressure on teachers to give children a higher assessment. 
After the policy change the measure for children’s track allocation became more subjec-
tive and there is more opportunity for parents to influence the teacher’s assessment.  
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5.4.3 Predictive power of the 5th grade test score 
We are interested in observing whether teachers start looking at earlier test scores now 
that they cannot make use of the 6th grade test score for their teacher’s assessment. 
Feron (2017) shows that teachers make use of the test score when composing their 
final assessment. Therefore, we expect that teachers will now turn to the 5th grade test 
score as input for their assessment. The average test score in 5th grade does not differ 
across schoolyears. Therefore, we assume that children who are in 6th grade in 
schoolyear 2014-2015 did not change their test taking behaviour in 5th grade in antici-
pation of the policy change.56 In Table 7 we investigate whether the 5th grade test score 
has a larger predictive power for the teacher’s assessments in schoolyear 2014-2015 
compared to earlier schoolyears. In column 1 we observe that the interaction effect 
between the dummy variable for schoolyear 2014-2015 and the 5th grade standardized 
test score is significantly positive with a coefficient of 0.337. This suggests that following 
the policy change teachers have started to incorporate more information from the 5th 
grade test score into their initial assessment compared to previous years. In column 3 
we observe similar estimates for the final teacher’s assessment. We find a significant 
positive coefficient of 0.153 for the interaction effect between the dummy variable for 
schoolyear 2014-2015 and the 5th grade standardized test score.57 The drop in the coef-
ficient of the interaction term in column 3 is due to the inclusion of ITA as a control 
variable. In column 4 we add an interaction term between the year after the policy 
change and the ITA to control for the potentially increased importance of the ITA com-
pared to the FTA following the policy change. In column 4 we observe that this interac-
tion coefficient is significant with a coefficient of 0.176 and leads to a negative interac-
tion coefficient between the year after the policy change and the 5th grade test score. It 
seems that if we control for the fact that ITA had a larger effect on FTA after the policy 
change then the 5th grade test score becomes less important for the FTA. It is likely that 
the effect of the 5th grade test score works via the ITA after the policy change. In con-
clusion, these findings indicate that the predictive power of the 5th grade test score has 
increased for both the initial teacher’s assessment and the final teacher’s assessment 
(via the ITA) in schoolyear 2014-2015 compared to earlier years. The interaction effects 
represent effect sizes of 15 and 7 percent of the standard deviations of the initial and 
final teacher’s assessments respectively.58 
 
                                                                
56 The results of these estimates can be found in Appendix C.  
57 The 5th grade standardized test score is the mean of all the available standardized test scores per child in 5th 
grade on the topics, spelling, reading comprehension and calculus/math. The 5th grade test scores are stand-
ardized separately as they have different scales. The 5th grade test score is the average of all 5th grade stand-
ardized test scores.  
58 Effect sizes for the initial and final teacher’s assessments in schoolyear 2014-2015, where the mean and the 
standard deviation for the initial teacher’s assessment are 6.34 and 2.27 and for the final teacher’s assess-
ment are 6.37 and 2.27.  
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Table 7: Predictive power of the 5th grade test score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ITA FTA FTA FTA 
Year after policy change -0.050 -0.317*** -0.278*** -1.356*** 
  (0.099) (0.107) (0.060) (0.185) 
TS 5th grade 1.070*** 0.990*** 0.137*** 0.208*** 
  (0.045) (0.052) (0.038) (0.044) 
Year after policy change*TS 5th grade 0.337*** 0.422*** 0.153*** -0.161** 
  (0.070) (0.069) (0.040) (0.069) 
2011-2012 0.157** 0.264*** 0.139** 0.144** 
  (0.078) (0.076) (0.057) (0.057) 
2012-2013 0.082 0.159* 0.093 0.094 
  (0.076) (0.087) (0.061) (0.061) 
TS 3rd grade 0.358*** 0.342*** 0.057 0.061 
  (0.047) (0.059) (0.040) (0.053) 
TS 4th grade 0.721*** 0.655*** 0.080* 0.114** 
  (0.050) (0.060) (0.045) (0.055) 
ITA     0.797*** 0.747*** 
      (0.020) (0.024) 
Year after policy change*ITA       0.176*** 
        (0.027) 
Constant 10.648*** 11.706*** 3.218*** 3.550*** 
  (0.533) (0.580) (0.483) (0.479) 
School FE yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes 
Observations 4,255 4,255 4,255 4,255 
R-squared 0.749 0.676 0.838 0.839 
Note: Coefficients are from OLS regressions where the initial teacher's assessment (ITA) and the final tea-
cher's assessment (FTA) are dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. 
***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively. The control variables in this regressi-
on are: gender, age, education level of the father and the mother, labor market position of the father and the 
mother, region of birth of the father and the mother, whether the child lives with both parents and for certain 
analyses the positive and negative difference between the ITA and the predicted test score.  
5.4.4 Robustness checks   
In Table 6 and in Table 7 we show that there is a positive interaction effect between the 
schoolyear 2014-2015 dummy variable and the 5th grade test score which indicates that 
there is an increase in the predictive power of the 5th grade test score for the initial and 
final teacher’s assessments after the policy change. As a robustness check for these 
findings we repeat the same analysis but exclude the schoolyear 2014-2015 from the 
analysis. The dummy variable in the analysis is one if the schoolyear is schoolyear 2013-
2014 and zero otherwise. The results of these estimations are shown in Appendix D. If 
the effect is due to the policy change we expect to find no significant positive interac-
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tion effect. The estimates in Appendix D show no significant interaction effect between 
the dummy variable schoolyear 2013-2014 and the 5th grade test score for the initial 
teacher’s assessment or the final teacher’s assessment. This confirms our earlier finding 
that the predictive power of the 5th grade test score for the initial and the final teacher’s 
assessment has increased following the policy change.  
To test whether the policy change has led to causal effects we would ideally observe 
the same children before and after the policy change and observe whether there is a 
change in the outcome variables. As we do not observe the same children but children 
in different yearly cohorts, an alternative is to match similar children before and after 
the policy change and observe whether there is a difference in the outcome variables 
between these matched children. We use estimates from propensity score matching to 
check our results for robustness. We match children based on gender, age and the 
parental education level. We assume that these covariates are the most important 
characteristics of children in our sample and that they determine children’s outcomes 
for the test score and the teacher’s assessments. Matching children on more variables is 
possible but there is a tradeoff. A lower amount of variables to match on leads to more 
matches being found but they might be less exact. A higher amount of variables to 
match on likely leads to more exact matches, however, the amount of children we can 
match is lower. In our case, where the identification comes from the policy change, we 
want to use propensity score matching as a robustness check to observe whether our 
results are the same if we had the same set of children before and after the policy 
change. Therefore, we choose to match on the three variables, gender, age and paren-
tal education level.59 Our estimates in Appendix E suggest that for the initial teacher’s 
assessment and the test score there is no difference following the policy change. Never-
theless, the final teacher’s assessment seems to be significantly lower after the policy 
change. These results confirm our OLS results in Table 5.  
5.5 Policy perspective  
The results of this research suggest three things. First, on average the test score seems 
to be unaffected by the policy change. At first sight, the average initial teacher’s as-
sessment also seems to be unaffected by the policy change. However, after the policy 
change, the initial teacher’s assessment and the final teacher’s assessment become 
more alike. Furthermore, the average final teacher’s assessment seems to have de-
creased following the policy change. Second, the effect of the policy change on the 
initial teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment seems to 
vary with gender and the parental education level. Third, the predictive power of the 5th 
grade test score seems to have increased for the initial teacher’s assessment and the 
                                                                
59 Results from matching based on a more extensive set of matching variables provides similar results.  
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final teacher’s assessment. It is possible that these effects represent a lower bound of 
the true effect of the policy change as we only observe the first cohort of children after 
the policy change. Possibly, parents and children have not fully anticipated the effect of 
this policy change on children’s (earlier) test scores and teacher’s assessments as well 
as their consequent track placement. In a few years, when these children are in the 
third year of secondary education we can also investigate whether this policy change 
has an effect on children’s track placement and track switching.  
That the initial and the final teacher’s assessments look more alike following the pol-
icy change is caused by an increase in the average initial teacher’s assessment and a 
decrease in the average final teacher’s assessment. There could be several explanations 
for this finding. The increase in the initial teacher’s assessment could be due to a cor-
rection for these children being a slightly better scoring cohort, based on their predict-
ed test scores. It is also likely that this is due to the fact that the initial teacher’s assess-
ment has become more important compared to previous years. The fact that, after the 
policy change, the initial teacher’s assessment is still slightly lower than the final teach-
er’s assessment could also be due to a timing and/or information gap. It is also possible 
that after the policy change, teachers update their final assessment less compared to 
previous years as they have a preference for consistency between their initial and their 
final assessment as suggested by Falk and Zimmermann (2011). 
On average we find no effect of the test becoming a low-stakes or a high-stakes test 
following the policy change for children who had a different teacher’s assessment com-
pared to their predicted test score based on tests from 3rd and 4th grade.60 Our esti-
mates do suggest that girls seem to have a higher test score following the policy 
change. Furthermore, the initial and the final teacher’s assessment are more favorable 
for children whose parents obtained a higher level of education, compared to children 
whose parents only obtained a lower level of education. This finding is in line with pre-
vious research, e.g., Timmermans et al. (2015), who show that the teacher’s assessment 
can be disadvantageous for children from lower social-economic backgrounds even if 
they have a similar performance as other children. Our results suggest that the influ-
ence of parental education increases with the policy change.  
Finally, our results indicate that teachers make more use of the 5th grade test score 
when establishing their teacher’s assessment, following the policy change, when the 6th 
grade test score is not available to them. This result shows that teachers look for earlier 
cognitive measures of children’s ability level to base their assessment on. It is possible 
that parents and children will react to this change in the future and put more emphasis 
on the 5th grade test score as a decisive measure of children’s track placement in sec-
ondary school. This will likely make the 5th grade test score a more high-stakes test and 
possibly move the selection process forward. National as well as international institu-
                                                                
60 These results were not shown in a table since we do not find any significant differences. These results are 
available upon request.  
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tions have argued for a more flexible and delayed selection process in the transition 
from primary to secondary education (OECD, 2016; Onderwijsraad, 2014; Onder-
wijsraad 2015).  
There are two things that should be considered regarding the interpretation of our 
results. First, other trends that might affect our estimates is the shift away from the 
‘double’ teacher’s assessments where teachers recommend more than one track, e.g. 
T1d/T2 or ‘vmbo-t/havo’, towards ‘single’ teacher’s assessments where teachers rec-
ommend only one track. Second, the effects we find for the test score regarding the 
heterogeneity of gender might be related to changes that have been made to the test in 
the schoolyear 2014-2015. Nevertheless, these changes in the test should not affect our 
estimates of the effect of the policy change on the initial teacher’s assessment and the 
final teacher’s assessment.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Generally achievement tests are seen as objective measures of children’s ability and 
teacher’s assessments are seen as subjective measures of children’s ability. An im-
portant question to understand the meaning of tests and assessments is whether the 
way information is aggregated is stable or varies when the incentives of the test or the 
assessment change. We investigate this question using a policy change in the Dutch 
education system as of the schoolyear 2014-2015.  
This paper investigates whether a change in the incentives changes the way teach-
ers incorporate available information into their teacher’s assessment. We use a recent 
policy change in the Netherlands regarding the use of information for the transition 
from primary to secondary school to investigate the effect of circumstance on the test 
and the teacher’s assessments. The policy change has two main components. First, the 
moment at which children take the standardized test in 6th grade is delayed from Feb-
ruary until April. Second, the teacher’s assessment of children’s ability in 6th grade be-
comes the measure that determines to which track children are allocated at the start of 
secondary school. This policy change potentially has an impact on how available infor-
mation is incorporated in the teacher’s assessment.   
This study has three main findings. First, on average the test score seems to be unaf-
fected by the policy change. The average initial teacher’s assessment also seems to be 
unaffected by the policy change. However, after the policy change, the initial teacher’s 
assessment and the final teacher’s assessment become more alike. Furthermore, the 
average final teacher’s assessment seems to have decreased following the policy 
change, by 12 percent of a standard deviation. Second, it seems that the effect of the 
policy change on the test score and the teacher’s assessments is heterogeneous across 
gender and the parental education level: girls score significantly higher on the test while 
boys score significantly lower and children whose parents completed a higher level of 
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education seem to receive higher teacher’s assessments compared to children whose 
parents completed only lower education. Finally, we find that teachers seem to put 
more emphasis on children’s 5th grade test score for their teacher’s assessments follow-
ing the policy change. The estimates suggest that the additional effect of the 5th grade 
test score on the initial teacher’s assessment is on average approximately 15 percent of 
a standard deviation and the additional effect is approximately 7 percent of a standard 
deviation for the final teacher’s assessment.   
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Appendix 
This appendix presents supporting material. In Section A we discuss the bivariate corre-
lation coefficients of all of our outcome measures and covariates used in our analyses. 
In section B we investigate whether or not individual characteristics are able to predict 
whether children end up in our sample for analyses. Section C presents the estimates of 
the 5th grade test score across years. Section D presents the placebo analysis for the 
initial teacher’s assessment and the final teacher’s assessment. Section E presents the 
results of the analysis using propensity score matching.  
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A. Correlations 
Table A shows the bivariate correlation coefficients of our main variables of interest, the 
initial teacher’s assessment, the test score and the final teacher’s assessment as well as 
the covariates used in the analysis for the schoolyears 2011-2012 until 2014-2015 com-
bined. First of all, we observe that the correlation coefficients between our main varia-
bles of interest are all high and significant. The correlation coefficients between the 
initial teacher’s assessment and the 6th grade test score are approximately equal to the 
correlation coefficients of the final teacher’s assessment and the 6th grade test score. 
Possibly this is due to the lower final teacher’s assessment in schoolyear 2014-2015 
compared to previous years. The 5th grade test score has a lower correlation with the 
initial and final teacher’s assessments compared to the 6th grade test score. Further-
more, children who are older have a negative correlation with the test scores and the 
teacher’s assessments. Boys seem to have (slightly) higher test scores compared to girls. 
The parental education level, the mother’s region of birth, the labor market position of 
the mother and father and whether the child lives with both parents, are all positive 
and significantly correlated with children’s test scores and their teacher’s assessments. 
Overall, the covariates used in the analysis do not show any surprising relationships with 
the children’s test score and teacher’s assessments.  
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B. Selection into the sample 
We address selection issues with regard to the sample we use for our analyses in Table 
B. Table B shows probit and OLS estimates of whether characteristics of children are 
able to predict whether the child ends up in our sample for analyses or has missing 
data. The dependent variable is whether the child ends up in our sample (1) or has miss-
ing data (0). Children who end up in our sample for analyses are children for whom we 
have data on the initial teacher’s assessment, the test score, the final teacher’s assess-
ment, gender, age and the parental education level, this are 8,531 children. In total our 
sample consists of 22,297 children.  
Table B shows that after controlling for primary school fixed effects and clustering 
the standard errors at the primary school level there are almost no individual character-
istics that predict whether children end up in our sample for analysis or not. We use 
primary school fixed effects since we are concerned mainly about selection within 
schools, where schools only provide us with data about their best performing children 
and might leave out data about lower performing children. We expect that such selec-
tion would show up on children’s SES data, such as the education levels of their parents. 
We cluster standard errors at the primary school level since observations of children are 
likely not independent within the primary school they attend. The results in column 4 
show that when parents have higher or university education the child is approximately 3 
to 4 percentage points more likely to end up in our sample compared to when the par-
ents have lower education. In column 2 and column 5 we only use those children for 
whom we have information on their test score. There are only a few children for whom 
we have information on teacher’s assessments but not on their test score. There does 
not seem to be a difference between the characteristics of children for whom we have a 
test score and for whom we do not have a test score. We find minor evidence that 
there are observable characteristics of children that are able to predict whether the 
child ends up in the sample. Since we do not find strong evidence that observable char-
acteristics of children predict whether the child ends up in our sample, we assume that 
there are also no unobservable characteristics that distinguish the children in our sam-
ple from the children who are not in our sample.  
Note that there are missing observations in our analyses. This is due to the fact that 
we do not have information on all covariates for all children. Since we are specifically 
interested in whether any of these covariates predict selection into our sample of anal-
yses we lose observations when data on covariates is missing.   
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Appendix B: Selection into the sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Boys -0.031 -0.046 -0.033 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012 
  (0.036) (0.035) (0.026) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
Age (in months) -0.006* -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mother has vocatonal education 0.093* 0.116** 0.014 0.015 0.017* 0.005 
  (0.057) (0.059) (0.045) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) 
Mother has higher education 0.160*** 0.184*** 0.028 0.029** 0.031*** 0.010 
  (0.061) (0.063) (0.052) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) 
Mother has university education 0.239*** 0.272*** 0.063 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.023 
  (0.076) (0.079) (0.080) (0.014) (0.014) (0.029) 
Father has vocational education -0.001 -0.027 -0.054 0.000 -0.003 -0.019 
  (0.051) (0.054) (0.042) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) 
Father has higher education 0.029 0.019 -0.118** 0.005 0.004 -0.042** 
  (0.067) (0.070) (0.051) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
Father has univerity education 0.006 -0.036 -0.088 -0.001 -0.007 -0.031 
  (0.074) (0.078) (0.064) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) 
Mother born in other region NL 0.020 0.021 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.000 
  (0.065) (0.067) (0.054) (0.013) (0.012) (0.019) 
Mother born abroad -0.077 -0.069 0.031 -0.013 -0.012 0.010 
  (0.069) (0.073) (0.060) (0.012) (0.011) (0.021) 
Father born in other region NL -0.001 -0.011 0.010 -0.000 -0.002 0.004 
  (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) 
Father born abroad -0.016 -0.006 0.131** -0.003 0.000 0.045** 
  (0.074) (0.076) (0.057) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) 
Mother has paid work 0.015 -0.029 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.000 
  (0.055) (0.056) (0.039) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) 
Father has paid work -0.053 -0.096 -0.079 -0.007 -0.014 -0.027 
  (0.062) (0.068) (0.051) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) 
Child lives with both parents 0.090 0.102* 0.039 0.013 0.016* 0.014 
  (0.055) (0.054) (0.039) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) 
Constant 0.726 0.358 0.887* 1.103*** 1.039*** 0.831*** 
  (0.466) (0.469) (0.461) (0.087) (0.083) (0.163) 
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS 
School FE yes yes no yes yes no 
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,297 7,647 11,698 11,698 11,441 11,698 
Note: The coefficients are from probit regressions and from ordinary least squares regressions with a dummy 
variable for selection into the sample as the dependent variable. Selected into the sample equals 1, all other 
observations equal 0. In colomn 2 and 5 only children for whom we have information on the test score are 
included. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 percent 
significance levels respectively.  
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C. Test for 5th grade test score across years 
We are interested in observing whether teachers start looking at earlier test scores now 
that they cannot make use of the 6th grade test score for their teacher’s assessment. In 
order to use the 5th grade test score in our analysis, we assume that children in 
schoolyear 2014-2015 have not anticipated the policy change and did not change their 
test taking behavior for the test in 5th grade. We use OLS regressions to investigate 
whether the test score in 5th grade deviates for children in schoolyear 2014-2015 com-
pared to earlier years. Table C reports that the coefficient for the policy effect is not 
significantly different from zero. Therefore, we conclude that children have not antici-
pated the policy change as they have not changed their test taking behavior for the 5th 
grade test.   
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Appendix C: Test for difference in 5th grade test score across years 
  Test score 5th grade 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Year after policy change 0.082 -0.017 -0.001 
  (0.055) (0.041) (0.040) 
2011-2012 0.038 -0.000 -0.033 
  (0.043) (0.036) (0.028) 
2012-2013 0.009 -0.059 -0.065* 
  (0.056) (0.042) (0.035) 
ITA     0.125*** 
      (0.016) 
TS_predict34   0.103*** 0.062*** 
    (0.002) (0.003) 
FTA     0.040*** 
      (0.009) 
Constant 4.276*** -54.503*** -34.593*** 
  (0.347) (1.018) (1.713) 
School FE yes yes yes 
Clustered SEs yes yes yes 
Observations 4,255 4,255 4,255 
R-squared 0.218 0.671 0.741 
Note: Coefficients are from OLS regressions where the test score in 5th grade is the dependent variable. 
Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. ***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 percent significance 
levels respectively. The control variables in this regression are: gender, age, education level of the father and 
the mother, labor market position of the father and the mother, region of birth of the father and the mother, 
whether the child lives with both parents and for certain analyses the positive and negative difference bet-
ween the ITA and the predicted test score.  
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D. Placebo analysis 
In Table 7 we show that there is a positive interaction effect between the schoolyear 
2014-2015 dummy variable and the 5th grade test score which indicates that there is an 
increase in the predictive power of the 5th grade test score for the initial and final 
teacher’s assessments after the policy change. As a robustness check for these findings 
we repeat the same analysis but exclude the schoolyear 2014-2015 from the analysis. If 
the effect is due to the policy change we expect to find no significant positive interac-
tion effect. We run OLS regressions to investigate whether the interaction effect we 
observe in Table 7 disappears once we eliminate the year after the policy change. The 
dummy variable in the analysis is one if the schoolyear is schoolyear 2013-2014 and 
zero otherwise. In columns 1-2 we report the estimates for the initial teacher’s assess-
ment and in columns 3-4 we report the estimates for the final teacher’s assessment. 
The estimates in Table D show no significant interaction effect between the dummy 
variable schoolyear 2013-2014 and the 5th grade test score for the initial teacher’s as-
sessment or the final teacher’s assessment. We conclude that the interaction effect is 
not present in the year before the policy change.  
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Appendix D: Placebo analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ITA ITA FTA FTA 
Year after policy change - placebo -0.057 -0.054 -0.141 -0.099 
  (0.079) (0.080) (0.089) (0.064) 
TS 5th grade 1.111*** 1.114*** 1.013*** 0.185*** 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.045) 
Year after policy change placebo*TS 5th grade -0.066 -0.065 0.045 0.095 
  (0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.058) 
2011-2012 0.090 0.088 0.120* 0.053 
  (0.069) (0.070) (0.071) (0.049) 
ITA       0.745*** 
        (0.024) 
TS 3rd grade 0.306***   0.286***   
  (0.051)   (0.068)   
TS 4th grade 0.759***   0.678***   
  (0.058)   (0.068)   
TS_predict34   0.131***   0.021*** 
    (0.007)   (0.006) 
Constant 10.716*** -59.578*** 11.754*** -7.423** 
  (0.626) (3.726) (0.729) (2.957) 
School FE yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SEs yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,024 3,024 3,024 3,024 
R-squared 0.753 0.753 0.658 0.796 
Note: Coefficients are from OLS regressions where the initial teacher's assessment (ITA) and the final tea-
cher's assessment (FTA) are dependent variables. Standard errors are clustered at the primary school level. 
***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively. The control variables in this regressi-
on are: gender, age, education level of the father and the mother, labor market position of the father and the 
mother, region of birth of the father and the mother, whether the child lives with both parents and for certain 
analyses the positive and negative difference between the ITA and the predicted test score.  
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E. Propensity score matching 
To test whether the policy change has led to causal effects we would ideally observe the 
same children before and after the policy change and observe whether there is a change 
in the outcome variables. As we do not observe these data an alternative is to match 
similar children before and after the policy change and observe whether there is a differ-
ence in the outcome variables between these children. We use estimates from propensi-
ty score matching to check our results for robustness. We match children based on gen-
der, age and the parental education level. We assume that these covariates are the most 
important characteristics of children in our sample and that they determine children’s 
outcomes for the test score and the teacher’s assessments. Matching children on more 
variables is possible but there is a tradeoff. A lower amount of variables to match on 
leads to more matches being found but they might be less exact. A higher amount of 
variables to match on likely leads to more exact matches, however, the amount of chil-
dren we can match is lower. In our case, where the identification comes from the policy 
change, we want to use propensity score matching as a robustness check to observe 
whether our results are the same if we had the same set of children before and after the 
policy change. Therefore, we choose to match on the three variables, gender, age and 
parental education level. Our estimates in Table E suggest that for the initial teacher’s 
assessment and the test score there is no difference following the policy change. Never-
theless, the final teacher’s assessment seems to be significantly lower after the policy 
change. These results confirm our OLS results in Table 5.  
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Appendix E: Propensity score matching 
Initial teacher’s assessment 
 
Test score 6th grade 
 
Final teacher’s assessment 
 
  
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)      .0677447   .0511627     1.32   0.185    -.0325324    .1680218
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
        pre2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =         57
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      8,531
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)     -.0886596   .2133764    -0.42   0.678    -.5068697    .3295504
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
        cito        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =         57
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      8,531
                                                                              
   (1 vs 0)     -.2971852   .0516922    -5.75   0.000       -.3985   -.1958704
   treatment  
ATE           
                                                                              
     post2_2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            AI Robust
                                                                              
Treatment model: probit                                       max =         57
Outcome model  : matching                                     min =          1
Estimator      : propensity-score matching     Matches: requested =          1
Treatment-effects estimation                   Number of obs      =      8,531
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6.1 Introduction 
Investment in human capital is crucial for labour-market outcomes. The path of optimal 
human capital investment has been documented by Ben-Porath (1967). It boils down to 
people making most of their investments when they are young, and to a large extent by 
foregoing current earnings, to build a stock of human capital which is used to make a 
living later on in life. This means that too low investments or underachievement in 
school is detrimental to a person’s earnings capacity. Preventing underachievement 
when raising and educating children seems to be beneficial from a human capital per-
spective. Empirically it has been shown that underachieving children often have lower 
levels of motivation, lower future expectations, more behavioural problems, a higher 
risk of dropping out of school, and lower wages and more health problems when work-
ing compared to children who perform up to level (Uno et al., 2010; van Rooij et al., 
2010; Mercer and Pullen, 2009; Dianda, 2008; Mulder et al., 2007; Lan and Lanthier, 
2003 and Heckman and Rubinstein 2001).  
The empirical literature about the effects of underachievement in school on later-
life outcomes is often plagued by two problems. First, it is hard to define undera-
chievement in school because a child’s innate ability cannot be observed directly. Re-
searchers only observe behaviour in school, a number of intermediate outcomes, such 
as grades, and sometimes later-life outcomes, such as wages, employment and health 
outcomes. The preferences and the rationality of choices made by children remain 
unobserved. In this paper we define children as underachievers when their current 
achievement in school is below their expected potential achievement.61 Underachieve-
ment is defined in several ways in the literature, either in terms of some groups of chil-
dren underperforming in relation to other groups, for example boys versus girls, (Ber-
trand and Pan, 2013), or individual children underperforming in relation to their own 
ability (Smith, 2003). In this paper we use the latter definition of underachievement. We 
select children for whom we observe that their individual achievement is lower in 9th 
grade compared to 6th grade. Important is also that we include children across the full 
ability distribution, i.e. we do not only focus on the underachievement of gifted chil-
dren.  
The second problem in this literature is that it is hard to establish a causal relation-
ship between observed behaviour and underachievement in school. This makes it hard 
to design interventions to lower underachievement. The approach taken in this paper is 
to use a network of schools that participates in a long term data collection process to 
improve education outcomes in the south of the Netherlands (Onderwijs Monitor Lim-
                                                                
61 Where children’s current achievement is measured by their score on a math and language test in 9th grade 
and by the child’s teacher in 9th grade. Children’s expected potential achievement is measured by a high 
stakes test score on math and language in 6th grade. In this study we select the bottom 25 percent of the 
children who experience the largest drop in achievement scores over time. For every child we consult the 
child’s teacher in 9th grade about his/her opinion on the child’s achievement.  
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burg (OML)). During the OML project teachers in these schools had meetings with re-
searchers to discuss the results of the project for their school. The results of these 
meetings reveal that underachievement is a major concern among teachers. Motiva-
tional problems seem to be at the core of underachievement. This research was set up 
jointly with schools that participated in the OML project. This ensured us that schools 
had an actual interest in the topic of the intervention and that they would put effort in 
their children’s participation. Furthermore, designing the intervention together with 
schools minimizes application problems in practice and increases scalability. The lack of 
motivation among underachieving children is a challenge for interventions because 
children could be more likely to drop out of a targeted intervention study which could 
lead to biased estimated effects of an intervention. As pointed out by Paunesku et al. 
(2015) many interventions that are targeted at academic achievement are research-
oriented, i.e. they are designed by researchers, usually not in cooperation with educa-
tional practitioners. This could raise difficulties when the intervention has to be imple-
mented by teachers that might not understand all important features of the interven-
tions, or in schools with different environments that do not fit the design of the inter-
vention (Borghans et al., 2015). 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether an intervention targeted at undera-
chieving secondary school children’s school attitude and motivation raises their perfor-
mance in terms of grades. We use a randomized field experiment to investigate this 
question. We use test scores for math and language  from 6th and 9th grade as well as 
teacher evaluations in 9th grade to identify the target group. During seven months, 
underachieving children receive monthly assignments that target their study skills by 
raising awareness in the field of self-discipline, critical thinking, decision making and 
problem solving, school motivation and future orientation by raising awareness of the 
usefulness of performance in school and obtaining a degree. Several studies show that 
aspects like being able to plan and organize tasks, self-discipline, future goal orientation, 
self-confidence, daily learning routines and being able to focus on important tasks are 
positively related to school performance (Andriessen et al., 2006; Corker & Donnellan, 
2012; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Dietz et al., 2007; Dignath & Büttner, 2008; Hodis et al., 2011; 
Lee et al., 2010; McClure et al., 2011). The program confronts children with their study 
behaviour and school attitude. Outcomes are both continued participation in the inter-
vention and grade point average (GPA). The intervention consists of 363 children of 
which 161 children are in the control group and 202 children are in the treatment 
group.62  
The main results from the experiment are threefold. First, we show that continued 
participation in the treatment is selective. Children who have a lower GPA and children 
who report to have a higher motivation before the treatment are more likely to comply 
with the treatment. Specifically, children with higher grades are approximately 22 per-
                                                                
62 For 337 of these children we have information on GPA.  
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cent less likely and children who report to have a higher motivation are approximately 
16 percent more likely to complete at least four assignments. The effects of GPA and 
motivation are interesting as higher motivated children remain in the treatment, but 
also those with lower grades. Second, we investigate the effect of the treatment on 
children’s GPA, motivation, homework and self-confidence. We find no significant effect 
of our treatment on children’s GPA, motivation, homework or self-confidence. Thirdly, 
we investigate if there is heterogeneity in the treatment effect across gender, track, 
GPA before treatment or motivation before treatment. Our estimates suggest that 
there are no heterogeneous treatment effects for GPA and motivation across gender, 
track, GPA before treatment and motivation before treatment.  
There is a growing awareness in the literature that children’s performance does not 
only reflect their ability, knowledge and intelligence but also seems to have powerful 
components related to children’s non-cognitive skills such as personality traits and mo-
tivation. As stated by Borghans et al. (2011, p. 318) “Grades and achievement test 
scores predict adult outcomes better than IQ because they also capture personality 
traits”. Work on Perry Preschool (Heckman, 2000; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; 
Heckman and Masterov, 2007; Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev, 2013) and the GED 
(Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006; Heckman, 
Humphries and Kautz, 2014) show that next to cognitive skills there is a second 
dimension that is crucial in understanding the development of children and their future 
success and behavior. An increasing number of studies, in the US and Europe, show the 
importance of both cognitive and noncognitive factors in skill acquisition and later life 
outcomes varying from labor market success to risky behavior and health (Cunha, 
Heckman and Schennach, 2010; Campbell et al., 2014; Frijters et al., 2014; Kautz et al., 
2014; Lundborg et al., 2014; Cunha and Heckman, 2007). For example, being able to 
plan and organize tasks, self-discipline, strategic thinking, self-confidence and being able 
to focus on important tasks is positively related to school performance (Sligte et al. 
2009, van Rooij et al. 2010).  
Studies have also shown that in the Netherlands about ten percent of the children in 
secondary education show lower performance than could be expected based on their 
talents (Dutch Education Council, 2007). It has been shown that underachievement in 
general is mainly present among children from lower social-economic backgrounds or 
from ethnic minorities and that this often coincides with behavioural problems, low 
motivation and unclear or low future expectations (Mulder et al., 2007; Lens and 
Decruyenaere 1991). For example, focusing resources on weaker children may be more 
effective (Banerjee et al., 2007). Holmlund and Silva (2009) find little evidence that their 
remedial education program significantly helped children to improve test outcomes. 
Other studies such as Lavy and Schlosser (2005) find a significant improvement of chil-
dren’s mean matriculation scores. However, this program was not found to be cost 
effective compared to alternative interventions.  
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The number of (quasi-) experimental studies targeting children’s non-cognitive skills 
is scarce but there is some evidence that there is a positive causal relation between 
non-cognitive skills and child performance at various ages (Heller et al., 2013; Algan et 
al., 2012; Laird, 2009; Machin et al., 2004; Eisen et al., 2003; Heckman and Rubinstein, 
2001; Laird and Syropoulos, 1995; Laird and Roden, 1991). For example, Heller et al. 
(2013) show, by means of a randomized experiment where underachieving children in 
the treatment group receive special sports activities targeted to boost their self-
confidence and motivation, that such a program improves schooling outcomes. They 
observe a 0.14 standard deviation increase in an index comprising absenteeism, grades 
and participation in the program during the intervention period. In addition, positive 
effects from these types of experiments on school success are observed from the “Lions 
Quest Skills for Adolescence” program. This is a comprehensive life skills education 
program designed for school-wide as well as classroom implementation in grades 6-8, 
using group-randomized trials where schools are the unit of assignment. Results of the 
program are, among others, lower absenteeism during and after the intervention peri-
od and on average an increase in children’s GPA, from 2.1 to 2.3 on a scale from 0-4 
(Laird and Roden, 1991; Laird and Syropoulos, 1995). These results are based on the 
treatment of the whole classroom or school, not just on targeting a number of undera-
chieving children per classroom or school.  
In addition, some authors argue that many interventions that are targeted at aca-
demic achievement are research-oriented, i.e. they involve a lot of support by, or even 
depend on, researchers (Dignath & Büttner, 2008; Paunesku et al., 2015). This could 
raise difficulties when the intervention has to be transferred to school practice by 
teachers that might not understand all important features of the interventions, or in 
schools with different environments that do not fit the design of the intervention (Bor-
ghans et al., 2016). 
The paper proceeds as follows. We start with a detailed description of the interven-
tion including our definition of underachieving children, the aim of the intervention, the 
selection of schools and children and our outcome measures and empirical strategy. 
Afterwards we present the results where we focus on two types of outcomes. First, 
children’s compliance with assignment to the treatment group and second, the treat-
ment effect estimates on cognitive outcomes (gpa) and non-cognitive outcomes (moti-
vation, homework and self-confidence). 
6.2 The intervention 
6.2.1 Defining underachievement 
The intervention is only targeted at children who underperform in relation to their ex-
pected performance. Our measure for underachievement has two important features. 
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First, information from both primary school and secondary school is used. Second, ob-
jective and subjective information is combined by using both test scores in 6th and 9th 
grade as well as the teacher’s evaluation in 9th grade.63 We determine underachieve-
ment in two steps. First, we use a high stakes standardized test score at the end of 6th 
grade as a proxy for the children’ expected performance and a test score in 9th grade as 
a proxy for the children’ current performance. The test score in 6th grade seems espe-
cially suited to test a child’s potential because this test score is used as one of the 
measures to determine children’s track placement in secondary education. The test in 
9th grade is part of a long term data collection process and contains similar questions 
on math and language as the test in 6th grade. The test in 9th grade is a low stakes test. 
Appendix A provides a detailed description of the data. Both tests include measures of 
math and language. Children are flagged as underachievers when their performance on 
the test in 9th grade is substantially below their score on the test in 6th grade. As a cut 
off, we take the 25 percent of children per class and per school who underperform the 
most. For the region in which our study takes place this leads to 1,066 children who are 
flagged as underachievers across all schools, not only the schools that eventually partic-
ipate in the experiment.  
We choose the 25 percent cut off for several reasons. First, enough children need to 
participate in the experiment in order to measure an effect.64 Furthermore, there are 
more pragmatic reasons, such as schools preferring to participate in an experiment if 
they know that at least a certain number of children are able to participate. As this 
study is dependent on the cooperation with schools this is a necessary condition. Other 
reasons include the number of schools that participate in the experiment and the asso-
ciated costs of the experiment.  
To confirm the validity of our selection method we asked teachers and mentors at 
the children’ schools to evaluate the group of children that we find eligible for treat-
ment, a procedure also used in previous studies (e.g., Holmlund and Silva, 2009 and 
Lavy and Schlosser, 2005).65 Feron et al. (2016) show that the information provided by 
teachers complements the assessment of children’s ability provided by test scores. In 
some cases teachers and mentors argued that certain children should not be eligible for 
treatment. The main reason for removing these children from the pool of underachiev-
ers was that  their underachievement was only of a temporary nature and/or due to 
personal circumstances. In addition, in a pilot phase of this experiment we used the 
same selection criteria and found that our method corresponds well with the teachers’ 
evaluation.  
                                                                
63 Figure 1 shows a timeline of the events.  
64 Appendix C shows a power analysis for this experiment.  
65 Both Holmlund and Silva (2009) and Lavy and Schlosser (2005) use a similar method for the selection of 
children. Holmlund and Silva base their selection on teachers’ assessment of children’s risk of educational 
exclusion, perceptions of worsening educational performance and school disengagement, while Lavy and 
Schlosser base their selection on teachers’ estimation of the likelihood of children passing their matriculation 
exams. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of events 
6.2.2 Design of the intervention 
The intervention is designed to improve the performance of underachieving children by 
increasing their motivation. During the intervention period the treatment group is of-
fered seven monthly assignments. The assignments are aimed at raising children’s 
awareness about their school attitude and study behaviour by answering questions 
using self-reflection. Every assignment has a different topic including planning, self-
image, self-confidence, skill creation, teamwork, responsibility and expectations about 
the future.66  
 The assignments used in this study are inspired by the program ’Skills for Adoles-
cence’ (Lionsquest, 2002) and the book ’7 habits of highly effective teens’ (Covey, 
2002). The ‘Skills for Adolescence’ program is a comprehensive life skills education pro-
gram designed for school-wide and classroom implementation in grades 6-8, using a 
group-randomized trial with schools as the unit of assignment. Reported results of the 
program are, among others, lower absenteeism during and after the intervention peri-
od and a higher average GPA, from 2.1 to 2.3 on a scale from 0-4 (Laird and Roden, 
1991; Laird and Syropoulos, 1995). These findings are based on the treatment of the 
whole classroom or school and not only the underperforming children. The ‘Seven hab-
its of highly effective teens’ demonstrates the importance of certain habits, such as 
having a proactive attitude towards studying, prioritizing and goal orientation and in 
being able to respond to and manage changes in life (Prevoo, 2013).  
Participation in the assignments is supervised by a teacher or mentor at the chil-
dren’s school. Supervision is expected to increase participation in the treatment, since it 
ensures that children receive the treatment in a fostering learning environment and 
allows them to ask questions. An important aspect of this intervention is the ease and 
limited costs with which it can be scaled up. The tasks have a low time-intensity and 
children complete the tasks online. Furthermore, the intervention does not interfere 
with the children’s courses as the sessions of the intervention are scheduled at school in 
hours when they do not have classes. The possible disadvantage of the low-time inten-
                                                                
66 In appendix D the assignments are presented (in Dutch). 
May 2008: 
6th grade 
test scores
April-June 2012: 
9th grade test 
scores, gpa and 
questionnaire  
September 2012: 
start intervention: 
1st assignment 
March 2013: end 
intervention: last 
assignment and 
questionnaire
June 2013: 
receive 
children's gpa
Intervention period
Consult
teachers 
about 
selected 
children and 
make final 
selection of 
target group
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sity of the intervention is that the time scheduled for the intervention is too short to 
observe any effects.  
6.2.3 Selection of schools and children 
A power analysis shows67 that to find an effect of 0.4 points increase in children’s GPA, 
a sample size of 200 children (or about 10 schools) is sufficient. To find a slightly more 
modest effect of 0.3 points increase in children’ GPA, a sample size of 300 children (or 
about 15 schools) is needed. These effect sizes are comparable to the ones found in the 
literature of the ‘Skills for Adolescence’ program. The intervention targets children in 
9th grade who attend either the pre-vocational education track (vmbo and in particular 
the upper theoretical track) or the pre-higher vocational education track (havo). These 
tracks are selected because these children are expected to gain the most from the in-
tervention. It has been shown that underachievement, in relation to motivational prob-
lems, is most common in these two tracks (Dutch education council, 2007). Children in 
these tracks are generally concentrated in the middle of the overall ability distribution 
and comprise a more heterogeneous group in terms of performance than children in 
the lowest and highest tracks. The 9th grade is selected because some of the perfor-
mance related problems that children encounter in 7th grade are likely related to the 
transition from primary to secondary school (Driessen et al., 2005). These transition-
specific problems are expected to disappear over the first two years of secondary 
school. The intervention focuses on problems that are more persistent. Furthermore, 
children in 9th grade still have at least one year before graduation. This leaves some 
time for the effect of the program to materialize. 
School visits to all schools that responded positively were organized to explain the 
intervention study and the procedures and to receive information from the schools on 
how they organized their education practice and on aspects they considered to be of 
importance when participating in the study. Important points to take into account were 
timely planning of the intervention and sufficient information for the children’s parents. 
This way of involving schools in the study is very time consuming, yet a minimum re-
quirement for cooperation.   
6.2.4 Sample of schools 
18 schools participate in the study, 10 pre-vocational education schools (vmbo) and 8 
pre-higher vocational education schools (havo).68 Within each track, schools are ran-
domly assigned to the treatment or the control group.69 This randomization results in 
                                                                
67 Appendix C describes the power analysis.  
68 In this study, a school is defined as an educational track (usually separate school location). Two schools in 
the sample participate with both the pre-vocational and pre-higher education track. 
69 The randomized assignment to treatment or control group is performed by an external party, in this case 
The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy analysis. 
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five treatment schools and five control schools for the pre-vocational education track 
(vmbo) and four treatment schools and four control schools for the pre-higher voca-
tional education track (havo). Using the selection procedure described earlier, the un-
derachieving children are selected per school. This selection results in 202 children in 
the treatment and 161 children in the control group. 
An important question is whether schools that participate in this experiment are a 
selective group of schools. It is possible that schools are more willing to participate in 
this experiment when they experience problems with children’s motivation and undera-
chievement. Other schools might have decided not to participate because of the ran-
domized assignment to the intervention and control groups. Fortunately, we have addi-
tional information on the schools that did not participate in the study that allow us to 
make a comparison on child and school characteristics between participating and non-
participating schools. Table 1 gives an overview of the child characteristics in the differ-
ent groups. The first two columns report the intervention and control group of the un-
derachieving children at the participating schools. Column 3 shows the descriptive sta-
tistics for the target population of underachieving children at non-participating schools. 
From table 1 we conclude that children’s demographic characteristics are not signifi-
cantly different in schools that participate in the study compared to those that do not 
participate. The share of pre-higher education schools is slightly lower in this study 
compared to the non-participating schools. In addition, we checked for differences in 
the size of the schools’ child population and the location of the school. We do not find 
any significant differences on these school characteristics (Feron and Schils, 2015). 
Overall, we observe that the schools that participate in the intervention do not differ 
strongly from schools that do not participate in the intervention based on child and 
school characteristics. We assume that the same holds for their non-observable charac-
teristics. Therefore, we conclude that schools that participate in this study are not sig-
nificantly different from schools that do not participate in the study and that selection 
bias is not likely to be a major problem.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Participating schools  Non-participating 
schools 
 Treatment group Control group  All 
Cognitive and non-cognitive variables    
GPA 9th grade 6.24 6.22  
Motivation1 -0.03 -0.22 0.07 
Homework (hours) 6.3 5.55 5.8 
Self-confidence1 -0.11 0.12 0.10* 
Demographic variables       
Pre-higher education track (share) 0.42 0.43 0.52** 
Age (in years)  15.74 15.76 15.71 
Girls  0.43 0.36 0.43 
Education level parents 2.20 2.19 2.11 
1. Lower education 21.34% 25% 25.12% 
2. Vocational education 37.80% 32.25% 38.66% 
3. Higher/university education 40.85% 43.75% 36.22% 
Child born in the Netherlands 0.92 0.90 0.90 
Observations 202 161 703 
Note: The first two columns show student characteristics, before the start of the experiment, for the treat-
ment and control groups that participate in the study and the third column shows student characteristics at 
schools that did not participate in the study. We selected 202 underachieving students for the treatment 
group, 161 students for the control group and 703 students that did not participate in the study. Differences 
reported between the treatment and control group(s) at *, **, ***, at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
significance levels respectively, based on t-tests. Not for all students there is information available on all 
control variables. We do not have information on grades for the non-participating schools. A detailed descrip-
tion of the data is provided in the appendix. 
1Standardized variables. We standardize these variables before treatment using the full population of stu-
dents and anchor the outcomes after the treatment to the first outcomes using only the scores of the stu-
dents in the control group that do not drop out of the study. More details on the standardization approach 
are found in Appendix B.  
6.2.5 Outcome measures and empirical strategy 
In this paper we look at two types of outcome measures: school performance in terms 
of grades and motivation, time spend on homework and self-confidence. During sec-
ondary school children’s performance is assessed throughout the year by means of 
formal tests. The grades children receive for these tests are measures on a scale from 1-
10, where 1 represents the lowest and 10 the highest grade. Children receive an official 
report card that lists the average grades they have obtained in all of their courses sev-
eral times per year. We collect these report cards, before and after the intervention 
period, i.e. at the end of 9th grade and at the end of 10th grade. Based on these grades, 
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we calculate the grade point average for all children. For 337 out of the 363 children we 
have information on their grades.70,71  
Before and after the intervention period, children in both the treatment and the 
control group completed a questionnaire that includes questions on school motivation, 
hours spent on homework and self-confidence. The questionnaire after the intervention 
was taken at the end of the experiment. Therefore, information on these variables is 
only available for those children that completed the full treatment. To prevent children 
from dropping out of the program we use monetary incentives, next to the involvement 
of the teacher. Bettinger (2012) shows a positive relation between paying children for 
successful completion of standardized tests and their test scores. Furthermore, Bet-
tinger (2012) and Kremer et al. (2009) find no evidence that financial incentives weaken 
intrinsic motivation to learn or lead to gaming or cheating. Children in the treatment 
group who complete at least five out of the seven assignments in the intervention re-
ceive 25 Euro for their participation. Participants in the intervention were informed 
about the monetary incentives before the start of the program.  
We look at two types of results in this study. First, we investigate which children 
complete the treatment and which children do not. Especially since we target undera-
chievers this is a relevant outcome variable, as completion of the treatment might be 
related to motivational attitudes. Due to some minor issues with the logistics at schools, 
some children were unable to participate in all assignments. We define children as 
treatment group compliers when they completed at least four out of the seven assign-
ments.72 Second, we look at the effect of the treatment on several outcomes. Our main 
interest is whether the treatment has an effect on children’s GPA. In addition, we ob-
serve whether the treatment has an effect on children’s motivation, hours spend on 
homework and self-confidence.  
To analyse the treatment effect, we use two types of models. We use linear models 
of the effect of the treatment on child outcomes where we include the levels of these 
outcomes before the treatment as lagged variables, or 
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where Yi,t represents the child’s GPA, motivation, hours spent on homework or self-
confidence in period t after the treatment, Di equals 1 if the child is in the treatment 
group and equals 0 otherwise, Yi,t-1 represents the child’s GPA, motivation, hours spent 
on homework or self-confidence in period t-1 before the treatment and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 represents 
the error term.  
                                                                
70 Appendix A provides a detailed overview of the data used for this study. 
71 Since we have information on grades for 337 children these children make up our sample for the analyses.  
72 In the results section we show the estimates for the group of children who have participated in at least four 
assignments. We choose to show this group as we have more observations in this group. There is a gradual 
decline in the children who drop out of doing the assignments during the intervention period. Figure 2 shows 
there is no jump at participating in at least five assignments. The estimates are similar when we use the group 
of children who have participated in at least five assignments.  
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In addition, we use a generalized difference-in-differences method. We estimate panel 
fixed-effects models with period fixed effects and child fixed effects to better isolate the 
treatment effect as the fixed effects soak up some of the residual variation, or   
 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2) 
where Yi,t represents the child’s GPA, motivation, hours spent on homework or self-
confidence in period t, Pt represents the times-series simple difference estimate. P 
equals 1 if period t occurs after treatment and equals 0 otherwise. Di equals 1 if the 
child is in the treatment group and equals 0 otherwise. The coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 of the interac-
tion variable Pt*Di represents the treatment effect estimate. αi represents the child 
fixed effects, δt represents the period fixed effects and µi,t represents the error term. 
We use three different ways of defining the treatment effect. The first definition is 
based on assignment to treatment (intention to treat or ITT). In the above models this 
implies that D=1 for all children who were assigned to the treatment group at the start 
of the intervention. However, a part of the treatment group might not receive the actu-
al treatment due to dropping out early, the treatment group non-compliers. The second 
definition is based on actual treatment participation. This implies that D=1 for all chil-
dren who have completed at least four assignments. This model assumes that those 
who dropped out of the treatment also did not benefit from the assignment to treat-
ment. If children self-select into completing the actual treatment or if participation is 
based on the expected gains from treatment we expect that the conditional mean inde-
pendence assumption is violated and we can no longer make causal inferences. Such 
selection sounds quite plausible in our case due to the large number of children who 
drop out of the intervention. Therefore, a third definition is used, which uses an instru-
mental variable approach. Assignment to the treatment is used as an instrument for the 
actual treatment taken (treatment effect on the treated or TOT).  
Finally, all models are estimated both with robust standard errors and with standard 
errors clustered at the school level, because observations might not be independent 
within schools. Moreover, models that show significant effects are also estimated with 
standard errors cluster bootstrapped with clusters at the school level. The bootstrap is 
used to see whether results hold when simulating a larger sample of schools, since we 
only have 18 schools in our sample.  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the three groups before the start of the 
treatment. The children in our sample are on average 15 years old and there are slightly 
more boys than girls in our sample. Most parents have completed at least vocational 
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education and approximately 90 percent of the children in our sample are born in the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, the children have an average gpa of 6.2 and spend approxi-
mately 6 hours on homework. Children in our sample seem to be slightly less motivated 
compared to children who do not participate and children in our treatment group re-
port a lower level of self-confidence.  
Table 2 shows the correlation table for the variables we use in the analyses. There 
are some interesting correlations regarding motivation and gpa. Motivation before 
treatment is significantly positively correlated with completing at least four assignments 
and with gpa before treatment. Motivation after treatment is significantly positively 
correlated with gpa before and after treatment and with motivation after treatment. 
Furthermore, girls report to be more motivated than boys. Regarding gpa we observe 
that gpa before treatment is significantly positively correlated with gpa after treatment, 
children in the pre-higher education track appear to have a lower gpa than children in 
the pre-vocational track, children who are born in the Netherlands appear to have a 
higher gpa than children who are not born in the Netherlands and children who report a 
higher level of self-confidence appear to have a lower gpa.  
6.3.2 Randomization 
The results in table 1 indicate that the randomization was successful. Another check to 
see if the randomization was successful is to observe if any of the covariates predict 
assignment to treatment. Table 3 reports the marginal effects of a probit model where 
the dependent variable equals 1 when the child is assigned to the treatment group and 
equals zero when the child is assigned to the control group. In column 1 we observe all 
337 children in the treatment and control group for whom we have information on their 
GPA. If the randomization is successful the covariates should not be different between 
the two groups. The results in table 3 show that generally no variable is able to predict 
whether children end up in the treatment or in the control group. These results indicate 
that the randomization was successful.  
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Table 3: Randomization 
  treatment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GPA before treatment 0.028 0.014 0.014 0.014 
  (0.051) (0.063) (0.095) (0.102) 
Pre-higher education track -0.010 0.048 0.048 0.048 
  (0.058) (0.065) (0.269) (0.298) 
Girls 0.093 0.072 0.072 0.072 
  (0.057) (0.067) (0.061) (0.068) 
Parents have vocational education 0.092 0.044 0.044 0.044 
  (0.078) (0.087) (0.088) (0.094) 
Parents have higher/university education 0.004 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 
  (0.077) (0.083) (0.076) (0.090) 
Parents' education unknown 0.070 0.076 0.076 0.076 
  (0.111) (0.202) (0.198) (0.221) 
Age (in months) -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Child born in the Netherlands 0.026 0.090 0.090 0.090 
  (0.102) (0.107) (0.115) (0.135) 
Child's country of birth unknown1 0.196       
  (0.127)       
Motivation   0.065** 0.065** 0.065** 
    (0.031) (0.028) (0.031) 
Homework (in hours)   0.008 0.008* 0.008 
    (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Self-confidence   -0.036 -0.036* -0.036 
    (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) 
Robust SEs yes yes no no 
Clustered SEs no no yes no 
Cluster bootstrapped SEs no no no yes 
Observations 337 259 259 259 
Note: This table shows the marginal effects from probit models with the dependent variable being equal to 1 
if the student is assigned to the treatment group and 0 if he is assigned to the control group. Standard errors 
are reported between brackets. *, **, ***, represent 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels 
respectively.  
1This category is used to keep all students in the first model. In the later models, no information on the perso-
nality traits is available for the students in this category and therefore it drops from the analysis. 
In column 1 we have 337 observations, this are all children for who we have information on their GPA. In 
column 2 we add motivation, homework and self-confidence before treatment. We only have this information 
for children who answered the first questionnaire.   
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6.3.3 Compliance  
A first result to evaluate is to what extent children comply with the intervention. Since 
the children in our target group are selected because they are currently underperform-
ing, we expect that these children have a higher probability of dropping out as their 
motivation to take up and complete the treatment is likely lower compared to regular 
children. During the seven months that the treatment was provided children had ample 
opportunities to drop out of the treatment. Participation in the experiment is voluntary 
and when children decide to participate in the experiment they stay one additional hour 
in school every month to complete the online tasks. Teachers and mentors can remind 
children to participate in the experiment but they do not force children to participate. It 
is unlikely that forcing unwilling children to just sit behind a computer for one hour a 
month will contribute to their school motivation and their school performance.   
 We define children as treatment group compliers when they participate in at least 
four out of the seven assignments. Figure 2 shows the number of treatment group 
compliers per assignment. The children in our target group have a relatively high prob-
ability of dropping out of the treatment. Over the duration of the experiment children 
gradually drop out. 51 percent of the children participate in at least four assignments. A 
first step in the analysis is to see whether the children who complete the treatment 
systematically differ from those who do not. 
 
 
Figure 2: Compliance with treatment 
Note: This figure shows the number of children that completed a different number of assignments, ranging 
from 0 (no assignments made at all) to 7 (completed full treatment). 
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Table 4 shows the results of probit models for the probability to complete at least four 
assignments for children in the treatment group. In column 1 we observe all 202 chil-
dren in the treatment group. The results show that children’s gpa, age and motivation 
seem to be consistent predictors of completing at least four assignments. If gpa goes up 
by 1, children are on average approximately 22 percent less likely to complete at least 
four assignments, younger children and children who report higher levels of motivation 
seem more likely to complete at least four assignments. Motivation is measured on a 
Likert scale from 1-5 and is later standardized. A standard deviation increase in reported 
motivation is related to a 16 percent increase in completing at least four assignments. 
Possibly, older children are those who have repeated a year either in primary or sec-
ondary school. We lose observations when we add motivation, homework and self-
confidence to the regression models as not all children answered the questionnaire 
(fully). The positive relation between motivation and completing at least four assign-
ments is particularly interesting. This suggests that children who report a lower motiva-
tion are less likely to complete the assignments. This part of the distribution of children 
is exactly the part that the intervention is trying to reach. 
Based on these results, it seems to be the case that continued participation in the 
treatment is selective. Children who do not comply with all assignments are likely to not 
benefit from the treatment. This means that our treatment effect estimates are biased 
downwards. For this reason, we argue that estimating an Intention-To-Treat (ITT) effect 
for these children would dilute our estimate of the treatment effect, and estimating a 
Treatment-on-Treated (TOT) effect is likely to be more accurate. In our analyses of the 
treatment effect on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes we will show both models.  
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Table 4: Compliance 
  Completed at least four assignments 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GPA before treatment   -0.219** -0.219*** -0.219** 
    (0.093) (0.081) (0.089) 
Pre-higher education track 0.146* 0.097 0.097 0.097 
  (0.079) (0.095) (0.258) (0.277) 
Girls 0.013 -0.073 -0.073 -0.073 
  (0.075) (0.094) (0.077) (0.080) 
Parents have vocational education 0.058 0.081 0.081 0.081 
  (0.113) (0.124) (0.142) (0.171) 
Parents have higher/university education 0.184* 0.191 0.191 0.191 
  (0.108) (0.117) (0.126) (0.139) 
Parents education unknown 0.024 -0.287 -0.287 -0.287** 
  (0.149) (0.269) (0.185) (0.135) 
Age (in months) -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Child born in the Netherlands -0.189 -0.151 -0.151 -0.151 
  (0.143) (0.155) (0.197) (0.192) 
Child's country of birth unknown -0.134       
  (0.188)       
Motivation   0.159*** 0.159** 0.159* 
    (0.057) (0.063) (0.095) 
Homework   -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
    (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
Self-confidence   -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
    (0.037) (0.031) (0.034) 
Robust SEs yes yes no no 
Clustered SEs no no yes no 
Cluster bootstrapped SEs no no no yes 
Observations 202 135 135 135 
Note: This table shows the marginal effects from probit regressions where the dependent variable is equal to 
1 if the student completed at least four assignments and 0 otherwise (students in the treatment group only). 
Robust standard errors are reported between brackets. *, **, ***, at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent 
significance levels respectively.  
6.3.4 Treatment effects  
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients of the treatment on children’s GPA. In col-
umn 1-3 we use the data as cross-sectional data and control for GPA before the treat-
ment, the children’s track, gender, parental education level, age and country of birth. In 
column 1 we use assignment to treatment as the treatment variable (Intention-to-treat 
or ITT), in column 2 we use completion of at least four assignments as the treatment 
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variable and in column 3 we use assignment to the treatment group as an instrument 
for completion of at least four assignments (Treatment-on-treated or TOT). Further-
more, in column 4-6 we use the data as panel data where we use period and child fixed 
effects.  
The results in table 5 show that we find no treatment effect of the intervention on 
GPA. The results in column 4-6 show a negative time trend for GPA.  Furthermore, we 
observe that the treatment effects in column 3 and 6, where we use assignment to 
treatment as an instrument for treatment taken, are approximately twice the size of the 
ITT estimates in column 1 and 4. This is consistent with approximately 50 percent of our 
children dropping out of the treatment.  
In table 6 we present the results of the treatment on motivation, homework and 
self-confidence. The results show that we find no treatment effect of the intervention 
on motivation, homework and self-confidence. This might be due to the low number of 
observations that resulted after treatment, since the non-cognitive skills are measured 
after the seventh assignment was completed and about 70 percent of the children in 
the treatment group has left the study by that time.  
Table 5: Treatment effect on cognitive outcome 
  Grade Point Average 
  ITT TOT TOT with IV ITT TOT TOT with IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment -0.059 -0.048 -0.110 -0.031 -0.025 -0.056 
  (0.067) (0.079) (0.123) (0.073) (0.078) (0.132) 
Post       -0.160*** -0.169*** -0.160*** 
        (0.055) (0.044) (0.055) 
Constant 3.119*** 3.195*** 3.386*** 6.332*** 6.332***   
  (1.163) (1.209) (1.190) (0.026) (0.026)   
Robust SEs yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SEs no no no no no no 
Cluster bootstrapped SEs no no no no no no 
Observations 294 294 294 601 601 588 
R-squared 0.309 0.308 0.306 0.076 0.076 0.075 
Note: This table shows coefficients from OLS regressions in cross sectional data and panel data. In the cross 
sectional data we use GPA before treatment, track, gender, parental education level, age and region of birth 
as control variables. In the panel data regressions we use period and student fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are reported between brackets. Clustered standard errors and cluster bootstrapped standard errors 
give similar results. *, **, ***, at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels respectively. Models 
with standard errors clustered at the school level and with bootstrapped standard errors showed similar 
results.  
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Table 6: Treatment effect on non-cognitive outcomes 
  Motivation Homework Self-
confidence 
Motivation Homework Self-
confidence 
  ITT and TOT is the same 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment 0.073 -1.778 -0.499 -0.075 -1.330 -0.498 
  (0.210) (1.165) (0.315) (0.220) (1.162) (0.330) 
Post       -0.003 2.443*** -0.150 
        (0.173) (0.911) (0.267) 
Constant -6.829*** -2.485 -0.467 0.009 6.107*** -0.003 
  (2.550) (17.178) (4.339) (0.077) (0.409) (0.114) 
Robust SEs yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SEs no no no no no no 
Cluster bootstrapped SEs no no no no no no 
Observations 108 104 101 231 227 221 
R-squared 0.340 0.177 0.365 0.003 0.086 0.104 
Note: This table shows coefficients from OLS regressions in cross sectional data and panel data. In the cross 
sectional data we use GPA before treatment, track, gender, parental education level, age, region of birth and 
the respective dependent variable before treatment as control variables. In the panel data regressions we use 
period and student fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported between brackets. Clustered standard 
errors and cluster bootstrapped standard errors give similar results. *, **, ***, at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent significance levels respectively. Models with standard errors clustered at the school level and with 
bootstrapped standard errors showed similar results.  
 
In a next step, we analyse whether there is any heterogeneity in the treatment effects. 
Table 7 and table 8 show the results of the interaction variables female, track (havo), 
GPA above mean and motivation above mean. In table 7 we find no heterogeneity in 
treatment effects for GPA. We do observe that children in the pre-higher education 
(havo) track generally have a lower GPA compared to children in the pre-vocational 
education (vmbo) track. Furthermore, column 3 shows that children in the control 
group who have a GPA above the mean before the treatment, have a higher GPA after 
treatment. In table 8 we find no heterogeneity in treatment effects for motivation. We 
do find a similar relation for GPA above the mean as in table 7. Furthermore, we find 
that above average reported motivation before the treatment is related to higher re-
ported motivation after treatment.  
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Table 7: Heterogeneity in treatment effect cognitive outcome 
  Grade Point Average 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment -0.032 0.034 -0.032 -0.141 
  (0.095) (0.079) (0.107) (0.094) 
Girls -0.011       
  (0.097)       
Treatment#Girls -0.066       
  (0.137)       
Pre-higher education track   -0.240**     
    (0.099)     
Treatment#pre-higher education track   -0.219     
    (0.136)     
GPA before treatment, above mean     0.513***   
      (0.104)   
Treatment#GPA before treatment above mean   -0.019   
      (0.143)   
Motivation above mean       -0.057 
        (0.098) 
Treatment#Motivation above mean       0.156 
        (0.132) 
Constant 3.137*** 2.870** 7.112*** 3.101*** 
  (1.161) (1.165) (1.046) (1.156) 
Robust SEs yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SEs no no no no 
Cluster bootstrapped SEs no no no no 
Observations 294 294 294 294 
R-squared 0.309 0.315 0.222 0.312 
Note: The regressions show coefficients from OLS regressions with interaction variables for female, study-
track, gpa above mean and motivation above mean. We use GPA before treatment, track, gender, parental 
education level, age, and region of birth as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported between 
brackets. Models with standard errors clustered at the school level and with cluster bootstrapped standard 
errors show similar results. *, **, ***, at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels respectively.   
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Table 8: Heterogeneity in treatment effect non-cognitive outcome 
  Motivation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment -0.099 0.196 0.024 0.344 
  (0.258) (0.303) (0.268) (0.322) 
Girls -0.148       
  (0.274)       
Treatment#Girls 0.429       
  (0.377)       
Pre-higher education track   0.019     
    (0.302)     
Treatment#pre-higher education track   -0.265     
    (0.428)     
GPA before treatment, above mean     0.484*   
      (0.278)   
Treatment#GPA before treatment above mean    0.291   
      (0.408)   
Motivation above mean       1.082*** 
        (0.333) 
Treatment#Motivation above mean       -0.605 
        (0.455) 
Constant -7.065*** -7.297*** -3.477 -6.983*** 
  (2.537) (2.551) (2.232) (2.548) 
Robust SEs yes yes yes yes 
Clustered SEs no no no no 
Cluster bootstrapped SEs no no no no 
Observations 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.348 0.342 0.354 0.299 
Note: The regressions show coefficients from OLS regressions with interaction variables for female, study-
track, gpa above mean and motivation above mean. We use GPA before treatment, track, gender, parental 
education level, age, and region of birth as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported between 
brackets. Models with standard errors clustered at the school level and with cluster bootstrapped standard 
errors show similar results. OLS regressions with homework and self-confidence as the dependent variable 
show no significant interaction effects. *, **, ***, at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels 
respectively.   
6.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether an intervention targeted at underachiev-
ing secondary school children’s motivation raises their performance, measured by GPA. 
Since lack of motivation is likely to be at the core of underachievement problems, a 
challenge for interventions targeted at underachievers is to keep them participating in 
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the activities of the intervention. A question is whether those that could benefit the 
most from the intervention, i.e. those with the lowest motivation and performance, 
have a higher likelihood of dropping out of the intervention and whether observed 
effects of the intervention differ between those that have most to gain and the other 
children. We use a randomized field experiment to investigate these questions.  
An important feature of our study is that the experiment was designed in response 
to a growing concern among teachers at secondary schools about the motivation and 
school performance of certain groups of children. Both for the successful implementa-
tion and usefulness of the results, the participation of schools in experimental research 
is of primary importance. Not only in the phase of execution of the experiment, but 
already in the phase where the research question is formulated and the experimental 
design is made.73  
The results of our intervention show that continued participation in the treatment is 
selective. Children who have a lower gpa and children who report a higher motivation 
before the treatment are more likely to complete the treatment. The effects of GPA and 
motivation are interesting: higher motivated children remain in the treatment, but also 
those with lower grades. We observe no significant effect of the treatment on GPA and 
motivation. This results might be partly explained by the large number of children who 
drop out of the treatment.  
Our results show how difficult it is to reach this particular target group of children 
with a school intervention. It also indicates the importance of the classroom environ-
ment and teacher support. As discussed in Borghans et al. (2016) for children to be 
motivated to participate in the intervention it is important that schools and teachers 
support the intervention and facilitate children in participating in the intervention. In 
this case, even a close cooperation between schools and researchers could not prevent 
children from dropping out of the experiment.   
                                                                
73 A pilot was executed to optimize both the detection procedure and the intervention. With respect to the 
content of the intervention, from the pilot we established that our method for child selection was very similar 
to the teacher evaluation. The pilot contributed to the creation of the tasks that are used in the experiment. 
Parts of the content as well as the language used in the tasks was adjusted based on the feedback we re-
ceived.  
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Appendix   
This appendix presents supporting material. In Section A we discuss the data description 
which includes the definition for underachievement, our outcome measures and an 
explanation of the control variables we use in the analyses. In section B we describe the 
standardization procedure we use for the analyses. In section C we present our power 
analyses and show how many children we need to be able to find certain effect sizes. In 
section D we present the seven assignments as well as the questionnaire used for this 
study. Finally, in section E we present the results from the pilot phase.  
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A. Data description 
Many variables that are used in this study stem from the Onderwijs Monitor Limburg 
(OML) which is a cooperative project between Maastricht University and (primary and 
secondary) schools, school boards and government bodies in Limburg, a region in the 
south of the Netherlands. The project aims to collect and analyse information about the 
educational development of children in order to foster educational improvement. The 
collected information is a combination of administrative child data from schools, includ-
ing test results, and survey data from questionnaires among children and their parents 
at these schools. In secondary education, which is the focus of this study, about 90 
percent of the schools in the region participate in this project. The schools which do not 
participate are special education schools, schools that have a philosophy not to test 
children, and schools which were unable to plan the survey activities. We only select 
children that are in the pre-vocational education (vmbo) and pre-higher vocational 
education (havo) track. The total population of children in these tracks in the region is 
4,814 children. The variables that are used for our study are described in more detail 
below.  
Defining underachievement 
To define underachievement we first look at the children’s expected performance. For 
this, we use a high stakes standardized test in 6th grade. In this final year of primary 
education, children take a three-day standardized achievement test (Cito test), accom-
panied with a lot of media attention, which is very important to determine in which 
track they are selected for secondary education. Therefore, this test is high-stakes for 
the children. About 85 percent of the schools use this test. The test is developed and 
assessed by Cito, a testing company which is independent from the schools. The test 
contains 290 multiple choice questions testing the children on three main domains: 
Dutch language, mathematics, and world orientation (e.g. geography, biology and histo-
ry). The score ranges from 501 to 550. This test score is available for 4,231 children, 
which is 87.9 percent of all children in the two tracks that we consider for our study.  
For some of the children for whom we do not have this test score, we have an alter-
native. In 9th grade children completed an IQ-test as part of the research project in the 
region. For 501 children this is used as an alternative measure to determine whether 
they are underachievers or not. This is not an high stakes test as the test in 6th grade, 
but it can be shown that the IQ-test should deliver a proxy of a child’s potential perfor-
mance.74 Moreover, we validate the selection of children among their teachers and 
mentors. In this way we screen our selection to either deselect ‘wrongly accused’ un-
derachievers or add underachievers that were not picked up by our procedure.  
                                                                
74 For children for whom we have both cito and iq, we find that for about 67 percent of the children there is 
about one standard deviation of the mean difference between the two percentile distributions. 
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Second, we look at children’s current performance. For this we use a test that chil-
dren take in 9th grade. Children completed questions on both math and language as part 
of the research project. The score ranges from 0 to 1. Test scores are available for 4,017 
children. For all these children either the 6th grade test or the IQ-test is available to 
determine their expected performance. 
Both scores on expected and current performance are divided in percentiles, by 
school and by study track, and the difference between current and expected perfor-
mance is calculated. A negative difference implies that children performed better in 6th 
grade than in 9th grade. As a cut-off, we take the 25 percent of children per class and 
per school that underperform the most. This is the target population of underachievers, 
which consists of 1,066 children.  
Outcome measures 
To determine GPA, we take all courses that children have in the period before and after 
the intervention. Some courses only run for half a year and we left these outside the 
calculation of GPA. For the pre-vocational education track (vmbo) we include Dutch, 
English, French, German, math, science, biology, economics, geography, history and 
civics. For the pre-higher vocational education track (havo) we include Dutch, English, 
French, German, math, physics, chemistry, biology, economics, geography and history. 
Not all children take all courses, but the GPA is calculated over the courses they take. 
Table A1 shows the mean grades of all courses separately and the GPA. GPA before 
intervention available for 337 children (153 control and 184 treatment) and after the 
intervention for 307 children (134 control and 173 treatment). 
Table A1: mean grades before the intervention 
Course Number of observations Mean Sd 
Dutch 337 6.32 0.64 
English 337 6.42 0.91 
French 202 5.95 1.03 
German 314 6.26 0.90 
Math 329 6.11 1.02 
Science 1 138 6.08 0.86 
Science 2 87 6.12 0.86 
Physics 149 5.96 0.97 
Chemistry 150 6.27 0.85 
Biology 196 6.25 0.62 
Economics 312 6.24 0.82 
Geography 243 6.37 0.63 
History 287 6.15 0.91 
Civics 76 6.72 0.69 
Overall GPA 337 6.23 0.54 
Grades are only available for schools that participate in the study. See details on the selection of schools in 
the text. 
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Next to the cognitive outcomes, we look at non-cognitive outcomes. A first non-
cognitive outcome that we include is children’s motivation. Children had to indicate 
whether they agree or disagree with eight statements about their motivation to go to 
school and their attitude towards learning in general. Each statement was measured on 
a 5-point scale ranging from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”. Looking at the inter-item 
correlation, two items are removed as they seemed not to fit to the others. From the 
remaining six statements, the overall factor score is calculated, with negative items 
being reversed. Table A2 shows the scoring coefficients of the various statements.  
For the analyses we standardized the variables to be able to compare before and af-
ter outcomes. In our standardization approach we take three aspects of our study into 
consideration: (1) we select only underachieving children for our study, (2) some chil-
dren are treated while others are not, and (3) there might be selective non-compliance 
with the treatment. We standardize the outcome before treatment using the full popu-
lation of children and anchor the outcome after treatment to the first outcome using 
only the scores of the children in the control group that do not drop out of the study.75 
The motivation score before intervention is available for 291 children, or 85 percent of 
the population in our study (87 percent of the control group and 84 percent of the 
treatment group), and after the intervention for 122 children, or 36 percent of the pop-
ulation in our study (28 percent of the control group and 43 percent in the treatment 
group). The questionnaire after the intervention was taken at the very end, so these 
non-cognitive variables are only available for those children that completed the full 
treatment. 
Table A2: statements and scoring coefficients on factor score for motivation 
Motivation   
-As soon as I can, I quit school (-) 0.201 
-I am motivated to continue learning 0.235 
-I am going to learn interesting things 0.181 
-I am continuing to learn because I like it 0.236 
-I am continuing to learn for a long time 0.276 
-As soon as I have a job, I quit school (-) 0.139 
Negative items have been reversed. 
 
A second non-cognitive outcome that we include is the average hours that children 
spent on homework. We include both hours spent on homework at home and at school 
during hours that children do not have courses. Before the intervention, children spent 
on average 5.8 hours on homework. We have information on this variable for 269 chil-
dren before intervention, or 80 percent of the population in our study (83 percent of 
the control group and 77 percent of the treatment group) and for 123 children after the 
                                                                
75 Appendix C provides a detailed description of our standardization procedure. 
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intervention, or 36 percent of the population in our study (29 percent of the control 
group and 38 percent in the treatment group). 
The final non-cognitive outcome we consider is children’s self-confidence. Children 
were asked to rate themselves on a range of skills, including social skills like socializing 
with others, instrumental skills like taking the lead, study skills like mental arithmetic 
and computer skills.  Table A3 provides an overview of the skills. The skills were rated on 
a 1-10 scale. We standardized the outcome variable using the standardization approach 
mentioned before. We have information on this variable for 287 children before inter-
vention, or 85 percent of the population in our study (88 percent of the control group 
and 83 percent of the treatment group) and for 120 children after intervention, or 36 
percent of the population in our study (27 percent of the control group and 43 percent 
in the treatment group). 
Table A3: statements used for self-confidence 
Giving my own opinion 
Getting what I want 
Taking the lead 
Debating 
Comforting somebody 
Listening to somebody with problems 
Socializing with other children 
Choosing nice clothes and looking good 
 
Mental arithmetic 
Writing without mistakes 
Drawing, painting or making music 
Following the news 
Concentrating 
Searching something on the computer 
Chatting on the computer 
Chatting on a mobile device 
Using Microsoft Word 
Using Microsoft Excel 
Browsing the internet for study purposes 
Browsing the internet for fun 
Playing computer games 
Control variables 
We include a small range of control variables in our analysis. Table 1 (in the main text) 
shows these variables and their means. Demographic information includes children’s 
age, gender, parental education level and region of birth. Age is measured in years. For 
parental education level we take the level of education of the highest educated parent 
and distinguish between three levels: (1) primary or lower secondary education; (2) 
upper secondary education or lower tertiary education; and (3) higher tertiary 
education or academic education. Region of birth distinguishes between: (1) the 
Netherlands (2) outside of the Netherlands (3) place of birth unknown.  
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B. Details on the standardization procedure used in the analysis 
Some of the outcome measures that we use have no natural scale. To assess the size of 
the effect we choose to standardize these variables. Three aspects of our study compli-
cate this standardization approach: (1) we select underachieving children, (2) some 
children are treated while others are not, and (3) there might be selective non-
compliance with the treatment. We discuss these issues and our strategy to deal with 
them below in more detail. 
For our study, we only select underachieving children. After the intervention, we on-
ly have the outcome variable for this selection of children. This is only a part of the 
distribution of all children and the variance in this subset is lower than the overall vari-
ance of the full population  (see figure C1). This implies that when we standardize the 
variables based on this selection only, effect sizes will be overestimated. Yet, we are 
more interested in the size of the possible effects in relation to the full population of 
children. Therefore, we first standardize the variable with mean zero and standard de-
viation one for the full population. We then take the mean and standard deviation of 
the standardized variable but only for the target population of underachieving children. 
We use this to ‘correct’ or anchor the outcome after the intervention.  
 
 
Figure C1: Selection of underachieving children 
 
From the selected population for this study, about half of them are randomly assigned 
to the treatment group and others are placed in the control group. It is expected that 
the treatment increases the scores on the variables for the treated population, in rela-
tion to those of the control group. Figure C2 shows the expected distribution of the 
outcome variable after treatment: the outcome of the treatment group has improved 
and the distribution is next to the one of the control group. This is also shown in the 
scatter of panel b. The scores of the treated population are, for every given score be-
fore the treatment, above that of the control group. 
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Figure C2: Outcome measure before and after treatment, standardized on full population 
 
The populations before and after treatment are no longer comparable due to the im-
provement of the treated population. Standardizing on the full population, i.e. ignoring 
this, could lead to a biased estimate of the treatment effect, or an underestimation in 
this example.  
A final issue that diffuses the comparison of variables between the population be-
fore and after treatment is that some of the children do not comply with the interven-
tion and drop out of the study. If the drop out was random over both the control and 
treatment group, this would be no additional issue, yet if the drop out is selective it 
creates a similar problem as described above and could lead to biased estimates of the 
treatment effect. Consequently, we only use the complying children in the control 
group as the basis of the standardization of variables in both outcomes. 
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C. Power analysis 
To select the number of children for the study, power analysis has been applied. Chil-
dren’s GPA is the main outcome variable and is defined as follows: 
𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = (𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑇𝑇) + (𝑏𝑏 ∗ 𝑔𝑔1) + (𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑔𝑔2) + (𝑔𝑔 ∗ 𝑔𝑔3) + 𝑎𝑎 
Where:  
• T is whether the child is in the treatment group and f is the expected effect of the 
treatment. Based on previous studies discussed earlier, it could be expected that the 
intervention leads to an increase of 0.4 point in the child’s GPA. In the power analy-
sis we also included an increase of 0.3 and 0.5 points in GPA. 
• e1 is the measurement error due to the differences in grades between children not 
caused by the treatment. To get a proxy for this, we used a sample of children from 
a secondary school in the Netherlands, which was used for another study (Borghans 
et al., 2011). We selected children from the pre-higher education (havo) track since 
this track is also a part of our study and we are left with 93 children. The standard 
deviation of mean GPA in this sample is 0.48. 
• e2 is the measurement error due to differences in grades between tests. To get a 
proxy for this, we used the same sample as described for e1. Using a panel regres-
sion with a constant only, the measurement error due to differences in grades be-
tween tests is 0.29. 
• e3 is the measurement error due to differences in grades between schools. To get a 
proxy for this, we looked at the difference in math test scores between schools in a 
research project in the region. We find that the between-school variance in GPA is 
about 0.19.  
• a is a constant. To get a proxy for this, we used the same sample as described for e1. 
The average GPA is 6.11. 
In the definition of underachievement, we take the 25 percent of children per class and 
per school that underperform the most, i.e. that have the largest difference between 
test results in 6th and 9th grade. This is about 20 children per school. We include this as 
an assumption in our power analysis. In addition, it can be expected that not all children 
complete the intervention. Especially since the target group is underachieving and less 
motivated children, non-compliance can become an issue. To see how this affects the 
size of the sample to start with, we include the probability that only half of the children 
complies with the assignment to treatment.  
Using this information, we looked at three types of definitions of GPA in our power 
analysis: 
1. fixed-effect panel regression with assignment to treatment as the treatment varia-
ble (intention-to-treat) 
2. fixed-effect panel regression with actual treatment as an instrument for the treat-
ment variable (treatment effect on the treated); 
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3. linear regression with assignment to treatment as the treatment variable and GPA 
before treatment included as a lagged variable. 
Each regression is estimated 500 times to calculate the power. Table B2 shows the 
results. The number of respondents varies from 100 to 500. The program Onder-
wijsBewijs, of which this study received a subsidy, demanded a minimum level of power 
of 75 percent. From the table we can conclude that to find an effect of 0.4 points in-
crease in GPA, a sample size of 200 children is sufficient. To find a slightly more modest 
effect of 0.3 points increase in GPA, a sample size of 300 children is needed, which is 
about 15 schools. 
Table B2. Results from power analysis to calculate number of children in the study1  
Expected increase in GPA  Number of children Model [1] Model [2] Model [3] 
0.3 points  100 0.38 0.40 0.51 
 200 0.68 0.70 0.70 
 300 0.90 0.91 0.87 
 400 0.95 0.96 0.93 
 500 0.98 0.99 0.98 
0.4 points 100 0.64 0.70 0.72 
 200 0.89 0.91 0.88 
 300 0.98 0.98 0.97 
 400 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 500 1.00 1.00 1.00 
0.5 points 100 0.79 0.83 0.85 
 200 0.99 0.99 0.97 
 300 1.00 1.00 0.99 
 400 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 500 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1Model 1: xtreg gpa treatment i.jaar, fe i(id) 
Model 2: xtivreg gpa (realtreatment=treatment) i.jaar, fe i(id) 
Model 3: reg gpa treatment gpa1 if jaar==2, cluster(school) 
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D. Assignments (in Dutch) 
Assignment 1: 
Beste leerling, 
Zoals je wellicht hebt gehoord is er momenteel veel te doen rondom het voortgezet 
onderwijs in de politiek. De huidige discussie rondom het onderwijs is deels gericht op 
de prestatieverhoging van leerlingen. Om meer duidelijkheid te scheppen in de dis-
cussie over hoe prestaties van leerlingen verhoogd kunnen worden, worden er door 
verschillende instanties onderzoeken op dit gebied uitgevoerd. De Universiteit Maas-
tricht is een van deze instanties die onderzoek uitvoert naar de prestaties van leer-
lingen. Het onderzoek waarvoor jullie medewerking wordt gevraagd probeert te 
achterhalen of de prestaties van leerlingen in het voortgezet onderwijs kunnen worden 
verhoogd door leerlingen specifieke opdrachten te laten maken.  
Wij waarderen je deelname aan dit onderzoek. 
Met vriendelijke groet, 
Eva Feron en Trudie Schils 
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Opgave 1: Het bijhouden van een studie dagboek 
Ben jij je bewust van de tijd die je besteedt aan het maken van huiswerk en het leren 
voor de verschillende vakken die je volgt? Uit een onderzoek in 2010 van Universiteit 
Maastricht blijkt dat vmbo-tl leerlingen gemiddeld 1,2 uur per dag huiswerk maken en 
havo leerlingen gemiddeld 1,7 uur. Dit naast de tijd die ze op school krijgen om aan hun 
huiswerk te werken. Planning van je schoolwerk is een belangrijk onderdeel van het op 
tijd afhebben van je huiswerk en helpt om de leerstof beter te begrijpen. Ook helpt het 
je als je leert voor een toets of proefwerk omdat je al meer van de leerstof hebt opge-
nomen en je daardoor minder snel in tijdnood komt.  
Om je bewust te worden van je studieplanning is het de bedoeling dat je in ieder geval 
de komende maanden (vanaf nu tot en met april), voor de periode dat je participeert 
aan dit onderzoek, een dagboek bijhoudt van de tijd die je besteedt aan je studie. In dit 
dagboek beschrijf je allereerst de tijd die je nodig denkt te hebben om aan al je verschil-
lende huiswerk- en studieopdrachten te voldoen per onderdeel/vak per dag. De ge-
plande tijdsbesteding per onderdeel kun je samenstellen in overleg met je ler-
aar/mentor.  
Nadat je de planning hebt ingevuld, begin je met het bijhouden van de tijd die je 
daadwerkelijk besteedt aan het maken van je huiswerk en het leren. Het is de bedoeling 
dat je iedere dag in een studiedagboek schrijft hoeveel tijd je werkelijk besteed hebt 
aan het maken van huiswerk en het leren en of je het idee hebt dat de tijd die je eraan 
gespendeerd hebt voldoende is voor de prestatie die je op school voor je 
huiswerk/toets moet leveren. 
Aan het einde van iedere maand geef je aan hoe goed je je aan je eigen studieplanning 
gehouden hebt en of je tevreden bent met het resultaat dat je behaald hebt. Deze in-
formatie is vertrouwelijk en wordt niet met je leraar/mentor besproken. Je wordt hier 
dus ook niet op beoordeeld. 
Klik dadelijk op verder en geef dan aan hoe jij je tijd het beste kan besteden.  
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Assignment 2: 
Opgave 2: Ideaal zelfbeeld 
Stel je voor dat je over een aantal jaar je diploma van de middelbare school behaalt. Je 
mentor/decaan houdt op je diploma uitreiking een korte toespraak over jou. Hij/zij 
heeft deze toespraak geschreven op basis van dingen die mensen in jouw omgeving 
over jou gezegd hebben. Dit zijn bijvoorbeeld je vrienden/vriendinnen, je familie, je 
leraren of mensen die jou kennen van de sportclub of van de muziekschool.   
Wat wil jij dat er in de toespraak komt te staan?  
Denk hierbij niet alleen aan je schoolprestaties maar vooral aan je gedrag tegenover 
andere mensen, je karakter, je persoonlijkheid, je sociale vaardigheden en je ambities 
(wat je graag zou willen bereiken in je leven).  
Het gaat er bij deze opgave dus niet om hoe je in werkelijkheid overkomt bij mensen in 
je omgeving maar over hoe jij graag wilt dat mensen om je heen jou zien en zich jou 
herinneren.  
Klik dadelijk op verder en schrijf dan deze korte toespraak zoals jij hem het liefst zou 
horen! 
Als je hiermee klaar bent beantwoord je nog twee andere vragen over dit onderwerp. 
Als laatste krijg je nog een paar vragen over de omgeving waarin je deze opgave maakt 
en nog een paar vragen over de vorige opgave.  
 
Beschrijf je ideale toespraak. 
 
 
 
 
In hoeverre denk je dat je nu al aan dit beeld voldoet? 
Geef dit aan op onderstaande schaal. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Leg uit waarom je denkt dat je dit cijfer scoort. 
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Welke dingen (waaraan je wilt dat andere mensen zich jou herinneren) wil je nog verder 
ontwikkelen? Leg ook uit waarom je dit wilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
Standaardvragen76 
Kruis het antwoord aan dat van toepassing is.  
Wie heeft je begeleid bij het maken van de opgave? 
o Leraar/lerares 
o Mentor 
Hoe heb je deze opgave gemaakt? 
o Klassikaal (tegelijkertijd met andere leerlingen) 
o Individueel (zonder andere leerlingen erbij) 
Was het duidelijk wat je bij deze opgave moest doen? 
o Ja, helemaal ++ 
o + 
o Neutraal 0 
– 
o Nee, helemaal niet – 
Reflectie eerdere opgave 
Kruis het antwoord aan dat van toepassing is.   
Eerder heb je een opgave over een studie dagboek gemaakt. Hierin heb je aangegeven 
hoe je je studie en andere bezigheden wilt plannen. 
1. Heb je je de afgelopen maand aan je studie dagboek kunnen houden? 
o Ja, helemaal ++ 
o + 
o Neutraal 0 
o – 
o Nee, helemaal niet – 
Als je bij bovenstaande vraag een van de laatste 4 antwoordmogelijkheden hebt 
gekozen ga dan verder naar vraag 2. Als je de eerste antwoordmogelijkheid hebt 
gekozen ga dan verder met vraag 3.  
 
                                                                
76 Deze standaardvragen en reflectievragen op de eerdere opgave worden in elke volgende opdracht her-
haald.  
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2. Leg uit waarom je je de afgelopen maand niet altijd aan je studie dagboek hebt 
gehouden? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Heb je door het bijhouden van het studie dagboek het idee dat je de planning van je 
schoolwerk beter in de hand hebt? 
o Ja, helemaal mee eens ++ 
o + 
o Neutraal 0 
o – 
o Nee, helemaal niet mee eens -- 
 
4. Heb je meer vertrouwen in je schoolwerk door het bijhouden van je studie dagboek? 
o Ja, helemaal mee eens ++ 
o + 
o Neutraal 0 
o – 
o Nee, helemaal niet mee eens – 
 
5. Ben je door het bijhouden van je studie dagboek minder in tijdnood gekomen met je 
huiswerk of het leren voor een toets? 
o Ja, helemaal mee eens ++ 
o + 
o Neutraal 0 
o – 
o Nee, helemaal niet mee eens – 
 
6. Heb je de opgave over het studie dagboek afgelopen maand met iemand bespro-
ken? 
o Ja 
o Nee 
Als je vraag 6 met “Ja” hebt beantwoord ga dan verder naar vraag 7.  
 
7. Met wie heb je de opgave over je eigen studie dagboek besproken? 
o Moeder 
o Vader 
o Broer/zus 
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o Vrienden/vriendinnen 
o Anderen 
 
Bedankt voor het maken van de opgave! 
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Assignment 3: 
Opgave 3: Zelfvertrouwen  
Het verhogen van je zelfvertrouwen kan ervoor zorgen dat je beter gaat presteren op 
school doordat je meer overtuigd bent van je eigen kunnen en je lekkerder in je vel zit.  
Bij deze opdracht is het belangrijk dat je dat wat je weet over zelfvertrouwen toepast en 
ontwikkelt door middel van bewustwording en zelfreflectie.  
In deze opdracht ga je kijken naar zelfvertrouwen.  
Klik dadelijk op verder en beantwoordt dan de vragen over zelfvertrouwen.   
Als laatste krijg je nog een paar vragen over de omgeving waarin je deze opgave maakt 
en nog een paar vragen over de vorige opgaven.  
 
Waar denk je aan bij zelfvertrouwen? Schrijf minimaal 3 woorden op die bij je opkomen.   
 
 
 
 
 
Ken je mensen van wie je denkt dat ze veel zelfvertrouwen hebben? (Dit kan iedereen 
zijn, beroemde mensen en mensen die jij zelf kent) 
Beschrijf minimaal een persoon. 
 
 
 
 
 
Waarom denk je dat deze mensen veel zelfvertrouwen hebben? (denk dan aan iemand 
zijn/haar gedrag, eigenschappen en kenmerken).  
Schrijf minimaal 3 dingen op. 
 
 
 
Wat denk je dat negatieve gevolgen kunnen zijn van het hebben van geen/weinig zelf-
vertrouwen?  
Beschrijf minimaal 3 gevolgen. 
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Wat denk je dat positieve gevolgen kunnen zijn van het hebben van zelfvertrouwen?  
Beschrijf minimaal 3 gevolgen. 
 
 
 
 
 
Geef op de schaal 1-10 aan welk cijfer jij geeft aan je zelfvertrouwen. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 
Leg uit waarom je jezelf dit cijfer geeft voor je zelfvertrouwen.  
 
 
 
 
 
Zou je je zelfvertrouwen verder willen ontwikkelen? Leg ook uit waarom. 
 
 
 
 
 
Hoe denk je dat je je zelfvertrouwen verder kunt ontwikkelen?  
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Assignment 4:  
Opgave 4: Talentontwikkeling  
Door je best te doen op school en een opleiding af te ronden heb je meer kans op een 
betaalde baan en is de kans op werkloosheid kleiner. Ook is de kans dat je in aanraking 
komt met criminaliteit in vergelijking met lager opgeleiden kleiner. Minder voor de hand 
liggend is misschien dat er ook een positieve relatie is tussen je opleidingsniveau en je 
gezondheid: als je een hogere opleiding hebt, weet je beter hoe je een goede gezond-
heid kunt houden, kun je ook meer gezondheidszorg betalen en wordt je ouder.  
Iedereen heeft zijn eigen talenten en vaardigheden ook als het gaat om school-
prestaties. Om het beste uit jezelf te halen is het verstandig om de dingen waar je goed 
in bent en die je leuk vindt om te doen verder te ontwikkelen. Dingen doen die je niet 
leuk vindt, houd je niet lang vol, maar toch kan het soms handig zijn ze even te doen. 
Misschien heb je soms geen zin om te leren voor een toets of om je huiswerk te maken 
maar kijk je liever naar een spannende film. Op het moment dat je deze keuze maakt is 
het verstandig om rekening te houden met je prioriteiten, de dingen die het belangrijkst 
voor je zijn, niet alleen voor vandaag maar ook voor je toekomst. 
In deze opdracht ga je kijken naar welke talenten en vaardigheden voor jou belangrijk 
zijn om je doel te verwezenlijken. 
Klik dadelijk op verder en beantwoordt dan de vragen over talentontwikkeling.   
Als laatste krijg je nog een paar vragen over de omgeving waarin je deze opgave maakt 
en nog een paar vragen over de vorige opgaven.  
Hieronder staat een lijst met vaardigheden. Lees deze vaardigheden door en ga dan 
verder met de volgende vraag.  
Lijst met vaardigheden: 
Goed met getallen  
Goed met woorden  
Creatief  
Atletisch  
Dingen voor elkaar krijgen  
Behoeftes aanvoelen  
Technisch  
Artistiek  
Luisteren  
Discussiëren 
Zelfstandig werken  
Dansen  
Beslissingen nemen  
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Dingen bouwen  
Muziek 
Anderen accepteren  
Goed in weetjes 
Voorspellen wat er zal gebeuren 
Humor 
Spreken 
Dingen onthouden 
Schrijven 
Zingen 
Samenwerken 
 
Wat zijn de belangrijkste talenten/vaardigheden die jij denkt nodig te hebben in een 
succesvolle carrière? Leg ook uit waarom.  
Beschrijf minimaal 3 talenten/vaardigheden.  
Je mag natuurlijk ook talenten/vaardigheden opschrijven die hierboven niet staan 
vermeld. 
 
 
 
 
 
In welke van deze talenten/vaardigheden ben jij goed? Leg ook uit waarom.  
Beschrijf minimaal een talent/vaardigheid.  
Je mag ook talenten/vaardigheden opschrijven die hierboven niet staan vermeld.  
 
 
 
 
 
Welke talenten/vaardigheden bewonder je in andere mensen? Leg ook uit waarom.  
Beschrijf minimaal een talent/vaardigheid.  
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Welke talenten/vaardigheden wil je graag verder ontwikkelen? Leg ook uit waarom.  
Beschrijf minimaal een talent/vaardigheid.  
 
 
 
 
 
In de vorige vraag heb je beschreven welke talenten/vaardigheden je graag verder wilt 
ontwikkelen. Hoe denk je dat je deze talenten/vaardigheden verder kunt ontwikkelen?  
(Denk hierbij aan hoe je dit kan oefenen of hoe andere mensen goed zijn geworden in 
deze talenten/vaardigheden) 
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Assignment 5:  
Opgave 5: Samenwerken  
Je zult waarschijnlijk al in veel situaties met andere mensen hebben samengewerkt. Met 
andere leerlingen op school om een project te maken, met mensen van je sportclub om 
samen een wedstrijd te spelen maar ook met je ouders en vrienden. In de toekomst zal 
je nog vaak te maken krijgen met situaties waarin je met andere mensen moet samen-
werken. Als je effectief met mensen kan samenwerken ben je in staat om samen naar 
een betere oplossing te komen, elkaar te waarderen en van elkaar te leren.  
In deze opdracht ga je kijken naar het belang van samenwerken en hoe jij je hierin nog 
zou kunnen ontwikkelen.  
Klik dadelijk op verder en beantwoordt dan de vragen over samenwerken.   
Als laatste krijg je nog een paar vragen over de omgeving waarin je deze opgave maakt 
en nog een paar vragen over de vorige opgaven.  
 
Kan je redenen bedenken waarom samenwerken belangrijk is?  Beschrijf minimaal drie 
redenen.  
 
 
 
 
Wat moet je doen om goed met anderen te kunnen samenwerken? Beschrijf minimaal 
drie dingen.  
 
 
 
 
 
Welke dingen kunnen ervoor zorgen dat mensen niet goed samenwerken? Beschrijf 
minimaal drie dingen.   
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Hoe denk je dat je deze dingen die een goede samenwerking moeilijk maken kunt op-
lossen of voorkomen? Beschrijf minimaal een manier waarop je dit kunt doen.  
 
 
 
 
 
In welke dingen die een positieve invloed hebben op samenwerken ben je goed? Be-
schrijf minimaal een ding waar jij goed in bent.  
 
 
 
 
 
In welk(e) ding(en) die een positieve invloed hebben op samenwerken zou je graag 
beter willen worden?  
 
 
 
 
 
Kan je een situatie bedenken waar samenwerken met anderen tot een goed resultaat 
heeft geleid? Wat was jouw aandeel daarin?  
 
 
 
 
 
Wat zou je de volgende keer anders doen? 
 
 
 
 
 
Kan je een situatie bedenken waar er geen goede samenwerking was? Wat was het 
gevolg daarvan? 
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Hoe zou je dit aanpakken als je het opnieuw mocht doen? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Motivation and its effect on school performance 
239 
Assignment 6:  
Opgave 6: Beslissingen maken en verantwoordelijkheid 
Om je doelen te kunnen bereiken en om te kunnen doen wat jij belangrijk vindt moet je 
verantwoordelijkheid nemen voor jezelf en in staat zijn om zelf beslissingen te kunnen 
maken.  
Om je doelen te kunnen bereiken moet je goed nadenken over hoe je dit het beste kan 
doen en welke acties hiervoor nodig zijn.  
Je staat nu op een punt in je leven waarin je belangrijke beslissingen gaat maken die 
invloed hebben op je toekomst. Wat is voor jou het belangrijkst?  
In deze opdracht ga je nadenken over dingen die echt belangrijk voor jou zijn en welke 
beslissingen jij zult moeten maken en welke verantwoordelijkheid je zelf zal moeten 
nemen om je doelen te bereiken.  
Klik dadelijk op verder en beantwoordt dan de vragen over beslissingen maken en 
verantwoordelijkheid. Als laatste krijg je nog een paar vragen over de omgeving waarin 
je deze opgave maakt en nog een paar vragen over de vorige opgaven.  
 
Zoals gezegd zijn er op dit punt in je leven veel beslissingen die je moet maken. Kan je 
een aantal positieve en negatieve beslissingen noemen die mensen van jouw leeftijd 
maken? Beschrijf minimaal drie beslissingen.  
 
 
 
 
 
Welke factoren denk je dat jouw beslissingen en de beslissingen van anderen beïnvloe-
den? Kijk hierbij vooral naar je omgeving. Beschrijf minimaal drie factoren. 
 
 
 
 
 
Welke van deze factoren hebben volgens jou een positieve invloed en welke factoren 
hebben een negatieve invloed? 
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Niet iedere beslissing is voor iedereen hetzelfde. De beslissing die je uiteindelijk maakt 
hangt af van je eigen doelen en waarden. Om je te helpen is er een stappenplan voor 
het maken van een goede beslissing: 
1. Stel vast welke beslissing je moet maken 
2. Denk na over mogelijke opties 
3. Denk na over de gevolgen van deze opties voor jezelf en anderen 
4. Kies de optie die leidt naar het beste resultaat 
5. Zet je beslissing door 
6. Evalueer het resultaat zodat je weet wat je de volgende keer het beste kan doen 
Bedenk een situatie waarin je een beslissing moet maken en neem de zes voorgestelde 
stappen door. Beschrijf iedere stap.  
Als je geen situatie kunt bedenken neem dan de volgende situatie: je hebt de mogelijk-
heid om na school wat extra geld te verdienen door een baantje aan te nemen maar de 
tijden van het baantje komen overeen met de tijden van je sportles bij je sportclub. Je 
teamgenoten van je sportclub gaan ervanuit dat je in hun team meespeelt dit seizoen. 
Wat moet je doen? 
Beschrijf iedere stap.  
 
 
 
 
 
Waarom denk je dat mensen soms beslissingen maken die schadelijk zijn voor henzelf 
en misschien ook voor anderen? Beschrijf minimaal een ding.  
 
 
 
 
 
Welke dingen kunnen de uitvoering van een goede beslissing verhinderen? Beschrijf 
minimaal een ding.  
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Wat denk je dat het maken van beslissingen te maken heeft met verantwoordelijkheid?  
 
 
 
 
 
Kan je iets bedenken op dit moment in je leven waar je verantwoordelijkheid voor kunt 
nemen (iets waarover je meer controle kunt krijgen). Beschrijf minimaal een situatie.  
 
 
 
 
 
Wat zou je kunnen doen om meer controle te krijgen in deze situatie? Beschrijf mini-
maal een ding.  
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Assignment 7:  
Opgave 7: Verwachtingspatronen 
Mensen om je heen kunnen invloed hebben op de beslissingen die je maakt en hoe je 
omgaat met bepaalde situaties. Sommige mensen zijn vatbaarder voor de mening van 
iemand anders dan anderen. Deze invloed van anderen kan positief zijn, als ze je advies 
geven en je helpen om de juiste beslissing te maken maar kan ook negatief zijn, als ze je 
hun mening opdringen en je verhinderen om de juiste beslissing te maken.  
In deze opdracht draait het om de invloed die andere mensen hebben op jouw leven. 
Wie is het belangrijkst voor je en waarom? Wat zijn de eigenschappen van mensen die 
een positieve invloed hebben op jou?  
Klik dadelijk op verder en beantwoordt dan de vragen over verwachtingspatronen.   
Als laatste krijg je nog een paar vragen over de omgeving waarin je deze opgave maakt 
en nog een paar vragen over de vorige opgaven.  
 
 
Kan je een voorbeeld bedenken van een situatie waarin iemand anders een grote in-
vloed heeft gehad op een beslissing die je genomen hebt? Beschrijf minimaal een situa-
tie.  
 
 
 
 
 
Voel je wel eens druk van anderen om bepaalde beslissingen te maken? Zo ja, hoe ga je 
daarmee om? Beschrijf minimaal een manier om om te gaan met druk van anderen.  
 
 
 
 
 
Kan je negatieve effecten van deze druk van anderen bedenken? Beschrijf minimaal een 
effect.  
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Welke mensen hebben de meeste invloed op jouw leven? Leg ook uit waarom zij in-
vloed hebben in jouw leven. Beschrijf minimaal 3 personen.  
 
 
 
 
 
Vind je dat deze mensen die je net hebt beschreven een positieve of een negatieve 
invloed hebben op jouw leven? Geef dit aan voor iedere persoon die je genoemd hebt 
in de vorige vraag. Leg ook uit waarom. 
 
 
 
 
 
Rolmodellen zijn mensen die bewonderenswaardige kwaliteiten en eigenschappen 
bezitten en deze laten zien door de keuzes die zij maken, hun gedrag en hun acties.  
Wie of wat voor type mensen beschouw jij als rolmodel? Leg ook uit waarom. Beschrijf 
minimaal een persoon.  
 
 
 
 
 
Geef commentaar op de volgende stelling: “Iedereen heeft zijn eigen toekomst in han-
den”. 
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Final questionnaire: 
Beste leerling, 
De komende tijd werk je mee aan de ontwikkeling van een onderzoek waaraan jouw 
school meewerkt. Zoals je wellicht hebt gehoord is er momenteel veel te doen rondom 
het middelbaar onderwijs in de politiek. De huidige discussie rondom het onderwijs is 
deels gericht op de prestatieverhoging van leerlingen. Om meer duidelijkheid te schep-
pen in de discussie over hoe prestaties van leerlingen verhoogd kunnen worden, 
worden er door verschillende instanties onderzoeken op dit gebied uitgevoerd. De Uni-
versiteit Maastricht is een van deze instanties die onderzoek uitvoert naar de prestaties 
van leerlingen. Naast deze vragenlijst doe je later ook mee aan een aantal opdrachten, 
zodat we kunnen achterhalen of de prestaties van leerlingen in het middelbaar onder-
wijs kunnen worden verhoogd door leerlingen te laten deelnemen aan specifieke op-
drachten. Daarmee kunnen we je school belangrijke informatie geven hoe ze het doen 
in vergelijking met andere scholen en hoe ze dingen anders kunnen doen.  
In deze vragenlijst kom je een heleboel verschillende soorten vragen tegen. Denk niet te 
lang, maar geef het antwoord dat bij je opkomt. Als je ergens geen antwoord op wil 
geven, of iets niet weet, dan sla je het gewoon over.  
Dank je wel voor je medewerking  
 
 
Wie ben je?  
Voornaam   _________________________________________________ 
Achternaam  _________________________________________________ 
E-mailadres   _________________________________________________ 
Geboortedatum  _________________________________________________ 
Geslacht   _________________________________________________ 
Postcode & Plaats _________________________________________________  
School   _________________________________________________ 
Klas   _________________________________________________ 
Studie   _________________________________________________ 
Profiel/sector  _________________________________________________ 
Vakken   _________________________________________________  
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Huiswerk  
Hoeveel uur (hele of halve) besteed je ongeveer aan het maken van huiswerk, zowel 
door de week als in het weekend? 
 Aantal uren 
Op een doordeweekse dag, op school ... 
  Hoeveel uur daarvan heb je huiswerk gemaakt tijdens een gewoon lesuur? ... 
  Hoeveel uur daarvan heb je huiswerk gemaakt tijdens een tussenuur of studieuur? ... 
  Hoeveel uur daarvan heb je daarbij huiswerkbegeleiding? (van mentoren of dergelijke) ... 
Op een doordeweekse dag, thuis na school ... 
  Hoeveel uur daarvan maak je dat huiswerk alleen? ... 
  Hoeveel uur daarvan maak je dat huiswerk samen met vriendjes? ... 
  Hoeveel uur daarvan heb je daarbij huiswerkbegeleiding? (van ouders of externe     
  huiswerkbegeleiders) 
... 
In het weekend ... 
 
Lesindeling op school 
Denk eens terug aan de afgelopen week, hoeveel lesuren had je? 
 Aantal uren 
Gewone volledige lesuren (van 50 minuten) ... 
Ingeroosterde tussenuren of studie uren ... 
Uitgevallen lessen ... 
 
Spijbelen 
Hoe vaak heb je dit schooljaar gespijbeld? 
 Nooit 
 Een enkele keer 
 Elke maand wel een keer 
 Elke week wel een keer 
 Elke week wel meerdere keren 
 
Hoe soepel zijn ze bij jou op school als je spijbelt? 
 Heel soepel 
 Vrij soepel 
 Weet ik niet 
 Vrij streng 
 Heel streng 
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Alleen voor degenen die ja hebben geantwoord op de eerste vraag onder het kopje spij-
belen: 
Als je spijbelt, hoe lang is dit dan meestal? 
 Ik spijbel nooit 
 Een lesuur 
 Een halve dag 
 Een hele dag 
 
Hoe reageren je ouders als ze (zouden) weten dat je spijbelt? 
 Heel soepel 
 Vrij soepel 
 Weet ik niet 
 Vrij streng 
 Heel streng 
 
Motivatie om te leren 
Wat denk je dat er de komende jaren met je zal gebeuren? 
 Gebeurt 
zeker niet 
-- 
- Neutraal 
0 
 
+ 
Gebeurt 
zeker 
++ 
Ik stop met deze school zonder hem af te maken      
Ik ga nog heel gemotiveerd doorleren      
Zodra het kan, stop ik met leren      
Ik ga interessante dingen leren      
Ik ga een vak leren, maar buiten school      
Ik ga nog doorleren omdat ik het leuk vind      
Zodra ik een baan kan krijgen, stop ik met school      
Ik ga nog heel lang doorleren      
 
Zelfbeoordeling 
Hoe goed ben jij in onderstaande activiteiten? Geef  jezelf een rapportcijfer (2 = dikke 
onvoldoende, 4 = onvoldoende, 6 = voldoende, 8 = goed, 10 = uitmuntend) 
 Cijfer 
Eigen mening geven ... 
Winnen bij een ruzie ... 
Mijn zin doordrijven ... 
De baas spelen over anderen ... 
Discussiëren ... 
Iemand troosten ... 
Luisteren naar iemand die het moeilijk heeft ... 
Leuke kleren uitzoeken en er leuk uitzien ... 
Omgaan met andere leerlingen ... 
Tekenen, schilderen of muziek maken ... 
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Iets op de computer opzoeken ... 
Hoofdrekenen ... 
Schrijven zonder fouten ... 
Het nieuws volgen ... 
Je concentreren ... 
Chatten  / Msn-en op de computer ... 
What’s appen / pingen / chatten op de mobiele telefoon ... 
Het programma Word ... 
Het programma Excel ... 
Internetten voor school ... 
Internetten voor de lol ... 
Computerspelletjes ... 
Voorkomen dat ik ruzie krijg met anderen ... 
Er goed tegen kunnen als ik geplaagd wordt ... 
Goed overweg kunnen met mijn klasgenoten ... 
Zorgen dat het leuk blijft op school ... 
Zorgen dat het leuk is thuis ... 
 
Schoolwelbevinden 
Ben je het met de volgende stellingen eens? 
 Helemaal 
niet mee 
eens 
-- 
- Neutraal 
0 
+ Helemaal 
mee eens 
++ 
Ik vind het leuk op deze school      
Als ik hulp van de leraar wil, krijg ik die ook      
Sommige kinderen pesten mij      
In de klas voel ik mij soms alleen      
De leraren doen erg hun best voor mij      
Ik ga graag naar deze school      
Ik heb hier veel vriend(inn)en      
De leraren vinden mij aardig      
De leraren vinden mij slim      
Ik heb een hekel aan deze school      
Ik verveel me op deze school      
De kinderen hier vinden mij aardig      
In de klas voel ik dat ik erbij hoor      
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Vertrouwen in de toekomst 
Hoe groot denk je dat de kans is dat je een diploma haalt op de volgende opleidingen? 
 Heel klein Klein Redelijk Groot Heel groot 
Huidige opleiding      
MBO – tweejarig (basiskwalificatie)      
MBO – volledig      
HBO / Hogeschool      
WO / Universiteit      
 
Karakter  - Big 5  
[Stellingen moeten nog door elkaar worden gehusseld] 
Ben je het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
 Helemaal niet 
mee eens 
-- 
- Neutraal 
0 
 
+ 
Helemaal 
mee eens 
++ 
Ik gebruik vaak moeilijke woorden      
Ik barst van de ideeën      
Ik pik snel nieuwe dingen op      
Ik heb weinig fantasie      
Ik heb een grote woordenschat      
      
Ik doe klusjes meteen      
Ik laat mijn spullen vaak slingeren      
Ik hou me altijd aan mijn afspraken      
Ik vergeet soms dat ik iets moet doen      
Ik ben nauwkeurig in mijn werk      
      
Ik praat veel      
Ik ben stil in een groep met vreemden      
Ik ben de gangmaker op feestjes      
Ik vind het leuk om met veel mensen te zijn      
      
Ik probeer mensen te helpen      
Ik ben geïnteresseerd in anderen      
Ik leef mee met anderen      
Ik ben vriendelijk      
      
Ik raak makkelijk van streek      
Ik ben snel gestresst      
Ik heb vaak een wisselend humeur      
Ik heb regelmatig een somber humeur      
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Karakter – doorzettingsvermogen en prestatiegerichtheid 
[Stellingen moeten nog door elkaar worden gehusseld] 
Ben je het eens met de volgende stellingen? 
 Helemaal 
niet mee 
eens 
-- 
- Neutraal 
0 
 
+ 
Helemaal 
mee eens 
++ 
Ik wil graag hoge punten halen      
Ik wil later goed zijn in mijn beroep      
Je best doen is belangrijk voor mij      
Succes wordt veel te belangrijk gemaakt      
      
Als ik aan iets begin, maak ik het ook af      
Ik stop als iets te moeilijk wordt      
Als iets tegenvalt, verlies ik snel de moed      
Ik ga door tot het gelukt is      
 
Tijd besteed aan naschoolse activiteiten 
Hoeveel uur besteed je gemiddeld per week aan de volgende activiteiten buiten school 
en huiswerk? 
 Minder 
dan een 
half uur 
Half uur - 
uur 
1-2 uur 2-4 uur 4-6 uur Meer dan 
6 uur 
Sporten       
Muziek maken       
Andere vereniging/club       
Tijd met vrienden doorbrengen       
Lezen (geen schoolboeken)       
Sociale media       
Gamen       
Bezoek museum / tentoonstelling       
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E. Pilot study 
Pilot study 
We conducted a pilot study before the start of the actual experiment. The pilot is in-
tended to test various aspects of the intervention such as the child selection method, 
the appropriateness of the tasks and the feasibility of the intervention in schools. In 
addition, the pilot reduces the possibility of unforeseen events during the actual exper-
iment. The pilot study was held at two schools that both offer the two tracks that this 
study aims at. For randomization of treatment in the pilot phase we use a cross-over 
design, where both schools are allocated a treatment as well as a control group. One 
school offers the treatment group in the lower track and control group in the higher 
track and vice versa. On the one hand, the advantage of the cross-over design is that 
schools always have a group of children that participates as a treatment group which 
enhances the participation probability of the school. On the other hand, there might be 
a concern that due to the cross-over design there might be spill-over effects from the 
treatment to the control group. We believe that this latter effect is unlikely to happen in 
our case as the schools have separate locations for the two tracks and the children have 
different teachers.  
To determine the group of children that is flagged as underachieving and is eligible 
for treatment we use the two-step approach mentioned earlier: (1) a comparison of the 
test scores in 6th grade and in 9th grade, and (2) evaluation of this group by mentors and 
teachers. In deviation of the 9th grade test described earlier, for the pilot we use an 
alternative test that is provided to us by the institute ’Cohort Onderzoek Onderwijs 
Loopbanen’ (COOL) as the test we use in the actual experiment is not available in the 
pilot year. The alternative test we use for the pilot is very similar to the test we use for 
the actual intervention, it partly includes the same questions. In general, the teachers 
agreed with the children that were selected based on their diverging test scores be-
tween 6th and 9th grade and they only added additional information as to why some 
children had temporary lower school performance. For example, children might have 
been sick or there might have been some difficult home situations (e.g. parents got 
divorced). In a few instances teachers added a child of whom they thought the child 
should be able to perform better in school. This gives us confidence that our measure 
for the selection of underachieving children is valid.  
At the end of the pilot phase two feedback rounds were organized. One feedback 
round focused on the discussion with the children that participated in the pilot and the 
other feedback round focused on the discussion with the mentors and teachers in-
volved in the pilot. Overall, the pilot proved to be very useful for the actual experiment. 
First, we learned that designing an experiment in cooperation with schools results in a 
better understanding of the experimental design by schools and creates more willing-
ness for schools and teachers to participate in the experiment. In addition, when 
schools and teachers understand the benefit of an experiment they are better able to 
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translate this to their children. Second, intensive communication with schools is crucial 
for the proper execution of the experiment. This has an effect both on the logistic feasi-
bility of the experiment but also on the accuracy of the effect measurement. Third, we 
established that our method for child selection was very similar to the teacher evalua-
tion. Finally, the pilot contributed to the creation of the tasks that are used in the exper-
iment. Parts of the content as well as the language used in the tasks was adjusted based 
on the feedback we received. To ensure that the tasks were suitable for the target 
group they were adjusted by a child in secondary school as part of a school assignment. 
This child was in 11th grade in the pre-university track. 
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Motivatie 
In elk stadium van zijn onderwijsloopbaan ontwikkelt een leerling zijn talenten en com-
petenties, ontdekt hij waar zijn interesses liggen, en leert hij kennis en vaardigheden die 
nodig zijn voor de volgende stap in die loopbaan, zoals een vervolgopleiding. Leerlingen, 
en de samenleving in het algemeen, profiteren het meest als hun potentieel ten volste 
wordt benut en ze soepel door het onderwijssysteem bewegen. Investeringen in hun 
menselijk kapitaal zijn dan meest optimaal. Een soepele overgang tussen de verschillen-
de onderwijssectoren is daarbij van groot belang. Een soepele overgang betekent dat 
verwachtingen over het potentieel van de leerling helder moeten zijn zodat een goede 
keuze voor onderwijsniveau of studierichting gemaakt kan worden. Dit vermindert risi-
co’s als zittenblijven, afstroom, wisselen van studie, of voortijdig schoolverlaten. Ook 
draagt het bij aan goed opgeleide beroepsbevolking waardoor het verdienvermogen 
van de Nederlandse economie toeneemt en sociale problemen afnemen. Studievertra-
gingen, -wisselingen en uitval zijn inefficiënt en kostbaar.  
Eén van de vroege overgangen in de onderwijsloopbaan is de overgang van het 
primair naar het voortgezet onderwijs. Deze overgang heeft een belangrijke invloed op 
latere uitkomsten (zoals welk type baan) omdat er belangrijke keuzes gemaakt worden. 
In het voortgezet onderwijs worden leerlingen in Nederland ingedeeld op verschillende 
onderwijsniveaus. In een internationale vergelijking wordt het Nederlandse onderwijs-
systeem hiermee gekenmerkt door een vroege selectie van leerlingen naar verschillen-
de onderwijsniveaus. De keuze voor het onderwijsniveau, die op twaalfjarige leeftijd 
wordt gemaakt, heeft belangrijke consequenties voor de toekomstige schoolcarrière 
(Hanushek en Woessmann, 2006; Onderwijsinspectie, 2014; Timmermans et al., 2013). 
Er moet een keuze worden gemaakt voor schooltype (meer praktisch of meer theo-
retisch onderwijs) en het niveau van dat onderwijs (voorbereidend middelbaar beroep-
sonderwijs, hoger algemeen voortgezet onderwijs of voorbereidend wetenschappelijk 
onderwijs). Deze keuze is daarmee een belangrijke determinant voor de verdere 
schoolcarrière in het voortgezet onderwijs, maar ook voor het vervolgonderwijs en de 
arbeidsmarktpositie na het voortgezet onderwijs. De overgang van primair naar 
voortgezet onderwijs verloopt niet altijd soepel. Het komt regelmatig voor dat leer-
lingen in het voortgezet onderwijs de verwachtingen vanuit het advies van de ba-
sisschool niet inlossen. Soms is dat terug te voeren op een gebrek aan hun vermogen 
om zich aan te passen aan de nieuwe omgeving, soms zijn de verwachtingen vanuit het 
advies van de basisschool niet terecht.  
Om een goede keuze voor het voortgezet onderwijs te maken, zijn instrumenten 
voor het meten van de capaciteiten van leerlingen nodig. In het Nederlandse onderwijs-
systeem worden hiervoor twee instrumenten gebruikt: het schooladvies van de ba-
sisschool en de score op een gestandaardiseerde toets aan het einde van de basisschool 
– meestal de Citotoets. Beide instrumenten schatten de capaciteiten van leerlingen op 
basis van deels gelijke, maar ook deels verschillende informatiebronnen. Een leerkracht 
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baseert zijn oordeel over de capaciteiten van een leerling bijvoorbeeld op meer alge-
mene en eerdere prestaties van de leerling, het gedrag in de klas, achtergrondken-
merken zoals een thuissituatie, persoonskenmerken en overige eigenschappen die hij 
observeert. De score op de toets meet hoe de leerling presteert op een cognitieve test 
die specifieke vaardigheden op het terrein van bijvoorbeeld wiskunde of taal in beeld 
brengt. Beide instrumenten kunnen tot andere voorspellingen komen en het is niet 
duidelijk welk instrument een betere voorspeller is voor de latere leerprestaties van de 
leerling.  
Recent is er een belangrijke beleidswijziging in Nederland geweest die betrekking 
heeft op het gebruik van deze instrumenten bij de overgang van primair naar 
voortgezet onderwijs. Met deze wijziging, die in schooljaar 2014-2015 is doorgevoerd, 
krijgt het schooladvies dat de leerkracht geeft aan het einde van de basisschool een 
meer prominente rol toebedeeld als instrument in de bepaling van een passend 
schooltype en onderwijsniveau van leerlingen. Hiermee krijgt de score op de 
gestandaardiseerde toets wat minder nadruk. Deze ontwikkelingen zijn aanleiding voor 
wetenschappelijke onderzoeksvragen die ook beleidsmatig belangrijke informatie 
opleveren over de effecten van deze beleidsmaatregel en de inrichting van de overgang 
van het primair naar het voortgezet onderwijs. 
Wanneer gekeken wordt naar de resultaten van Nederlandse leerlingen en volwas-
senen op internationale toetsen, zoals het Program of International Student Assessment 
(PISA) en de Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), wordt ons onderwijssysteem dikwijls 
beschouwd als een van de best presterende onderwijssystemen in de landen die be-
horen tot de OESO. De resultaten van PISA 2012 laten bijvoorbeeld zien dat van de 65 
participerende landen, Nederland op nummer 10 staat bij wiskunde, op nummer 15 bij 
leesvaardigheid en op nummer 14 bij wetenschappelijke vaardigheden (OESO, 2016). 
Ondanks deze relatief hoge plek in termen van gemiddelde uitkomsten, is er een 
groeiende bezorgdheid onder beleidsmakers en toezichthouders over ongelijke kansen 
in het onderwijs en een toenemende rigiditeit in de plaatsing van leerlingen in een 
onderwijssysteem dat wordt gekenmerkt door vroege selectie (OESO, 2012; OESO, 
2016; Onderwijsinspectie, 2016). 
De Onderwijsinspectie stelt in de jaarlijkse evaluatie van het Nederlandse onderwijs-
systeem dat de verschillen in onderwijskansen tussen leerlingen van ouders met 
verschillende opleidingsniveaus toenemen. Het opleidingsniveau van ouders blijkt voor-
al een belangrijke voorspeller van schooladvies, toetsscore en plaatsing in het eerste 
jaar van  het voortgezet onderwijs. Daarnaast is er volgens de OESO (2016, p.40) “een 
spanning tussen het centrale principe van vroege selectie, waarbij leerlingen met 
bepaalde cognitieve vaardigheden het beste passen bij een bepaald schooltype en de 
vrijheid van de school waarbij plaatsing afhangt van het schooladvies en scores op cog-
nitieve toetsen die op een variabele basis geïnterpreteerd worden.” Er zijn geen for-
mele richtlijnen voor het tot stand komen van het schooladvies of plaatsing. Het is ge-
baseerd op variabele criteria, zoals een verschillend gebruik van toetsscores tussen 
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scholen om het schooladvies vast te stellen. Daarnaast mogen scholen in Nederland 
leerlingen selecteren en staat het ze vrij om additionele vormen van selectie toe te 
passen (OESO, 2016; Korpershoek et al., 2016; Onderwijsinspectie, 2013). De Onder-
wijsraad (2010 en 2014) en de OESO (2012) hebben gesteld dat onderwijssystemen die 
gebruik maken van vroege selectie flexibiliteit moeten garanderen zodat leerlingen 
additionele mogelijkheden hebben als er zich veranderingen in hun prestaties voor-
doen. Toch bestaat de indruk dat deze mogelijkheden afnemen, omdat de ruimte voor 
brede brugklassen en het stapelen van diploma’s steeds kleiner wordt.  
Een andere uitdaging voor het Nederlandse onderwijssysteem is onderpresteren van 
leerlingen en een gebrek aan motivatie enkele jaren nadat ze de overgang naar de mid-
delbare school hebben gemaakt. Volgens de OESO (2016) en de Onderwijsraad (2007) is 
de motivatie van Nederlandse leerlingen in het voortgezet onderwijs laag en zijn er, 
gegeven de over het algemeen hoge standaarden, weinig toppresteerders. Daarnaast is 
uit gesprekken met leraren op middelbare scholen naar voren gekomen dat veel leer-
lingen vanaf ongeveer de derde klas in het voortgezet onderwijs nog maar moeizaam 
tot presteren aan te zetten zijn, met name op het vmbo en havo. De leraren ervaren 
een gebrek aan motivatie en schoolhouding bij de leerlingen en geven aan dat de leer-
lingen niet naar hun kunnen presteren. Wanneer leerlingen onderpresteren is de accu-
mulatie van menselijk kapitaal niet optimaal. Deze leerlingen zouden meer kunnen 
leren, misschien zelfs een diploma kunnen behalen op een hoger niveau en betere 
vooruitzichten op de arbeidsmarkt kunnen hebben als ze op het verwachte niveau 
zouden presteren.  
In een onderwijssysteem dat gebruik maakt van vroege selectie is het belangrijk om 
te begrijpen wat de determinanten van plaatsing zijn en wat de relatie is met de ver-
dere schoolcarrière van leerlingen. Het Nederlandse onderwijssysteem biedt de mo-
gelijkheid om te onderzoeken wat de relatie is tussen het schooladvies, de toetsscore, 
plaatsing, het wisselen van onderwijsniveau op de middelbare school en andere maten 
van prestaties, zoals cijfers en motivatie. De relaties die in deze dissertatie worden 
onderzocht zijn gebaseerd op Nederlandse data, maar de resultaten van het onderzoek 
zijn van universeel belang om te begrijpen hoe het samenspel tussen het schooladvies 
van de leerkracht, de toetsscore en de prestaties van leerlingen in het voortgezet 
onderwijs kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd.  
Doel 
De vier studies in dit proefschrift geven inzicht in het belang van instrumenten voor het 
meten van de capaciteiten van leerlingen bij de overgang van het primair naar het 
voortgezet onderwijs. Vier onderwerpen vertegenwoordigen de kern van dit proef-
schrift: toetsen, het schooladvies van de leraar, plaatsing op verschillende onderwijsni-
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veaus en motivatie. Met een viertal studies beantwoordt dit proefschrift de volgende 
vragen: 
1.  Hoe zijn toetsscores en schooladvies van de leerkracht aan het einde van de ba-
sisschool gerelateerd aan plaatsing en opstroom of afstroom in de eerste drie jaar 
van het voortgezet onderwijs? 
2.  Hoe passen leerkrachten hun oorspronkelijke beoordeling van de capaciteiten van 
leerlingen aan na het ontvangen van informatie over toetsscores? 
3.  Wat gebeurt er met meetinstrumenten van het vermogen van leerlingen wanneer 
een beleidswijziging het belang van toetsscores vermindert? 
4.  Wat is het effect op de motivatie en schoolprestaties van onderpresterende leer-
lingen van een interventie gericht op hun niet-cognitieve vaardigheden? 
Samenvatting van de resultaten 
In het eerste inhoudelijke hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 3) wordt onder-
zocht in hoeverre het schooladvies aanvullende informatie bevat bovenop de informatie 
uit de toetsscore aan het einde van de basisschool en hoe dit gerelateerd is aan op-
stroom en afstroom in de eerste jaren van de middelbare school. De toetsscore wordt 
gebruikt voor het bepalen van de capaciteiten van leerlingen in groep 8 en 3VO. Eerst 
wordt onderzocht of er niet-willekeurige verschillen zijn tussen toetsscore en schoolad-
vies op leerlingniveau. Vervolgens wordt onderzocht in hoeverre de toetsscore of het 
schooladvies van de leraar de plaatsing van leerlingen in 1VO en positie in 3VO voor-
spelt. Tot slot wordt onderzocht of leerlingen die wisselen van niveau (tussen 1VO en 
3VO) zijn geplaatst volgens de toetsscore of volgens het schooladvies van de leraar. De 
belangrijkste bevindingen kunnen als volgt worden samengevat. Ten eerste, voor 19 
procent van de leerlingen bestaat er een substantieel verschil tussen de verschillende 
beoordelingsinstrumenten in groep 8. Het is waarschijnlijker dat meisjes een schoolad-
vies ontvangen dat hoger is dan hun toetsscore dan jongens en het is minder waar-
schijnlijk dat leerlingen met een lagere sociaal-economische achtergrond een schoolad-
vies ontvangen dat hoger is dan de toetsscore in vergelijking met leerlingen met een 
hogere sociaal-economische achtergrond. Ten tweede, blijkt het schooladvies twee keer 
zo goed in het verklaren van het verschil tussen de laagste en de hoogste plaatsing in 
vergelijking met de toetsscore. Dit is het geval in zowel 1VO als 3VO. Ten derde blijken 
leerlingen die geplaatst zijn op basis van het schooladvies minder vaak van schoolniveau 
te wisselen dan leerlingen die geplaatst zijn op basis van de toetsscore. Ten slotte blijkt 
het schooladvies positief gecorreleerd met de toetsscore in 3VO, terwijl de toetsscore in 
groep 8 niet gecorreleerd is met deze toets. Het wisselen van schoolniveaus tussen 1VO 
en 3VO lijkt een negatief effect te hebben op de toetsscore in 3VO wat een indicatie is 
van het bestaan van kosten van wisselen.   
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Hoofdstuk 4 bouwt voort op de analyses in hoofdstuk 3 door te laten zien hoe 
leerkrachten gebruik maken van de informatie die toetsscores geven om daarmee hun 
eerdere oordeel over de capaciteiten van leerlingen aan te passen. Dit onderzoek maakt 
gebruik van informatie over het oorspronkelijke schooladvies, toetsscores en het 
uiteindelijke schooladvies, in deze volgorde. Eerst wordt bepaald welke factoren van 
invloed zijn op het uiteindelijke schooladvies. In een volgende stap wordt onderzocht 
wat de effectgrootte is van het hebben van een andere toetsscore in vergelijking met 
het oorspronkelijke schooladvies op het uiteindelijke schooladvies. Tot slot wordt 
onderzocht of de aanpassing van de leraar verschilt met het geslacht of sociaal-
economische achtergrond van leerlingen. Twee belangrijke bevindingen komen uit de 
analyses naar voren. Ten eerste laten de schattingen zien dat leraren hun oorspron-
kelijke schooladvies gemiddeld met 19 procent van een standaarddeviatie aanpassen na 
het observeren van de toetsscore. Ten tweede, verschilt deze aanpassing naar geslacht 
en sociaal-economische achtergrond van de leerlingen. De aanpassingen zijn minder 
gunstig voor meisjes en leerlingen met een lagere sociaal-economische achtergrond. 
Zelfs wanneer leraren een rijke set aan achtergrondvariabelen meenemen in hun 
beoordeling is er een significant effect van de toetsscore in groep 8 als het gaat om het 
bepalen van de capaciteiten van leerlingen.  
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt onderzocht of een verandering in prikkels de manier verandert 
waarop leerkrachten de beschikbare informatie meenemen in hun schooladvies. Vanaf 
het schooljaar 2014-2015 maken leerlingen de toets nadat de leerkracht zijn schoolad-
vies heeft gegeven (in plaats van ervoor) en is het schooladvies de relevante maat voor 
de plaatsing van leerlingen in het voortgezet onderwijs. Het effect van deze wijziging is 
in drie stappen onderzocht. Ten eerste zijn het oorspronkelijke schooladvies, de 
toetsscore en het uiteindelijke schooladvies voor en na de beleidswijziging geob-
serveerd en wordt onderzocht of er veranderingen optreden. Ten tweede zijn de re-
sultaten opgesplitst naar geslacht en het opleidingsniveau van de moeder en de vader 
en wordt er geobserveerd of er verschillen bestaan tussen het geslacht en het 
opleidingsniveau van de ouders. Ten derde is onderzocht of leraren gebruik gaan maken 
van eerdere toetsscores als input voor hun schooladvies nu ze de toetsscore in groep 8 
niet tot hun beschikking hebben op het moment van advisering. Er is onderzocht of er 
een stijging in de voorspellende waarde van de toetsscore in groep 7 is voor het 
schooladvies. De resultaten wijzen er op dat er gemiddeld genomen geen verschil lijkt 
te zijn in de toetsscore. Echter, het oorspronkelijke en het uiteindelijke schooladvies zijn 
meer op elkaar gaan lijken na de beleidswijziging en het uiteindelijke schooladvies lijkt 
gemiddeld significant lager uit te komen. Het tweede resultaat van deze analyse is dat 
na de beleidswijziging meisjes significant hoger lijken te scoren op de toets, terwijl 
jongens significant lager lijken te scoren. Leerlingen van wie de ouders een hoger 
onderwijsniveau hebben afgerond lijken een hoger oorspronkelijk en daadwerkelijk 
schooladvies te ontvangen in vergelijking met leerlingen van wie de ouders alleen een 
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lager onderwijsniveau hebben afgerond. Ten slotte lijken leraren meer nadruk te leggen 
op de toetsscores in groep 7 als input voor hun schooladvies na de beleidswijziging.  
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt het effect van een interventie gericht op de niet-cognitieve 
vaardigheden en op de motivatie en schoolprestaties van onderpresterende leerlingen 
onderzocht. Onderpresteren staat in veel landen in de belangstelling, omdat onderpres-
teren leidt tot suboptimale investeringen in menselijk kapitaal. Er is een gerandomi-
seerd veldexperiment opgezet en uitgevoerd, waarbij onderpresterende leerlingen 
maandelijks opdrachten kregen die gericht waren op (a) hun studievaardigheden door 
bewustwording op het gebied van zelfdiscipline, kritisch denken, besluitvorming en 
probleemoplossing; en (b) schoolmotivatie en toekomstgerichtheid door het verhogen 
van het bewustzijn van het nut van de prestaties op school en het behalen van een 
diploma. Het programma confronteert leerlingen met hun studiegedrag en hun school-
houding. Uitkomstmaten van dit onderzoek zijn voortzetting van deelname aan de in-
terventie en de gemiddelde rapportcijfers van leerlingen. Aangezien de leerlingen in de 
doelgroep zijn geselecteerd omdat ze lager presteren dan verwacht, valt te verwachten 
dat deze leerlingen een grotere kans hebben om uit te vallen omdat hun motivatie om 
te starten met de interventie en deze af te ronden waarschijnlijk lager is in vergelijking 
met andere leerlingen. De schattingen laten zien dat leerlingen met lagere gemiddelde 
rapportcijfers en leerlingen met een hogere (zelf gerapporteerde) motivatie vaker door-
gaan met de interventie. Uit het onderzoek komt niet naar voren dat er een effect van 
de interventie bestaat op de motivatie of het gemiddelde rapportcijfer van leerlingen.  
Implicaties    
De bevindingen in dit proefschrift hebben implicaties voor verschillende partijen. Bij de 
keuze voor een schooltype en onderwijsniveau in het voortgezet onderwijs, zijn leer-
lingen en ouders bijvoorbeeld gebaat bij een realistische inschatting in de capaciteiten 
van de leerling. De toetsscore geldt als een objectief instrument hiervoor, maar de re-
sultaten laten zien dat de inschatting van de leraar een betere voorspeller is voor de 
capaciteiten van de leerling. Dit komt omdat ook andere vaardigheden, zoals persoon-
seigenschappen, nodig zijn om goed te presteren op de middelbare school. Tegelijker-
tijd laten de studies zien dat de leraar een neiging kan hebben om enkele achtergrond-
kenmerken sterker mee te wegen in zijn schooladvies, zoals sociaal-econonomische 
achtergrond. Hoewel het alloceren van leerlingen in onderwijsniveaus op basis van het 
schooladvies efficiënter lijkt te zijn omdat dit  kan lijden tot meer investeringen in men-
selijk kapitaal, is er tegelijkertijd een afruil met betrekking tot de gelijke kansen die het 
onderwijs biedt.  
De onderzoeksresultaten geven ook inzicht in het beoordelingsproces door leraren. 
De leerkracht neemt bij de beoordeling van de leerling andere informatie (bijvoorbeeld 
geobserveerd gedrag van de leerling) mee, maar ook dezelfde informatie (bijvoorbeeld 
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cognitieve prestaties leerling) die hij op een andere manier weegt in zijn oordeel in 
vergelijking met de toets. Het gegeven dat de leerkracht bij het verkrijgen van nieuwe 
informatie uit een toets, een aanpassing doet aan het schooladvies dat ongelijk is voor 
verschillende groepen is een belangrijke input voor bewustwording bij leraren. De 
verschillen kunnen het gevolg zijn van een realistische inschatting op basis van de nieu-
we gegevens of door stereotypering.  
De studies geven ook inzicht in het selectie- en toewijzingsproces in schooltype en 
onderwijsniveau bij de overgang van primair naar voortgezet onderwijs. Scholen krijgen 
inzicht in de mogelijke consequenties van hun eigen beleid en keuzes die worden ge-
maakt aan het begin van de educatieve carrière van leerlingen. Basisscholen krijgen 
informatie over hoe goed ze in staat zijn hun leerlingen te determineren en middelbare 
scholen krijgen inzicht in of hun leerlingen van onderwijsniveau wisselen gedurende hun 
middelbare schoolcarrière ten opzichte van het advies en de plaatsing in de eerste klas. 
De maatschappij krijgt inzicht in de determinanten die kunnen resulteren in een opti-
malere investering in menselijk kapitaal en de gevolgen die dit mogelijk heeft voor 
gelijke onderwijskansen. 
Tot slot laat het veldexperiment zien hoe moeilijk het kan zijn om onderpresterende 
leerlingen te benaderen met een schoolinterventie. Juist deze leerlingen zouden kun-
nen profiteren van interventies gericht op het verbeteren van hun motivatie en leer-
prestaties. Omdat ze echter niet gemotiveerd zijn om goed te presteren op school, zijn 
ze ook minder geneigd om met succes deel te nemen aan dit soort beleidsinterventies. 
De studie toont ook het belang aan van schoolondersteuning voor dit soort program-
ma’s. De ondersteuning door de mentor in de klas is cruciaal voor gecontinueerde 
deelname van de leerlingen aan de interventie. Interessant is ook dat deze interventie 
in samenwerking met scholen tot stand is gekomen, toch is zelfs dan participatie van 
leerkrachten niet gegarandeerd.  
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The transition from primary to secondary education 
A good transition between the different stages of education contributes to an optimal 
development of children’s human capital. Children as well as society in general benefit 
when investments in education are optimized and when all children use their potential 
to the fullest and smoothly move through the education system. This is likely to reduce 
retention rates, mismatches in study choices and on the labour market, and early school 
dropout rates. Switches and early dropout in children’s educational career are ineffi-
cient and expensive. Therefore, in general, the decisions made regarding children’s 
transition from primary to secondary education are high stakes for all parties involved.  
In many countries, such as in the Netherlands, the transition from primary to sec-
ondary education is an important educational decision because children are placed into 
tracks based on their performance and expected ability. School tracks include both the 
type (more practical vs. more theoretical) and the level of education (vocational, gen-
eral or academic). The educational track to which children are allocated to has im-
portant consequences for their future schooling career (Hanushek and Woessmann, 
2006; Inspectorate of Education, 2014; Timmermans et al., 2013). The educational track 
in secondary education is a determinant for future school education as well as for la-
bour market possibilities.  
In addition, in the Netherlands, the decision is made at a rather early age, i.e. the 
age of 12. In an education system that uses early tracking it is essential to understand 
the determinants of track placement and their relation to children’s further school ca-
reer. The Dutch education system, offers an opportunity to investigate the relation 
between the teacher’s assessment, the test score, track placement, track switching, and 
other measures of performance such as grades and motivation. These topics are at the 
core of this dissertation. 
Relation between research, schools and policy77 
The data that is used in this dissertation is collected as part of a project called Edu-
catieve Agenda Limburg. This project is a collaboration between Maastricht University, 
school boards (primary, secondary and tertiary) and government bodies in Limburg (a 
province in the South of the Netherlands). The goal of this project is to improve educa-
tion by means of increased networks for dialogue, innovative studies, monitoring and 
research. An important instrument for this is extensive data collection in the Onder-
wijsMonitor Limburg (OML). The OML aims to gain insight into the educational devel-
                                                                
77 The OnderwijsMonitor Limburg, 2018, De educatieve agenda Limburg. http://educatieveagendalimburg.nl/ 
onderwijsmonitor-p/english 
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opment of children in order to pursue the further improvement of education and to 
acquire knowledge about the dynamics of educational processes in general.  
The starting point of the OML is information which is already collected within 
schools. Additional testing and surveying is done where needed, in close collaboration 
with the schools. Data are collected at different ages, e.g. age of 6 (1st grade), 12 (6th 
grade) and 15 (9th grade). The data include administrative data from the school infor-
mation systems, surveys among children and their parents, test results and teachers’ 
assessments. In this way information is acquired about students’ test scores, socio-
economic background, personality, social-emotional wellbeing, social and academic 
skills and school attitude. The data covers children from all tracks with the exception of 
those who are in special needs education. This combination of data collection at differ-
ent ages provides a unique dataset about the educational development of children in 
Limburg. Almost all schools in the region have participated in the data collection pro-
cess. Approximately 95 percent of all primary schools and 90 percent of all secondary 
schools have participated in the data collection process. The unique feature of the data 
used in this dissertation is that these children are followed over time as they progress 
from 6th to 9th grade.  
The data in the OML is collected in ongoing dialogue with teachers, school leaders 
and policy makers about school performance and development. As a part of the data 
collection effort, the researchers working with the data identified important education-
al challenges among which track switching, the influence of the test score and the 
teacher’s assessment on children’s outcomes and children’s motivation in relation to 
underperformance. They have expressed a need to know more about these topics in 
the context of their schools and the children attending their schools. These challenges 
are addressed in this dissertation from a scientific point of view, but clearly arise from 
the school practice.  
The OML is used at different levels: 
• feedback for school on their educational performance, in relation to other schools in 
the regions and schools with a similar student population 
• regional analyses on education and the identification of important challenges, such 
as language problems or early school dropout. 
• research (both academic and applied) on educational questions and dissemination 
of insights into the domains of academia, policy and educational practice.  
With the studies in this dissertation, a contribution is made on all three  of these do-
mains. Not only did the topics in this dissertation arise from school practice, the anal-
yses are, where possible, used in the school feedback. This school feedback allows 
school boards and schools to adjust their policies and to measure and evaluate the 
effects of educational policies and practices. For example, the predictive value of test 
scores and the teacher’s advice, and the switching rates in secondary education are also 
calculated at the school-levels and included in the digital reports that the schools re-
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ceive. As a result of this feedback, some schools identified the reduction in the switch-
ing between educational tracks as an important strategic goal for the upcoming years. 
Teachers with a research component in their job were appointed to analyse this in more 
detail. In a professional learning community these teachers joined forces with research-
ers of Maastricht University to analyse the data and interpret the findings. The results 
from this dissertation were an important input in this process.  
Second, the results of the dissertation are used to present some regional analyses 
on the transition from primary to secondary education. Figures are presented on the 
website78 and were presented at various occasions in the region. Children are free to 
choose their school in the Netherlands and secondary schools might use different rules 
and procedures with respect to the placement in the first year of secondary education. 
Each school has its own policy on accepting students based on the test score and the 
teacher’s recommendation, and possible additional instruments (e.g. iq test or person-
ality test). Some schools have a reputation of being strict, while others are perceived to 
be lenient towards students with lower scores and willing to ‘offer chances to all’. Re-
gional agreements can also be in place. It is therefore important to look at regional 
differences, also to understand regional mismatches in tertiary education or differences 
in unused potential of students.  
Third, the dissertation clearly contributions to the scientific research on important 
educational questions. It adds to the literature and understanding about how to meas-
ure the educational development of children. The different papers in this dissertation all 
contain information that is valuable for schools to know in their ongoing effort to im-
prove children’s educational outcomes such as allocating children to the most appropri-
ate track, switching between tracks and children’s motivation to perform well in school. 
Results are translated into scientific papers and presented at both academic and policy-
oriented conferences.  
Apart from the direct valorisation to school practice and policy arising from the data 
used, another important valorisation aspect stems from the field experiment. The mere 
topic of motivation and underperformance was the result of continued dialogue with 
teachers in secondary schools. Already at the set-up of the intervention, the coopera-
tion between teachers, school leaders and researchers was intensive. First, a pilot-
intervention was developed with two schools. This pilot proved to be very useful for the 
actual experiment. First, we learned that designing an experiment in cooperation with 
schools results in a better understanding of the experimental design by schools and 
creates more willingness for schools and teachers to participate in the experiment. In 
addition, when schools and teachers understand the benefit of an experiment they are 
better able to translate this to their students. Second, intensive communication with 
schools is crucial for the proper execution of the experiment. This has an effect both on 
                                                                
78 http://educatieveagendalimburg.nl/limburg-cijfers/cijferpagina/schooladvies-en-positie-de-derde-van-de-
middelbare-school 
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the logistic feasibility of the experiment but also on the accuracy of the effect meas-
urement. Finally, the pilot contributed to the creation of the tasks that are used in the 
experiment. Parts of the content as well as the language used in the tasks was adjusted 
based on the feedback we received. To ensure that the tasks were suitable for the tar-
get group they were adjusted by a secondary school student as part of a school assign-
ment. This student was in 11th grade in the pre-university track. 
18 schools participated in the actual intervention study. The intervention showed 
that it is not enough to have the support of the school boards if the teachers supporting 
the intervention on a daily basis do not have the time to execute it properly. This is 
important information for school leaders who strive to work in an evidence-based man-
ner. Reliance on intervention studies is important, but for successful interventions 
teachers need to be included in the process.   
After the intervention study, the assignments used in the interventions, were made 
freely available to all schools who participated in the intervention study (also control 
schools). Schools were free to use these assignments to try to improve motivation of 
children in their school. A number of schools have told us that they would like to use 
the materials as they believed the children in their school could benefit.  
Results of this dissertation 
These findings have implications for different parties. Concerning the choice of a sec-
ondary school both children and parents will benefit from a realistic assessment of 
children’s ability. Children (and parents) benefit from the test as an assessment meas-
ure as it gives an objective assessment of their ability level independent from their oth-
er characteristics. The results show that the teacher’s assessment is a better predictor 
of children’s ability. This is because other skills such as personality traits are also needed 
to perform well in secondary school. At the same time the results show that the teacher 
seems to weigh in children’s background characteristics when giving an assessment, 
such as children’s social-economic background. Even though the allocation of children 
to tracks based on the teacher’s assessment seems to be more efficient as it leads to a 
higher investment in human capital, there is also a trade-off with equal opportunities.  
These studies also give an insight into the assessment process as done by teachers. 
The teacher uses different information compared to the test (e.g. children’s classroom 
behaviour) but teachers also use similar information (e.g. children’s cognitive perfor-
mances) but the information is weighted in a different way in the teacher’s assessment, 
compared to the test. The finding that the teacher uses the information obtained from 
a test to adjust children’s  assessment heterogeneously across different groups is im-
portant for teachers to be aware of. The differences in adjustments can be the conse-
quence of a realistic assessment based on new information or stereotyping.  
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The studies also provide information about the selection and allocation process dur-
ing the transition from primary to secondary education. Schools gain insight into the 
potential consequences of their own policies and choices made at the beginning of 
children’s educational career. Schools for primary education gain insight into their ade-
quacy of assessing children’s ability level and schools for secondary education gain in-
sight into how their children switch between tracks during their school career compared 
to the teacher’s assessment and the initial track allocation. Society gains insight into the 
determinants that can result in a higher investment in human capital and the potential 
consequences for equal opportunities.  
The field experiment shows how difficult it is to target underperforming children 
with a school intervention. This study focused on children who in 9th grade perform at a 
lower level compared to their expected performance in 6th grade. These children could, 
arguably, benefit from interventions aimed at improving their motivation and perfor-
mance. However, as they are not motivated to perform well in school they are also less 
likely to successfully participate in these kind of policy interventions. This study shows 
the importance of school support for this type of research. Without specifically target-
ing these children and without support from teachers and school staff it is difficult for 
outside researchers to successfully perform interventions.   
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